Researcher, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Researching mega-infrastructure projects, Security studies, sand mining, governance
Matatus were caught on camera trying to beat traffic this morning along Ngong Road by using pedestrian walkways. Kenyans are now asking if the NTSA has stopped issuing 'Jesma' exams to rogue drivers.
The Lamu -Ijara- Garissa (A10) Road is currently at 48.44 %, with relevant implementation agencies liaising to fast track compensation process for stage II and III. The Road Project is located in both Lamu and Garissa counties with a total length of approximately 453 Km.
In 2024, two powerful moments reshaped East Africa’s regional future: Ethiopia sent its first bulk fertilizer shipment through Lamu Port, a key #LAPSSET asset, showing that landlocked countries now have a new, strategic trade gateway to global markets.
#development
@mutie_kilonzo I agree @mutie_kilonzo! This is a highly complex conflict, and unfortunately, I do not anticipate a long-term resolution in the near future. The key actors involved have yet to demonstrate a genuine commitment to addressing the root causes fueling the crisis in Eastern DRC.
Uganda, which previously played a role in supporting M23, has tried to position itself as a mediator but also has economic and security interests in the region.
Unless the structural problems discussed above are addressed, violence will continue to cycle through generations.
Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda further complicated matters. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide forced millions of Hutu refugees, including genocidal militias (Interahamwe & FDLR) into eastern Congo. These groups launched crossborder attacks on Rwanda and the Banyamulenge inside DRC.
The group resurfaced in 2021, arguing that Kinshasa had failed to uphold peace agreements and continued to target Congolese Tutsi populations. The DRC accuses Rwanda of backing M23, while Rwanda insists it is merely protecting its borders from the FDLR which still operates in DRC
and marking them as “foreigners.”
Mobutu’s government fueled anti-Tutsi sentiment, portraying Rwandophones as a threat to Congolese sovereignty. This led to violent local conflicts, as indigenous communities sought to expel Tutsi populations from their land.
Following independence, the question of who was Congolese became a highly contested issue. Initially, in 1964, the newly independent Congolese state granted Rwandophones (including the Banyamulenge) citizenship.
However, this decision was reversed in 1981, when Mobutu ’s government introduced a nationality law stating that only people whose ancestors lived in Congo before 1885 were eligible for citizenship, effectively rendering the Banyamulenge stateless, stripping them their rights
This increased the resentment of indigenous Congolese groups toward Rwandophones, whom they viewed as favored by colonial authorities. By the time of Congo’s independence in 1960, tensions between local communities and Rwandophone groups (both Tutsi and Hutu) had worsened.
In Congo, the colonial government denied the Banyamulenge land ownership and political rights, reinforcing their marginalization. Meanwhile, Belgian authorities encouraged further migration of Rwandan laborers into eastern Congo, particularly for mining and plantation work.
The colonial administration introduced artificial ethnic classifications that reinforced divisions in the region. In Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians ruled through the Tutsi aristocracy, exacerbating the social and economic divide between Tutsi and Hutu.