Andrew Laing

Director & Founder of Artificial Fiscal Intelligence. Following the money to curb #corruption, increase #efficiency and support effective #political manoeuvres.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Good progress by the EU in qualifying consent.

When rape law is built around a narrow, binary notion of consent, rather than a fuller standard such as freely chosen, fully informed, and non‑coerced sexual participation, it leaves significant gaps. A consent‑only model can struggle to account for pressure, inducement, deception, or compromised capacity — all of which shape real‑world cases.

These weaknesses become even more visible in engineered or “honey‑trap” scenarios, where interactions are deliberately manipulated or staged. In such cases, a simplistic consent test may be too blunt: it can fail to capture coercive dynamics, yet it can also be misused because the law does not require a deeper examination of intent, inducement, duress and capacity.

A further emerging problem is the manipulation through social media. Minors, for example, can be coached, pressured, or incentivised online in ways that blur agency and distort their understanding of what they are being drawn into. A legal framework that relies solely on a binary consent test is poorly equipped to handle situations where an apparent agreement or offer is shaped by digital grooming, algorithmic exposure, or orchestrated online manipulation.

At a deeper level, sex is not just a momentary act; it carries long‑term consequences that can last generations. Across societies, stable parental investment by biological mothers and fathers is apparently one of the strongest predictors of child wellbeing. That is why institutions like monogamy, marriage, and long‑term partnership may have emerged: they can create a durable framework for raising children and sustaining human life. Under this view, the real significance of sexual relations is not merely consenting to an encounter, but consenting to the lifelong commitments and responsibilities that may follow. A legal model that treats sex as a trivial, isolated act risks missing this structural reality of life.

Taken together, these issues show why a consent‑only definition risks both under‑protection and over‑reach. A more robust standard being pursued by the EU— one that explicitly addresses coercion, inducement, deception, power asymmetry, and the long‑term social stakes of sexual relations — would better reflect the realities of modern exploitation and the responsibilities that sex inherently carries.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@elonmusk We’ll also need universal counselling for all the depression from not being productive or useful.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Europe’s Energy Priorities — Cost First, Clean is Only 2nd When the Playing Field Is Level

Europe needs the cheapest energy system possible to stay competitive.
Clean energy matters — but it is a distant second until the world’s biggest emitter agrees to real, enforceable constraints.

1. Cheap energy must be overwhelmingly Priority No. 1
Europe cannot compete when its electricity prices are 4–5× higher than China’s.

High energy prices hollow out industry, push manufacturing offshore, and make climate policy politically toxic.

2. Clean energy is Priority No. 2 — but a distant second
Europe must not unilaterally impose high-cost decarbonisation on itself while China runs its economy on cheap dirty coal and undercuts Western industry.

Clean only becomes a close second after China accepts:
• a level playing field on emissions,
• independent monitoring,
• binding enforcement, and
• real sanctions for non-compliance.

Without that, Europe is at best handicapping itself, or at worst, killing the golden goose.

3. Why modern nuclear remains part of the backbone
Nuclear is not cheap — but it is:
• cleaner than coal,
• cleaner than gas on lifecycle emissions,
• fully reliable, providing 24/7 firm power.

In a system where reliability is non-negotiable, nuclear anchors the clean side of the mix. If you have the capability, it’s a no brainier. Ursula is right here.

4. Why solar is essential — but not a full solution
Solar is ultra‑cheap when the sun shines — often the lowest-cost electricity in Europe.
But once you add:
• batteries,
• seasonal storage,
• grid balancing,

the system cost rises sharply. Storage is still expensive, and intermittency drives up total system costs.

But buying Chinese renewables infrastructure should be a red line as it hands over massive economies of scale benefits to China allowing renewables independence for them and dependency for Europe (80% of Chinese solar panels are exported). Energy security matters here too: Build it competitively it in Europe or forget it.

5. Coal and gas remain cheap, dispatchable anchors for the system
• Coal: ultra cheap but very dirty.
• Gas: cheap, flexible, cleaner than coal, but still emits CO₂ and depends on imports.

Europe uses them because they are very cheap and ultra reliable, not because they are clean.

6. The real system mix today
Europe ends up with a pragmatic combination:
• Solar and maybe wind for the cheapest energy when available
• Coal and gas for cheap, dispatchable backup
• Nuclear for clean, firm reliability
• Expensive storage and grids to integrate everything and make things work.

The point is simple: Europe cannot afford to be five times more expensive than China on energy while pretending the playing field is fair. It’s not.

Cheap energy remains priority no 1. Everything falls apart without it.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@BlueHoo4 @rtenews It’s what they use in court.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@NMFCOfficial Awesome!

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@danobrien20 Agreed. Looks like a good policy for all concerned. Up to certain point the cost is only a rounding error for the US. Let's see if it's a good bet.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@WankerEvan @rtenews No, because it's much more than that.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@mackintalkin @rtenews Yes, indeed, that's the: "he holds the keys to his own cell argument". It's valid, but there's a counter public interest argument also.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Ireland has the highest electricity prices in the EU and 2nd highest in the world … for many years.

The worry that they’re going up further is not the big issue. Cheap energy policy is embraced by China.

Ireland’s electricity prices are more than 5 times that of China.

If cheap energy policy is good enough for China it’s should be good enough for Europe.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@JournoStephen Article 51, as currently interpreted, incentivises terrorist state behaviour. It needs a fundamental reinterpretation — or better yet, a full update — to reflect the realities of modern conflict that the Article itself helped create.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@griptmedia Ireland already has the highest price for electricity in Europe and 2nd highest in the world.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

What proxy war has the UN ever actually resolved?

The record is bleak. The UN system was built for overt interstate aggression, not the deniable, militia‑driven, hybrid conflicts that define modern geopolitics. Every major proxy conflict—from Korea to Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine—has unfolded either outside UN control or in spite of it. Peacekeeping has occasionally frozen conflicts, but it has never solved a proxy war in the sense of stopping the sponsor state’s behaviour or restoring durable collective security.

The deeper problem is structural.
Article 51 was drafted for a world where “armed attack” meant tanks crossing borders. Modern conflict is engineered precisely to avoid that threshold. States now outsource violence to militias, drones, cyber units, and deniable proxies because the Charter’s definitions incentivise it. If you can keep each individual strike below the level of a “discrete armed attack,” you can bleed an adversary indefinitely while staying inside the legal grey zone.

That’s why Article 51 now needs reinterpretation—or outright revision.
The Charter’s self‑defence regime is misaligned with contemporary conflict. It neither deters proxy warfare nor protects states subjected to continuous low‑level attacks. In fact, the loopholes have become a strategic asset for states that weaponise ambiguity. The result is a collective‑security system that punishes overt action while rewarding deniable aggression.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Yes, in a stable geopolitical environment, comparative analysis 101 says it’s certainly the right thing to do and it’s in everyone’s interest to do so. It’s an economic no brainier.

But Adam Smith after making this very point gives a big caveat: “The wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade.” Wealth of Nations, Book IV ch 3

So what Smith argues is that nations should trade freely with their neighbours, except in the one case where dependence would endanger their security. When war is possible, or defence is at stake, a country is justified in protecting the industries it cannot afford to lose. Energy infrastructure might well be one of those industries. And nations shouldn’t wait to act when war is imminent because then it’s too late - dependency has already been created and industrial capability is already lost.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Yes, but coal is still massive, as it’s the one that still delivers reliable capacity for them.

Solar and wind is indeed lower cost when it runs, but only because the West pays for the economies of scale China enjoys.

China produces more solar and wind infrastructure than the rest of the world combined. 80% of its production is exported. China gets cheap renewable energy independence heavily subsidised by the West, while the West gets renewable energy infrastructure dependency in return. Not such a great deal in difficult geopolitical times.

The question is can the West produce renewable energy infrastructure at the same price point?

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Here are the two arguments that are used to justify such action.

1. The doctrinal argument states that accumulated armed attacks can trigger Article 51 on self‑defence, with imminence being “inferred” from a pattern of behaviour. Without this interpretation it leaves all states exposed to exactly the kind of long‑term proxy harassment Iran specialises in.

2. The structural argument is that the UN system is incapable of addressing proxy‑based state aggression especially with security council veto power, so self‑defence must adapt or states lose the ability to defend themselves.

The UN needs to adapt to proxy warfare or it will continue to fail to meet its founding purpose to prevent interstate war and provide collective security.

The uncomfortable truth: the UN system was built for a world that no longer exists.

The Charter assumes:
• wars are between states
• aggression is overt
• attribution is clear
• great powers cooperate
• the Security Council can act

None of these assumptions hold today.

Modern conflict is often:
• proxy‑based
• deniable
• hybrid
• cyber‑enabled
• long‑term and low‑intensity
• often conducted by states through non‑state actors

The Charter simply wasn’t designed for this. Moreover, modern conflict is arguably a direct result of the Charter, by incentivising “terrorist-type state behaviour”, flying just below the radar that triggers Article 51.

The UN is clearly powerless against “terrorist‑type state behaviour”. States like Iran also use:
• militias
• armed groups
• cyber units
• deniable attacks
• long‑term harassment

Each individual attack is too small to trigger collective action. But the aggregate is strategically decisive.

The UN Charter as it is currently structured and interpreted has no mechanism to address this.

The UN still matters enormously — but no longer for the reason it was founded. Will the UN adapt or will they stick to the old failed paradigms?

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

Here are the two arguments that are used to justify such action.

1. The doctrinal argument states that accumulated armed attacks can trigger Article 51 on self‑defence, with imminence being “inferred” from a pattern of behaviour. Without this interpretation leaves all states exposed to exactly the kind of long‑term proxy harassment Iran specialises in.

2. The structural argument is that the UN system is incapable of addressing proxy‑based state aggression especially with security council veto power, so self‑defence must adapt or states lose the ability to defend themselves.

The UN needs to adapt to proxy warfare or it will continue to fail to meet its founding purpose to prevent interstate war and provide collective security.

The uncomfortable truth: the UN system was built for a world that no longer exists.

The Charter assumes:
• wars are between states
• aggression is overt
• attribution is clear
• great powers cooperate
• the Security Council can act

None of these assumptions hold today.

Modern conflict is often:
• proxy‑based
• deniable
• hybrid
• cyber‑enabled
• long‑term and low‑intensity
• often conducted by states through non‑state actors

The Charter simply wasn’t designed for this. Moreover, modern conflict is arguably a direct result of Charter, by incentivising “terrorist-type state behaviour”, flying just below the radar that triggers Article 51.

The UN is clearly powerless against “terrorist‑type state behaviour”. States like Iran also use:
• militias
• armed groups
• cyber units
• deniable attacks
• long‑term harassment

Each individual attack is too small to trigger collective action. But the aggregate is strategically decisive.

The UN Charter as it is currently structured and interpreted has no mechanism to address this.

The UN still matters enormously — but no longer for the reason it was founded. Will the UN adapt or will they stick to the old failed paradigms?

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@RevengeSam92447 @elonmusk It’s the opposite. Get more efficient all energy production including renewables, just like China. It’ll be difficult, but not necessarily impossible.

[Andrew Laing @andrewmarklaing]

@SharifWen41097 @elonmusk For EVs not energy.