Very pleased to contribute to my first PLA Watch along with @LyleJMorris and @leontw99. In this 27th edition, we investigate the ever-increasing Chinese operational reach - reaching the African continent - and international military diplomacy.
This issue of @AsiaPolicy’s PLA Watch highlights a PLA undergoing major leadership upheaval while expanding its operational reach and international engagement. Here are the highlights:
-The Fifth Plenum formalized the expulsion of 16 senior military officers and elevated Zhang Shengmin to the Politburo, leaving him its only serving PLA general. The issue argues that Xi continues to prioritize loyalty and discipline, even as the loss of experienced commanders raises questions about readiness ahead of the 2027 modernization milestone.
-On October 29, the PRC Defense Ministry of National Defense announced the restructuring of several military educational institutions,including the establishment and reorganization of colleges specializing in unmanned and intelligent engineering, operational support, and military discipline and legal affairs. The two principal institutions explicitly identified were the PLA Army Engineering University and the PLA National Defense University. Other military universities were also reportedly affected.
-The Liaoning’s apparent circuit around the Philippines, alongside widespread surface-ship deployments, demonstrated alternative routes into the Philippine Sea. These activities extended well beyond Taiwan, making direct comparisons with the Taiwan-centered Justice Mission 2025 exercise problematic.
-PLAN replenishment ships crossed the First Island Chain separately under destroyer escort, suggesting experimentation with a more flexible support model. Whether they directly supported Liaoning remains unconfirmed, but the pattern could have significant implications for sustained operations east of Taiwan.
-A mixed PLAN–China Coast Guard formation transited into the Western Pacific, indicating closer coordination beyond the First Island Chain. More broadly, large deployments described as “routine training” could complicate assessments of Chinese intentions and reduce warning time before a crisis.
-PLA engagements with European counterparts, Russia, ASEAN, and African officers continued despite internal turmoil. A record 378-day Gulf of Aden deployment and a hospital-ship mission to Ghana illustrated growing endurance and Beijing’s use of military missions to build diplomatic influence.
Special thanks to @angelo_mlh and @leontw99 for their contributions.
https://t.co/jPciWod3ex
Interested in contributing to @AsiaPolicy's Center for China Analysis' work on the PLA, cross-Straits and Chinese foreign policy? If so, come work for me!
I am hiring an intern for the Winter/Spring in Washington, DC. Fluency in Mandarin a must.
https://t.co/GL0lGfdYqQ
New episode 🎙️
How can Europe and ASEAN navigate an increasingly complex AI landscape?
Dr Louise Marie Hurel of @RUSI_org joins Zsuzsa and Richard to explore the geopolitics of tech.
In cooperation | @EPinASEAN
iTunes https://t.co/V2yiI9ycTO
Spotify https://t.co/2WUFt0Vp2t
@AsiaPolicy and CCA's Taiwan Policy Database just finished a major update, with new speeches, legislative bills, and activities from all three sides. Check it out!
https://t.co/atz3d6nU30
Special thanks to Angelo M'BA for his research assistance!
As part of my role at @AsiaPolicy, I am co-curating the rich Taiwan Policy Database (TPD) that we host.
I highly recommend this fantastic resource to help track developments in and narratives surrounding US-China-Taiwan relations since the 1940s.
Link: https://t.co/92LUhyoO8C
Monthly Update on PLA Air and Maritime Maneuvers Around Taiwan
(1) Overall Trend: In September 2026, PLA aircraft conducted only 181 sorties crossing the median line, with 255 total sorties detected around Taiwan. Both figures remained well below the levels recorded in the same month in recent years, continuing the trend of the past several months. By contrast, PLAN vessel activity was broadly comparable to recent September levels. PRC official ship detections remained elevated, totaling 114 in September 2026, compared with 45 in September 2025.
(2) Joint Combat Readiness Patrols: PLA conducted four Joint Combat Readiness Patrols in September 2026, compared with three in September 2024 and three in September 2025. From January through September, however, PLA conducted only 27 patrols in 2026, compared with 32 in 2024 and 31 in 2025.
(3) Key Observation: While PLA air activity remained well below recent-year levels, PLAN vessel activity and the frequency of Joint Combat Readiness Patrols showed no comparable decline. Since June, the combined number of PLAN and PRC official ships exceeded ten on at least 19 days each month. Monthly PRC official ship detections totaled 100 in June, 116 in July, 160 in August, and 114 in September. This suggests that their operational tempo has generally stabilized at just over 100 vessel detections per month, rather than continuing to rise steadily.
Worth watching the entire interview with Singapore Foreign Minister @VivianBala, covering AI, its risks and opportunities, and Chinese industrial strategy: https://t.co/do89qMRj8j
"Beijing’s understanding of FOIP and the 2016 award as efforts to throttle China’s rise through security measures and alliances overlooked evolving frameworks that now include norm-setting and economic development, among other dimensions" https://t.co/hGwprNIcS9 | by @angelo_mlh
The Navigator — latest issue out now!
This month:
• Heatwaves, energy shocks and supply-chain strain drive Indo-Pacific hedging
• Europe shifts toward “strategic self-containment” on China
Stay ahead with our regional roundup.
Read: https://t.co/tUl5EPdk84
"Perhaps counter-intuitively, only an approach less concerned with morals and more with pragmatic engagement can pave the way for the EU to spread its values in the Indo-Pacific" https://t.co/Afh2pj0PYd | by @angelo_mlh
"Perhaps counter-intuitively, only an approach less concerned with morals and more with pragmatic engagement can pave the way for the EU to spread its values in the Indo-Pacific" https://t.co/Afh2pj0PYd | by @angelo_mlh
China is as full of political junkies as the United States
Naturally some of the best analysis of Chinese politics is in Chinese—and here on X!
Happy to publish this @shuizaiping2 guide to 10 must-follow X accounts for "China Watching in Chinese"
🗂️Alphabetical order🧵
As the U.S.-China competition intensifies, I write for @PacificForum that such pressure compels ASEAN actors to diversify their "partnership portfolio" in an effort to reduce dependencies and safeguard their agency and interests.
Read more:
https://t.co/CTiXTJv6Bn
For @Diplomat_APAC, my colleague @_iamdouglas and I argue that recent analyses affirming that Trump's policies will prompt European nations to align more closely with China - or even form an alliance - are misguided.
Read more at:
Trump’s recent measures have cemented a split between Washington and Brussels, but that won’t automatically translate into gains for Beijing. https://t.co/nkni7bXEkJ
Panel Discussion: Generative AI Regulations: Bridging the Gap Between China and the EU 🤖🌍
📅 Friday, March 21, 2025 | ⏰ 15:00 CET
Join us to discuss the future of generative AI regulation with expert speakers Sara Migliorini and Giorgos Verdi.
https://t.co/zxgRqswq0r