Agadro

Vivo intentando hacer lo correcto, probablemente ese sea mi mayor error.

[Agadro @adro135]

@MarioNawfal This means that iranian airlines will no longer be able to fly to IST,DXB…?

[Agadro @adro135]

What a disappointing performance of the mecca agreement…

[Shehbaz Sharif @CMShehbaz]

I condemn in the strongest terms, the cowardly attack by Houthis targeting civilian and energy facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which have left many people injured.

Pakistan stands in unwavering solidarity with the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the brotherly people of Saudi Arabia.

Such dastardly attacks threaten innocent lives as well as regional peace and security. We reaffirm our steadfast support for the Kingdom’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and pray for the swift recovery of all those injured.

[Agadro @adro135]

@kantinu Agree 100%

[Agadro @adro135]

@FurboChampagnee Sin estrella del mundial?

[Agadro @adro135]

@Alihashem You were a realiable source of information for people living out of Iran! Congratulations for the work you habe done!

[Agadro @adro135]

@fresh_sadegh @stats_feed Could you please explain how can you be connected to internet living inside Iran?

[Agadro @adro135]

@jleonros Se sabe algo de la reapertura del espacio aereo?

[Agadro @adro135]

@websterkaroon And what do you think about reopening iran’s airspace?

[Agadro @adro135]

@dlacalle @Apu_elrojo Dos temas que omite de forma interesada el sr.Lacalle y que explica porque el Líbano, sí:
1.- El proyecto del gran Israel que apoyan de forma abierta varios ministros del gobierno israelí.
2.- Israel invadio en dos ocasiones el Líbano sin que Hezbollah existiera.

[Agadro @adro135]

It is incredible to see the people that is in charge of our destiny…

[Aaron Rupar @atrupar]

Hegseth: "The only ones who need to be worried right now are Iranians who think they're going to live"

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

Day 6 of Iran vs. U.S./Israel conflict (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹Gulf states appear to be reassessing their exposure. The Financial Times reports that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are considering reviewing or reducing some overseas investments (including in the U.S.) as war-related financial pressures mount.

🔹Late evening, Iran resumed missile attacks toward Israel while also launching missiles toward a U.S. base in Kuwait, with reports indicating damage to U.S. facilities.

🔹Trump’s explicit endorsement of Kurdish insurgent action against Tehran is being used by Iranian official to encourage a “rally around the flag” effect, reinforcing official narratives that the war is about partition and internal collapse, not just regime change.

🔹This framing is now echoed across political camps. The Iranian Reformist Front issued a statement warning about civil war/partition dynamics while simultaneously urging an end to the war and hinting that succession should open space for political change.

🔹Civil defense is becoming a visible problem. Tehran authorities say dozens of metro stations have been prepared as shelters, highlighting how limited Iran’s purpose-built civilian shelter infrastructure is amid expanding strikes on urban areas.

🔹Iranian military messaging is increasingly explicit about an attritional strategy. A senior army (Artesh) commander claimed U.S. interceptor stockpiles could be depleted within days, reinforcing the logic that Iran is targeting U.S./GCC defensive layers to reduce protection for Israel later.

🔹A new wave of Iranian strikes on Israel included apparent use of cluster munitions again, and footage showing missiles reaching targets rather “easily” has fueled speculation about interceptor depletion or degradation of defensive performance.

🔹The Houthis continue to signal readiness while remaining held in reserve. Abdelmalek al-Houthi framed support for Iran as part of a broader “ummah” struggle, implying they may be kept for a later escalation stage.

🔹Leadership politics remain unresolved. The interim leadership council held its fourth session, with Larijani presenting a war report and discussions continuing on how to prepare the Assembly of Experts for selecting the next Supreme Leader.

🔹Importantly, the interim council was reportedly granted expanded authorities, including appointing/dismissing senior military officials and declaring war/peace, suggesting the succession process may still be contested rather than imminent.

🔹Rumors about Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession persist, but the very need to expand interim authorities points to continued disagreement among power brokers, including within security and IRGC circles.

🔹Iran’s strikes against Kurdish insurgent positions in Iraqi Kurdistan continued, while Kurdish groups reportedly increased preparedness. The border/insurgent dimension is becoming one of the war’s most dangerous escalation pathways.

🔹Trump publicly said he would support a Kurdish insurgent offensive, escalating Tehran’s anxieties and prompting Pezeshkian to order provincial authorities and commanders to confront any “separatist” move forcefully.

🔹KRG leaders are visibly trying to avoid entrapment. Both Nechirvan and Massoud Barzani publicly emphasized Iraqi Kurdistan will not be part of escalation, reflecting fear of becoming a battlefield between Iran, U.S. forces, and insurgent groups.

🔹Iran’s Intelligence Ministry claims it conducted a “preemptive” joint operation with the IRGC to disrupt attempted infiltration by separatist groups – another indicator Tehran is treating this as a red line.

🔹Regional air-defense strain is increasingly acknowledged in Western reporting. CBS reports Gulf states are struggling with interceptor depletion and have asked the U.S. to accelerate resupply.

🔹In Iranian commentary, the operational center of gravity is increasingly attributed to a small set of senior commanders shaping a “no red lines” approach, suggesting Tehran may become more offensively inclined as the war stretches.

🔹Iranian official figures claim ~500 missiles and 2,000 drones launched since the war began, with a stated majority directed at U.S. targets rather than Israel, reinforcing the argument that Washington is Tehran’s primary priority in this phase.

🔹Iran continues to pressure early warning networks. Reports claim additional THAAD-associated radar systems were targeted, including a reported strike in Jordan, expanding Iran’s attempt to blind the regional defensive architecture.

🔹Lebanon is trying to contain spillover: the Lebanese government imposed visa requirements for Iranian citizens, likely aimed at limiting movement of Iranian personnel linked to Hezbollah.

🔹Energy warfare continues to broaden. There are estimates that prolonged Hormuz closure could halt Iraqi exports within days and severely disrupt Kuwaiti exports soon after – exactly the pressure Iran appears to be banking on.

🔹Saudi Arabia is reportedly increasing exports via Red Sea routes, but the Houthi factor remains the key variable. If Iran seeks a comprehensive blockade effect, Red Sea routes may not remain insulated.

🔹Satellite imagery reportedly shows substantial damage at Bandar Abbas naval facilities, including fires and damage to major platforms, suggesting continued U.S./Israeli focus on degrading Iran’s maritime capacity underpinning Hormuz pressure.

🔹Human displacement is accelerating. UNHCR reports roughly 100,000 people have left Tehran since the start of the war.

🔹Iran claims first use of Khorramshahr-4 hypersonic missiles with a 1,000 kg warhead, a qualitative escalation even as overall launch tempo appears lower.

🔹The drone challenge is now openly acknowledged. Reports indicate U.S. officials admitted Iranian suicide drones are difficult to fully intercept, pushing the U.S. and Gulf states toward negotiations over Ukrainian-made counter-drone interceptors.

🔹Mediation signals are multiplying (China/Oman/Russia), but there’s little sign of traction.

🔹China increases diplomatic activities. Beijing says it is mediating, while reports suggest it is adjusting refinery export amid supply uncertainty, showing that energy escalation pressures China as well as the U.S.

🔹After a missile was intercepted over Turkey in a recent episode, and after drone attacks in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan, Iranian armed forces joint chief of staff issued unusually direct denials stressing respect for Turkish and Azerbaijani sovereignty. The need for high-level military denials signals how seriously Tehran views the risk of accidental spillover with Turkey and with Azerbaijan.

🔹The core concern is command-and-control. If parts of Iran’s launch and drone activity are being executed under decentralized wartime conditions, the probability of uncoordinated strikes or navigation errors increases, creating pathways to unintended escalation.

🔹Overall, Iran is still trying to expand costs across U.S. regional infrastructure and energy flows while managing internal fragility and border threats. The U.S./Israel side is apparently preparing for a longer campaign rather than a quick decisive outcome.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

A Day 3 recap of the war (with focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹CENTCOM confirms that U.S. strikes on Iranian missile bases used B-1 bombers. The U.S. is trying to dismantle Iran’s fortified underground missile facilities.

🔹Iranian reports suggest Tehran has rejected multiple mediation attempts. Tehran’s apparent assessment is that it can sustain high-intensity conflict for 60-90 days, making early ceasefire acceptance strategically disadvantageous.

🔹Ali Larijani explicitly framed the war as a contest of endurance, stating Iran – unlike the United States – is prepared for a prolonged conflict. The objective appears to be altering Washington’s cost-benefit calculations over time.

🔹Iranian strategic discourse increasingly describes the conflict as a “war without rules” or a “game without red lines,” signaling deliberate unpredictability intended to reshape deterrence dynamics after leadership decapitation failed to halt Iran’s response.

🔹A related concept emerging in Iranian messaging is operating “one level above” adversary actions, i.e., delivering escalatory responses even to indirect threats in order to redefine escalation thresholds.

🔹This logic appears reflected in Iranian strikes toward British facilities in Cyprus, interpreted domestically as retaliation for London allowing U.S. access to Diego Garcia despite not joining offensive operations.

🔹One of the most consequential developments was the loss of three U.S. F-15 aircraft, initially claimed by Iran as shootdowns but later attributed to friendly fire from Kuwaiti air defenses, highlighting the growing risks of coalition battlefield congestion.

🔹Analysts close to Iranian security circles describe a layered missile strategy: first targeting radar systems, then launching low-cost drones and missiles to exhaust air-defense interceptors before deploying advanced weapons later.

🔹Iran’s continuous missile launches therefore appear designed less for immediate damage and more for attritional depletion of U.S. and Israeli defensive systems over time.

🔹Uncertainty over the size and dispersal of Iran’s advanced missile stockpiles may explain intensified U.S. and Israeli strikes against underground facilities and missile infrastructure.

🔹President Pezeshkian expanded emergency authorities across ministries and provincial administrations to ensure continuity of governance, deepening wartime decentralization already initiated before the conflict.

🔹Israel’s targeting pattern has become clearer: strikes now heavily focus on intelligence ministries, police headquarters, IRGC district bases, and internal security institutions, suggesting systematic erosion of regime coercive capacity.

🔹Parallel strikes against western border regions and Kurdistan province have fueled Iranian fears that external actors may seek to enable insurgent infiltration as an alternative to direct ground invasion.

🔹Iran has responded by striking areas in Iraqi Kurdistan while increasing pressure along its borders, indicating concern about a potential indirect ground dimension to the war.

🔹Iran-aligned Iraqi resistance factions – including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada – continue their operations on a limited scale, opening another attritional front against U.S. forces.

🔹Hezbollah formally confirmed its participation, firing rockets toward Haifa, though involvement remains limited due to degraded capabilities and domestic political constraints in Lebanon.

🔹Iranian sources claim prewar coordination between the Quds Force and regional partners defined phased entry into the conflict, suggesting activation of the “axis of resistance” is proceeding gradually rather than simultaneously.

🔹The IRGC has reportedly begun enforcing a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, warning commercial vessels against transit and threatening missile strikes. This is a major escalation targeting global energy flows.

🔹Simultaneous attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, including an Aramco facility near Ras Tanura and gas infrastructure in Qatar, indicate an effort to raise global energy prices and increase economic pressure on Washington.

🔹Iranian authorities signaled zero tolerance for dissent. IRGC intelligence warned that actions undermining stability during wartime would be treated as collaboration with the enemy, implying harsh internal repression.

🔹Negotiation signals remain contradictory. While Trump suggested a potential deal was possible, Larijani publicly rejected negotiations, reinforcing Tehran’s view that talks can occur only after strategic calculations shift.

🔹Iran’s sustained missile tempo against Israel appears designed to impose psychological as well as military pressure, keeping populations under prolonged shelter conditions while conserving firepower for a longer conflict.

🔹Overall, Day 3 shows the war evolving into simultaneous military, economic, psychological, and regional escalation far beyond bilateral confrontation.

🔹The key question now is whether expanding proxy involvement and energy warfare will force external powers into deeper participation or instead accelerate pressure for negotiated containment.

---
P.S: Not sure how long I can keep doing this!

[Babak Vahdad @BabakVahdad]

If reports about Khamenei’s death were to be confirmed, the issue would not be limited to a political succession in Teheran. It would open a far deeper question about the future of the doctrine of Velayat-e faqih itself, the theological-legal architecture first systematized by Khomeini, drawing on historical figures like al-Karaki, al-Majlisi and al-Araki, breaking with Najaf’s historic quietist tradition.
- Since 1979, that doctrine was not just theory but state structure. Khomeini embodied both supreme political authority and supreme religious authority. Khamenei inherited that role under very different clerical credentials, yet over time consolidated his standing and gained recognition as a marjaʿ among parts of the Shia world, including in Iraq and Pakistan (with the highest number of Shias after Iran, my colleague Neccia has published recently a book on this).
His authority therefore extended beyond Iran’s borders into a broader transnational Shia constituency.
- His passing, if confirmed, would come at an exceptionally sensitive moment. Najaf itself is quietly navigating the future beyond Grand Ayatollah Sistani, with figures such as Bashir al-Najafi and Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad often mentioned in discussions after the death of Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim. Teheran has long sought to promote a religious leadership aligned with its vision of Shia political identity under the Velayat-e faqih. If Khamenei’s death were to coincide with a structural shift inside Iran, or even the end of the Islamic Republic as currently constituted, that entire projection strategy would be fundamentally weakened.
- There is also a more profound doctrinal implication. If succession inside Iran were to tilt toward a more overtly military or security-based leadership model, the religious centrality of the faqih could erode. In that case, the quietist current, historically dominant in Najaf and present, though often subdued, in Qom, might gradually reassert itself, not only in Iraq but potentially inside Iran’s own seminaries.
- The key unknown is how Shias communities across the region, many of whom regarded Khamenei as both political guide and religious reference, would recalibrate. This is not simply about who replaces one leader. It is about whether the Khomeinist synthesis of theology and state power survives him, or whether we are witnessing the possible closing chapter of a model that has shaped regional Shia politics since 1979.
#Iran

[Agadro @adro135]

@grok @lemooreaces @khamenei_ir Grok would have said the same thing about Vietnam…

[Agadro @adro135]

@amanpour Where can it be watched?

[Agadro @adro135]

@HichkasOfficial @chrismartenson

[Agadro @adro135]

@Ole_S_Hansen How will it affect ECB interest rates?

[Agadro @adro135]

@drafteados Para Antoni y extensible a Sergio, como se gestiona la relación con los vecinos cuando traes un recien nacido a casa que llora de forma habitual? Avisas antes?

[Agadro @adro135]

@sharghzadeh How much is an amtrak ticket from NYC to Phila?

[Agadro @adro135]

Wemby MVP, easy bet!