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11 days ago

What we have been expecting for several months is now starting to unfold in front of us, albeit more slowly than we initially thought. John Ratcliffe’s lightning visit to Moscow was not some routine diplomatic stop. It strongly echoes William Burns’ trip to Moscow in November 2021, when he was still CIA director. Back then, the Americans knew what Russia was preparing in Ukraine and were still trying to deter it. Three months later, the invasion began. The parallel is hard to ignore. Ratcliffe arrived on Tuesday, August 25 aboard a C-17, via Riga. That is an unusual and visible enough way to travel that it is difficult to pass the trip off as routine. The Kremlin eventually confirmed “contacts between intelligence services,” said Ratcliffe had not met Putin, and described the talks as “positive.” Trump called the visit “semi-routine.” That sounds more like an attempt to play the whole thing down. You do not send the CIA director to Moscow under those circumstances to discuss minor issues. The previous few weeks make the picture more interesting. Hybrid activity across Europe has been increasing. Between August 18 and 20, NATO sharply stepped up intelligence missions around Kaliningrad, including several anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Whatever they saw does not seem to have reassured Washington. Ratcliffe’s message can probably be summed up in fairly simple terms: we see what you’re doing. Don’t do anything stupid. The versions that later appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Politico and CBS described a US warning about the risk of a limited Russian attack on NATO “in the coming years”: cyber, hybrid action, perhaps even a ground incursion into the Baltic states. This is where the official story becomes difficult to believe. You do not put together this kind of urgent trip, with Ratcliffe flying into Moscow on a C-17, to discuss something that might happen three or five years from now. Especially not while Ukraine is reportedly being asked to ease off strikes on Moscow and northern Russia. The relevant timeframe looks much more like weeks or months. Public statements also have to be taken with caution. We saw the same thing in 2022. As late as February 22, Zelensky was still publicly playing down the likelihood of a full-scale invasion. Two days later, it happened. In the same way, the fact that Russian forces do not currently look perfectly ready does not rule out a move. The Russians do not always look ready. That does not mean they will wait until everything is perfectly in place. That is also what makes the 2021 precedent uncomfortable. Burns was sent to Moscow to deliver a direct American warning then too. It did not prevent the war. These visits are mainly about making sure the message reaches the highest level and that nobody can later claim they misunderstood it: we know what you are preparing, and this is our red line. But that has never automatically stopped a player who has already decided that moving is worth the risk. Ratcliffe’s visit therefore looks much less like a sign of de-escalation than a US response to what Moscow may see as a window of opportunity: Western stockpiles already under strain from Ukraine and other theatres, strategic fatigue, and the possibility of testing NATO cohesion with a limited move. The American message seems clear enough. Recent history tells us much less about what Moscow will choose to do with it. Buckle up.

anacyclis's tweet photo. What we have been expecting for several months is now starting to unfold in front of us, albeit more slowly than we initially thought.

John Ratcliffe’s lightning visit to Moscow was not some routine diplomatic stop. It strongly echoes William Burns’ trip to Moscow in November 2021, when he was still CIA director. Back then, the Americans knew what Russia was preparing in Ukraine and were still trying to deter it. Three months later, the invasion began. The parallel is hard to ignore.

Ratcliffe arrived on Tuesday, August 25 aboard a C-17, via Riga. That is an unusual and visible enough way to travel that it is difficult to pass the trip off as routine. The Kremlin eventually confirmed “contacts between intelligence services,” said Ratcliffe had not met Putin, and described the talks as “positive.” Trump called the visit “semi-routine.” That sounds more like an attempt to play the whole thing down. You do not send the CIA director to Moscow under those circumstances to discuss minor issues.

The previous few weeks make the picture more interesting. Hybrid activity across Europe has been increasing. Between August 18 and 20, NATO sharply stepped up intelligence missions around Kaliningrad, including several anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Whatever they saw does not seem to have reassured Washington. Ratcliffe’s message can probably be summed up in fairly simple terms: we see what you’re doing. Don’t do anything stupid.

The versions that later appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Politico and CBS described a US warning about the risk of a limited Russian attack on NATO “in the coming years”: cyber, hybrid action, perhaps even a ground incursion into the Baltic states. This is where the official story becomes difficult to believe. You do not put together this kind of urgent trip, with Ratcliffe flying into Moscow on a C-17, to discuss something that might happen three or five years from now. Especially not while Ukraine is reportedly being asked to ease off strikes on Moscow and northern Russia. The relevant timeframe looks much more like weeks or months.

Public statements also have to be taken with caution. We saw the same thing in 2022. As late as February 22, Zelensky was still publicly playing down the likelihood of a full-scale invasion. Two days later, it happened. In the same way, the fact that Russian forces do not currently look perfectly ready does not rule out a move. The Russians do not always look ready. That does not mean they will wait until everything is perfectly in place.

That is also what makes the 2021 precedent uncomfortable. Burns was sent to Moscow to deliver a direct American warning then too. It did not prevent the war. These visits are mainly about making sure the message reaches the highest level and that nobody can later claim they misunderstood it: we know what you are preparing, and this is our red line. But that has never automatically stopped a player who has already decided that moving is worth the risk.

Ratcliffe’s visit therefore looks much less like a sign of de-escalation than a US response to what Moscow may see as a window of opportunity: Western stockpiles already under strain from Ukraine and other theatres, strategic fatigue, and the possibility of testing NATO cohesion with a limited move.

The American message seems clear enough. Recent history tells us much less about what Moscow will choose to do with it.

Buckle up.

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