@qualiascript I had a lecturer who used (a,b) to mean tuples, inner product, gcd, with sometimes all the meanings being used simultaneously on the same board. Luckily, we didn't need to talk about ideals or open intervals.
@analytichegel What do you find interesting about this? I feel like philosophically it is (1) a recapitulation of the trite "truth as intersubjective validity" idea, (2) in many ways a regress into a naive pre-Tarskian position of e.g. Carnap's Untersuchungen zur allg. Axiomatik.
@Leon_Luca02 3. "Reine Form der Sinnlichkeit" ist genau dasselbe wie "reine Anschauung", siehe A20/B35: "Diese reine Form der Sinnlichkeit wird auch selber reine Anschauung heißen".
@Leon_Luca02 1. "Begriff" wird hier umgangssprachlich verwendet und bezieht sich auf die Überschriften der Abschnitte in der Transzendentalen Ästhetik. 2. "Erkenntnis" ist in B377/A320 definiert: "eine objektive Perzeption ist Erkenntnis. Diese ist entiweder Anschauung oder Begriff".
@NiaFrome@Mirs_____ The question whether falsification is a plausible demarcation criterion for science is independent of whether something (e.g. "marxist LTV") is "empirically testable".
@musicalcolin@schlegelol This is not what "foundationalism" usually means. It is a much more specific view on the structure of justification, which the positions you outlined do not necessarily entail.
@Fionnindy 1. In standard analytic-philosophy usage, belief is usually one kind of propositional attitude, not the other way around. 2. That propositions are objects of propositional attitudes is true definitionally, but they are not unquestionably treated as objects of mental acts.