@adorientem@RealisticNilist @Dr_M_Robillard It follows that on this view, an agent can be mistaken about the meaning of his own concepts. Now if he can be mistaken about this, how can those concepts compose the contents of the intentional states that rationalize actions, dumbass?
@adorientem@RealisticNilist @Dr_M_Robillard You’re such a stupid bigot that you don’t understand that on non-Fregean semantic externalism, meanings are not mediated by the agent’s beliefs—that is what it is for meaning to exhaustively consist in denotation.
@adorientem@RealisticNilist @Dr_M_Robillard Now that you’ve been corrected, we’ll soon see if you’re honest enough to admit your mistake. It’s also noteworthy that you’re not calling Robillard out for his inveterate dodging.
@adorientem@RealisticNilist @Dr_M_Robillard If meanings of concepts can’t be opaque to their possessors, this means that speakers can’t be mistaken about what their terms mean, dumbass.