Just minted Base Chain Bootleg Graphic on @basepaint_xyz! Join hundreds of pixel artists creating onchain art. Limited 24h mint window - don't miss out! 🎨 https://t.co/yW4x26Hyw0
@QMSNetwork#QMS0902
QMS stands out because mining is useful work, not wasted hashing. Miners solve real optimization problems that enterprises pay for, so the same computation both secures the chain and earns a second revenue stream.
It is post-quantum from day one in consensus and finality, yet it does not need quantum hardware to launch. Classical machines can run it now; quantum machines can join later with no protocol change and earn more when they find better solutions.
Add EVM-compatible execution plus a parallel post-quantum finality layer that does not slow block production, and you get a chain that is developer-friendly today, hard to 51% early on, and ready to become a marketplace for quantum compute tomorrow.
Keeping crypto safe from future quantum attacks can mean handling much more data. That can affect how quickly networks run and what transactions cost.
Two updates from the past week show what that looks like.
1️⃣ On September 10, Cloudflare announced support for checking quantum-resistant signatures in 1.1.1.1, its service that looks up website addresses. These signatures help confirm you’re getting an authentic answer.
Each signature of the new type takes 2,420 bytes, compared with 64 for a common existing type. That’s almost 38 times larger. In Cloudflare’s example, the answer exceeds the query’s initial message size limit, so the query tool retries using another way to receive it.
2️⃣ Ethereum researchers are working on a similar issue for transactions. On September 9, draft EIP-8288 was added to Ethereum’s proposal collection. It would let a block carry one proof covering many signatures and other proofs instead of including each of those bulky items separately. It aims to reduce the extra data and cost, but it’s still a proposal.
For anyone using crypto, the concern is straightforward: stronger security needs to work without making everyday transactions too expensive or slowing the network down.
The ECDSA(.)fail paper just went public.
In March, Google Quantum AI reported a more efficient circuit for a core step in a quantum attack on signatures used by Bitcoin and Ethereum. It published a proof and a program to check other people’s circuits but kept its own circuit private.
Eigen Labs turned that checker into a public contest. Over roughly two months, more than 100 contributors working with AI produced a benchmark score more than 50% below Google’s lower published benchmark, reaching that result by July 26.
The leaderboard has since moved to about 62% below. Differences in the circuit designs and how resources are counted prevent a direct comparison. This research did not recover a private key.
Moving systems to quantum-safe signatures takes years. This benchmark improved in roughly two months, in public, and the contest is still running.
The Standard Reserve is coming on September 14.
Both audits have found 0 critical vulnerabilities, reports will be made public before launch.
More details coming over the next few days.
A September 2026 snapshot of where Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and major Ethereum L2s stand on post-quantum migration:
Bitcoin: BIP-360 and BIP-361 remain drafts. Neither is activated. BIP-360 addresses long-exposed public keys; BIP-361 proposes a future migration and legacy-signature sunset.
August brought additional progress: a prototype SHRINCS signature specification and StarkWare’s reported quantum-safe Bitcoin transaction on mainnet. The latter used existing rules, expensive off-chain computation, and a direct mining path. It demonstrates a specialized construction, not a network-wide migration.
Ethereum: On September 7, the EF Protocol cluster set a self-imposed December 2029 deadline for quantum resistance across execution, consensus, and data. EIP-8141 Frame Transactions is now selected for Hegotá, providing a native account-abstraction path toward alternative signatures. This is a firmer delivery commitment, but the migration is still ahead.
Solana: Falcon implementation work is now complemented by Quantumglow, Anza’s proposed post-quantum adaptation of Alpenglow. Published in late July, it explores hash-based validator signatures and changes to consensus communication. It remains research, while ordinary Solana transactions still use Ed25519 signatures.
Major Ethereum L2s: Starknet has demonstrated an experimental, unaudited Falcon-512 account transfer on mainnet. Its broader migration remains incomplete, with bridge and data availability dependencies on Ethereum. Optimism also has a published roadmap, including a January 2036 target to deprecate ECDSA-based externally owned accounts, subject to governance approval. These are different milestones, not completed network-wide protection.
A post-quantum wallet is one part of the migration. Consensus, settlement, and data availability need protection too.
Banks can coordinate security upgrades centrally. On public blockchains, exposed public keys remain in transaction history, while upgrading protection can require users, wallets, and the network to move together.
That coordination takes time. Waiting until quantum attacks are possible could leave funds exposed while the ecosystem is still upgrading.
For users, a quantum-resistant wallet is only part of the protection. The network that validates transactions and makes them final also needs to be secure. That’s why quantum readiness has to cover both users’ accounts and the protocol securing them.