John | ܝܘܚܢܢ ꑭ 🇱🇧

Maronite🇻🇦| Law Student ⚖️ | Neo-Ouwet 🌲🏴

[Hicham Bou Nassif @Hbounassif]

This appeared in today's WSJ. It reflects the familiar bias that characterizes much of Western reporting on the Middle East in general, and Lebanon in particular.

Interestingly, in an article about Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon, the shaming epithet "gang" is used to describe and stigmatize Hezbollah's opponents. The journalists write: "In an area of Christian East Beirut known for its right-wing gangs, groups of black-clad men hung out near a building that displayed a four-story portrait of a rifle-wielding Bachir Gemayel."

I live in Christian East Beirut. I grew up here, and I am writing these very words from East Beirut. There are no "gangs" here, let alone Christian "right-wing gangs." A handful of young men—some unemployed, others doing odd jobs—hardly constitutes a gang.

The real super-gang in Lebanon is Hezbollah itself: an organization guilty of political assassinations, of dragging the country into war with Israel on behalf of Iran, and, according to numerous reports, of involvement in narcotics trafficking. Yet the article carefully avoids using any negative terminology to describe Hezbollah while casually applying pejorative labels to its opponents.

In fact, Christians are mentioned three times in the piece: first in connection with these alleged "gangs"; then as collaborators with Israel; and finally as armed men flashing pistols at a funeral. Reading the article, one might conclude that Lebanon's Christians are little more than a collection of hooligans who somehow manage to be both neo-Nazis and pro-Israeli at the same time. The portrayal is absurd.

The article also gives space to pro-Hezbollah narratives lamenting the Lebanese state's indifference to displaced Shiites: "The state? Where is the state?" What it fails to mention is that: (1) Hezbollah and Amal are among the most powerful actors within the Lebanese state; (2) decades of corruption by Amal weakened state institutions, while Hezbollah subordinated much of the country to Iranian interests. If the remnants of the Lebanese state are unable to adequately assist the Shiite population today, the responsibility lies, to a significant extent, with the very political forces that have dominated Shiite politics for decades.

Had this article appeared in The New York Times or The Washington Post, it would not have seemed out of place. It is disappointing to see it published in the Wall Street Journal. The WSJ is a serious newspaper and should demand better reporting on Lebanon.

@omarabdelb: If your knowledge of Lebanon is this limited, why write about it?

@ElliotKaufman6

[Catholic Arena @CatholicArena]

🚨 The Spanish Far Left is in MELTDOWN after Pope Leo XIV's direct and unapologetic speech in the parliament

Ione Belarra said that the visit should not have taken place and compared the visit to one from the AYATOLLAH

[Sami @sami_bey2]

متحول تابع لمحور حزبالله يطالب رئيس الجمهورية اللبنانية جوزيف عون و رئيس الحكومة نواف سلام بالرحيل اهم شي عملن تاغ و كتبلن ارحلو 😱😱😱

[Elon Musk @elonmusk]

Straits of Hormuz are named after Ahura Mazda from Zoroastrianism

[Mohamad Ahwaze @MohamadAhwaze]

صحيفة "فرهيختجان" الإيرانية تشن هجومًا حادًا على الرئيس اللبناني جوزف عون، واصفة إياه بأنه "مسؤول مكتب نتنياهو في بيروت".

[Georges Haddad 🇱🇧 @Georges__Haddad]

Hezbollah literally did May 7, 2008 (sab3a ayyar) when the Lebanese state tried to dismantle its illegal communication system within Beirut's Airport. Nasrallah even said it in his speech back then.

But Ibrahim Majed says "false accusations regarding the resistance's control over the national airport in the Southern Suburbs." This is getting ridiculous.

[Messenger of Baal Haddad 🇱🇧𐤀 @MessangerOfBaal]

I have been blocked for exposing this little rat @realAlexanderBR, he is some Shia larping as a Maronite trying to make them look like they are dhimmis. Just another case of taqiya from the 313 squad.

[Elias 🇸🇾 🇺🇦 @LyesAbouJaoude]

@Muawiyah_RA That explains how he has such as an embarrassing misread of the region despite covering it for 4 decades lmao

https://t.co/rSmEAzlamT

[John | ܝܘܚܢܢ ꑭ 🇱🇧 @BasedMardaite]

@OutrunBiker Razzouk is also a family name found in lebanon

[Thenewarea51 @thenewarea51]

The “new” Area 51 test article flying video has been posted. NGAD, F-47, F/A-XX, or something else? I’m surprised the landing light is on and how bright it is. Full video below by Project Fear

[🇮🇴WilliamTheBonqueror @BillTheKid1603]

The film that most influenced Trump to start the Iran war is 300

[Preist_prayin @Preist_Prayin1]

“We gave North Macedonia 750 million euros in development funds to build public infrastructure. They spent it on replica Greek temples made of concrete with white plastic cladding to look like marble, and a statue of Alexander the Great pointing a sword at Greece.“

[Woofers @NotWoofers]

Hello new American fighter jet

[Samer Kassis Archive @samerkassisT55]

صورة من أرشيف سامر القسيس:
قد تبدو للبعض صورة عادية، لجنديين في الجيش السوري (الاسدي)
لكن في الواقع، هي تمثل حقبة من تاريخ لبنان ، من حزيران ١٩٧٦، حتى نيسان ٢٠٠٥، من بداية الدخول الأول إلى لبنان، حتى الانسحاب النهائي.
على الأرجح هم من الوحدات الخاصة. التمويه (الي اليسار) ظهر منتصف الثمانينات، حيث قامت الوحدات الخاصة باعتماده، واستبدلت التمويه السابق ( السحلية Lizard) الذي كان نسخة محلية عن التمويه الفرنسي، والتي كانت تحتوي الوان حمراء.
اما الجندي إلى اليمين، فيرتدي تمويه مشتق عن الذي إلى جانبه، مع الوان زاهية اكثر، ويحمل السلاح الأساسي للوحدات الخاصة ، ال AKMS، النسخة الاجدد من الكلاشنيكوف عيار ٧.٦٢ ملم، مع "اخمص " معدني، والممشط الاجدد، والذي كان يسمى "باكالايت" Bakelite، لكنه في الواقع كان مصنوع من الزجاج المدعم بمواد عدة، يسمى AG-4S.
كما يرتدي "جعبة الصدر" المحلية الصنع، تحتوي على أربع مماشط (واحيانا قنبلتين يدويتين يمين ويسار الجعبة) ، وهي نسخة عن الجعبة الصينية الشهيرة ChiCom ( مختصر ل Chinese Communist )
الشاحنة هي من نوع Zil-130 سوفياتية، كانت تملأ الأراضي اللبنانية ، مع شاحنة أخرى "مترهلة " مثلها، الأقدم Zil-157، والتي يطلق عليها سوريا اسم "ام كامل".
الوحدات الخاصة السورية كانت رأس الحربة للجيش السوري وايضا رأس الحربة للنظام في السيطرة على الداخل السوري.
خاضت معارك عدة، بدأ من الهجوم الشهير ع��ى قمة جبل الشيخ عام ١٩٧٣، إضافة إلى معارك عدة على الأراضي اللبنانية ، مع أطراف محلية، أو مع الجيش الاسرائيلي عام ١٩٨٢.
ايضا كان لها دور كبير في معارك "الثورة السورية"، الحرب التي عصفت بالداخل السوري، من العام ٢٠١١ وحتى العام ٢٠٢٤، ونسب إليها ارتكاب الكثير من المجازر بحق المدنيين السوريين.
بعدا زوال النظام، زالت معه هذه الوحدات التي كانت تضم عدة فرق وافواج.

#الجيش_السوري
#الوحدات_الخاصة

#syrian_army_special_forces

[Elias 🇸🇾 🇺🇦 @LyesAbouJaoude]

if you want a conspiracy theory: the closure of the Straits of Hormuz mostly damages Israel's regional rivals: KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Iran(UAE can easily bypass it). Ergo, Israel has no incentive to see it reopened

[Elizabeth Tsurkov @LizHurra]

The Lebanese Presidency's tweet indicates that Hezbollah accepted a reduction of hostilities deal that it had rejected yesterday. Under this deal, the Dahiyeh will be spared in exchange for Hezbollah halting attacks on Israeli territory. Strikes inside Lebanon's south by both sides appear to be acceptable under the deal. Later on, a total ceasefire will be put in place.
This confirms the earlier a-Sharq News report and if true, represents a concession on Hezbollah's part, which earlier demanded a total ceasefire.

[Zeina @zaazoozee]

فتحوا حرب مش قدها، هجّروا العالم بنص الليل، وبدن يانا نكون ولاية إيرانية إسلامية غصب عنا. واليوم لما الناس تسكر مناطقها لتحمي حالها من هالتهور بيطلعوا يتباكوا. زمن المظلومية وبكائيات المقاومة انتهى.
كل واحد يقلع شوكه بإيده

[𝗞𝗛𝗔𝗟𝗜𝗟 𝗘𝗟𝗞𝗨𝗥𝗗𝗜  @Khalil_Elkurdi]

#عاجل | أحد المؤثرين التابعين لحزب اللابوبو💛... يهدد!

[T. ☀️ @levantophile]

I’m afraid I disagree with this analysis.

The Shia community launched its guerrilla campaign in the 1980s at the tail end of a massive population boom that began in the decades following independence, a demographic surge that increased its share of Lebanon’s population from roughly 20% to over 30%. At the same time, it was confronting an Israel with a smaller military and technological advantage, and one that was less willing to employ overwhelming force against civilian populations.

Today, the situation is very different. Shias have fewer children and have already sacrificed a significant share of their young men in both the Syrian war and the wars with Israel that followed October 7. Meanwhile, Israel enjoys an overwhelming military and technological edge and is far more willing to devastate entire Shia communities in pursuit of total victory.

The Shia community cannot sustain the current rate of losses among young men indefinitely, nor does it possess the demographic bulge that once made prolonged guerrilla warfare feasible. If its leadership has not already led it into a sort of communal suicide and manages to avert a total catastrophe, I suspect the community will emerge more resigned and quietist, much as the Christian and Druze communities did after 1990, transitioning from active belligerents to relative political quietism and accommodation.

I only hope that, after decades of near-constant warfare, it will eventually be all quiet on the southern front, allowing Shias to return to their villages and rebuild their lives. And I hope Lebanon is spared the opening of new fronts to the north and east in the coming years. 👀