From @BashaReport's @Substack archives: Inside the Houthi arsenal of small arms, land systems, missiles, naval systems, and drones https://t.co/x1seTOZoXi
#Yemen Escalation Signal | Three Presidential Leadership Council members, @sultan_alaradah, @ALalimiBawzer, and @OthmanMujalli, convened a high-level military meeting in Marib with the Chief of Staff @AzizSagheir and commanders of the 3rd, 6th and 7th Military Regions. The meeting focused on combat readiness, coordination and expanding support for Operation Dawn of Yemen #ODY against the Houthis. https://t.co/VvQjXlhokN
Iraq: Iraqi intelligence has uncovered a massive oil smuggling operation through state-owned pipelines that has been ongoing for the last five years in Babil province’s Jurf al-Nasr – a town where the pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah remains the principal force.
https://t.co/5umamTHeZ4
My comment to @Brady_k6@dcexaminer:
Unsurprisingly, @AmrAlBidh and the @STCSouthArabia proposal to achieve its dream of an independent South Yemen to counter the Houthis was unconvincing. @BashaReport doubted that the Houthis would even accept any deal that left Yemeni territory outside their control, as indicated by their push toward historically southern territory.
“Today, the Houthis are occupying historically southern territory in Lahj, testing the ground in Shabwa, and continuing to launch missiles and drones at bases in Hadramawt. In my assessment, their ambition remains to control all of Yemen, north and south,” he said.
Basha pointed out that the General People’s Congress, the party that ruled Yemen before the civil war, believed it was viable to sustain a power-sharing agreement with the Houthis, before the partnership “ended violently” in December 2017.
“I see little reason to believe the Houthis would accept a lasting coalition with a southern group or allow the south to govern itself. Shabwa and Hadramawt’s oil and gas resources are central to their ambitions and their pursuit of long-term financial survival,” he said.
https://t.co/Jhw9NwkN75
Commentary by Fathi bin Lazraq @fathibnlazrq, editor of Aden Al-Ghad @adenalghad, a staunch anti-Houthi voice and longtime supporter of the Saudi-led coalition, published a series of posts criticizing the management of military operations in Lahj Governorate. He warned that government-aligned forces in Al-Subaiha substantially outnumber and outgun the attacking Houthis but remain divided among the Southern @SouthArmed Giants Brigades @alamalikah, National Shield Forces @diralwatan, National Resistance Forces @nrfyemen , Salafi formations, and volunteer brigades, each operating under separate commands with little coordination. He described how the Houthis exploit these divisions by concentrating fighters against isolated positions while nearby government units remain inactive because they lack orders to intervene. Bin Lazraq compared these failures to those that contributed to the collapse of government positions in Mocha and contrasted them with Taiz, where he credited a unified operations room for more effective defensive coordination. While insisting that the situation in Al-Subaiha is not yet critical, he warned that continued mismanagement would lead to unnecessary casualties and territorial losses. He urged Yemen’s military leadership and the Saudi-led coalition to establish a unified command structure and bring experienced Yemeni officers back into operational planning. https://t.co/SBG9BEa2cu
#جبهات_الصبيحة
كلمة لا بد منها ومصارحة واجبة
فتحي بن لزرق
في جبهات الصبيحة، القوات المسلحة كثيرة العدد، ضخمة العتاد، ويفوق عدد أفرادها عناصر ميليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية التي تهاجم هذه الجبهات، ولكنها، وللأسف الشديد، منعزلة عن بعضها عملياتياً.
بمعنى أن هناك قوات تتبع العمالقة، وقوات درع الوطن، وقوات تتبع المقاومة الوطنية، وقوات للسلفيين، وقوات للألوية المتطوعة، وكل قوة من هذه القوات لديها قيادة خاصة بها.
حتى اللحظة، كل هذه القوات لديها خطة عسكرية تقتضي التصدي لأي هجمات واستنزاف ميليشيا الحوثي في هذه الجبهات.
إيش يعمل الحوثي في المقابل؟
يهاجم جبهة معينة أو موقعاً معيناً، ويحشد كل مقاتليه ويذهب بهم إلى ذلك الموقع ويهاجمه بضراوة، بينما القوات الأخرى لا تتقدم، لأن لديها توجيهات بعدم التقدم حالياً.
أبسطها لكم أكثر:
مثلاً، الحوثي يهجم على موقع فيه 50 مقاتلاً من قوة معينة، وعلى بُعد 3 كيلومترات توجد قوة عس��رية أخرى قوامها 800 مقاتل، لكن هذه القوات تبقى متمركزة في موقعها.
ليش؟
لأنها لا تملك تعليمات بالإسناد، ولديها قيادة منفصلة عن القوة الأخرى، وهنا يكمن الخطأ الذي ما زلنا ندفع ثمنه.
��ستفرد الحوثي بالموقع الذي يهاجمه، وهنا نتكبد خسائر بشرية، ويتمكن الحوثي من إحداث بعض الاختراقات.
الحوثي يحشد مثلاً 500 مقاتل، ويهاجم بهم موقعاً فيه 300 مقاتل، ويحقق بعض التقدم ويسيطر على بعض المواقع، ثم يثبت فيها 50 مقاتلاً، ويسحب بقية مقاتليه ويتجه بهم إلى موقع آخر، وهكذا.
هل الوضع خطير في الصبيحة؟
لا، ليس خطيراً، ولكن إدارة المشهد العسكري هناك خاطئة، وستكلفنا الكثير، وإذا استمرت طريقة الإدارة بهذا الشكل، فإن خسائرنا ستكون كبيرة وكثيرة.
ليش أكتب هذه الملاحظات الآن؟
لأن المشهد شبيه جداً بالخطأ الاستراتيجي الذي حدث في المخا.
في المخا، تم الدفع بقوات العمال��ة ودرع الوطن وتشكيلات مختلفة من القوات، ولكن عنصر الربط والتنسيق فيما بينها كان شبه منعدم، وكان الحوثي يمارس الآلية نفسها؛ يهاجم موقعاً معيناً، وفي لحظة الإرباك التي حصلت، انسحبت القوات لأن عنصر الربط بينها كان منعدماً.
تعا��وا نشوف تعز، ليش الحوثي عاجز عن التقدم فيها، ولم يستطع التقدم شبراً؟
أصحاب تعز لديهم غرفة عمليات مشتركة، وكل الجبهات مرتبطة بقيادة عسكرية واحدة، وفي اللحظة التي يحشد فيها الحوثي لمهاجمة جبهة معينة، تكون بقية القوات قد استعدت مسبقاً، وحينما تبدأ المعركة تكون الجبهة قوية جداً.
وقبل عشرة أيام تقريباً، استعد أصحاب تعز لهجمات الحوثيين حتى بالكشافات.
نرجع ونقول: هل الوضع العسكري في الصبيحة خطير؟
لا، ليس خطيراً (حتى اللحظة)، والقوات المنتشرة هناك كثيرة جداً، ومن مختلف التشكيلات العسكرية، ولكنها تفتقر إلى الترابط العسكري، وتفتقر إلى غرفة عمليات عسكرية واحدة، ��تفتقر إلى إسناد بعضها بعضاً عند وقوع الهجمات.
كل قوة تعمل بمعزل عن القوات الأخرى.
ليش نتكلم الآن؟
لأننا في حرب، ولأننا سكتنا عن الأخطاء نفسها في المخا، والآن لن نسكت، ونرمي الكرة في ملعب من يدير المشهد العسكري هناك، وتحديداً قيادة القوات المسلحة وقيادة قوات التحالف.
إيش المطلوب الآن؟
إيجاد غرفة عمليات مشتركة لكل هذه القوات، وربطها ببعضها، وتنسيق تحركاتها وإسنادها المت��ادل، والتعامل مع المستجدات الطارئة وفق المتغيرات الميدانية السريعة.
مرة اخرى ..هل الوضع خطير؟
لا، أبداً والله، ولكن بطريقة إدارة الحرب هذه ستطول المعركة، وسنكون في مواجهة خسائر لسنا بحاجة إليها.
المشكلة ليست في قلة الرجال أو ضعف العتاد، بل في غياب التنسيق ووحدة القيادة، وهذه مشكلة يمكن معالجتها إذا توفرت الإرادة والقرارات العسكرية الصحيحة.
بلغت اللهم فاشهد.
فتحي بن لزرق
Still alive! 😎 And @ConflictedThom and I aren't done yet!
We're planning a new independent podcast, with more Middle Eastern history, more geopolitics, and no shortage of arguments!
Want to be the first to hear about it? Leave your email here: https://t.co/R2hSdKVvi8
Besides the fact that 6 million liters is only 37,736 barrels, this footage is from 2024, when Tehran wasn’t happy to see its heavily subsidized fuel crossing borders. Today, however, the situation has likely shifted, given that Iran hasn't been able to export crude oil since mid-July.
On Monday, I interviewed @AmrAlBidh in Washington, D.C., during which he outlined Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council’s ambitious proposal: the U.S. and regional powers should support southern independence as the only viable way to stop the Houthis from advancing further.
It’s been met with expected pushback, including from @BashaReport and @salamyemen2 who outlined why they view independence as either unviable or playing into the Houthis’ hands.
You can read about it here:
War in #Yemen#SITREP | 11 November 2026 |
In Lahj Governorate, tribal fighters from Al-Subayha reportedly launched two operations against Houthi positions in Al-Mudaribah and Ras al-Arah District. Armed members of the Al-Jartah tribe, led by Sheikh Ghazi Jawhar, attacked Houthi positions along the Al-Barhanah front and reportedly recaptured several important positions following intense clashes. Six tribal fighters were wounded, while Houthi personnel reportedly suffered losses in manpower and equipment.
In a separate operation in Al-Tahamiyah, tribal fighters led by Abu Dhiab al-Alqami al-Subayhi reportedly ambushed three Houthi military pickup trucks. Two vehicles were disabled and a third captured. Tribal fighters also reportedly seized a DShK heavy machine gun and medium machine guns. Several Houthi fighters were reportedly killed.
In Taiz Governorate, government forces supported by local resistance fighters reported continued fighting along the Al-Shaqab, Al-Aqrud, and Kahlan fronts south of the city. Government units said they engaged Houthi positions and repelled attempted advances. Military aviation conducted several reported drone strikes against Houthi concentrations, positions, and vehicles across the governorate.
Additional air operations reportedly targeted Houthi positions in Sanamat village, Al-Misrakh District, southeast of Taiz, and Houthi movements along the Hayjat al-Abd and Al-Sahha roads connecting Taiz and Lahj.
Meanwhile, local sources report that Houthi authorities have intensified campaigns to identify and register military personnel living in villages recently brought under their control in rural Taiz. The reported campaign involves Houthi committees and local networks coordinating with tribal sheikhs and village representatives to collect personal and military information on soldiers and officers.
The Yemeni Ministry of Defense, the 35th Armored Brigade, and local authorities in Taiz have warned military personnel against surrendering their information or responding to Houthi summons. The warnings specifically concern personnel associated with the Taiz Military Axis, National Resistance Forces, Nation’s Shield Forces, and Tur al-Bahah Axis, including those previously deployed along the western coast and in Al-Hujariyah.
In Marib, local sources reported that Houthi forces launched three ballistic missiles toward the governorate while senior government officials were visiting the city. Those reportedly present included PLC members Sheikh Othman Mujalli and Dr. Abdullah al-Alimi, alongside the ministers of oil and finance.
Separately, the First Emergency Division announced that its road security and patrol units discovered and dismantled two improvised explosive devices along an international highway on Tuesday. According to the division, the devices were intended to target a convoy carrying Mujalli and al-Alimi.
In Al-Jawf Governorate, the First Emergency Division released battlefield footage reportedly showing drone strikes against Houthi troop concentrations and military equipment. Additional footage circulated online reportedly shows government military aviation targeting a Houthi tank.
In Al-Dhale Governorate, government forces reportedly repelled a Houthi attack in the Hajar sector northwest of the governorate following clashes near Jabal al-Hasha. Separately, local reporting indicated that a Houthi ballistic missile struck near the security administration building in Al-Mudaribah and Ras al-Arah District in Lahj.
War in #Yemen#SITREP | 10 November 2026 | Government-aligned forces report continued air, drone, rocket, and artillery operations across multiple fronts under Operation Dawn of Yemen #ODY. Their latest statement lists 29 airstrikes, 39 drone strikes, 62 rocket artillery fire missions, and 744 field artillery fire missions during the preceding hours, targeting Houthi positions, reinforcements, fortifications, weapons, and firing points.
On the northern, al-Jawf, and Marib fronts, Emergency Forces @YEMEN_MRAN@MCAzal102S@mhor2025@alfrqt7357, National Shield Forces, and units of the @YemenAFMedia 3rd, 6th, and 7th Military Regions reported continued engagements with Houthi forces. Shabwa Defense Forces @QShbwt and military formations deployed in al-Bayda also reported ongoing combat operations.
In Taiz, government forces and Popular Resistance fighters reported repelling Houthi attacks and targeting their movements and positions. The Taiz Axis @axistaiz said its Moral Guidance Department visited frontline positions in the city’s western sector. Deputy department chief Col. Abdulbasit al-Bahr urged troops to maintain vigilance.
On the southern and southwestern fronts, National Shield Forces, Southern @SouthArmed Giants Brigades @alamalikah, and National Resistance units claimed to have recaptured several positions.
Fighting continued in other sectors. National Shield Forces @diralwatan also released footage described as showing its 1st Division fighting on the al-Muhawalah front.
On the al-Zariqa front, the National Resistance @nrfyemen reported intensive artillery strikes against Houthi reinforcements and weapons stores during heavy fighting. It claimed dozens of Houthi fighters were killed or wounded.
Anger and grief in Sana’a, after the funeral of 15 children and 8 women killed in Bani Hushaish. Both sides trade blame, claiming an airstrike or missile misfire. Whatever the cause, the tragedy is the same. Civilians continue to pay the highest price for Yemen’s war. 🙏
It is not just Yemenis from Houthi-controlled areas who are traveling to Russia to fight in its war against Ukraine. Southerners are also among them.
Meet Abu Shararah [Alias for spark] al-Yafei, a southern Yemeni from the Yafe’ tribe, who resided previously in Aden city. He regularly posts videos from the Russian front lines. In several clips, he appears alongside another southerner, Ibrahim al-Qasidi, who has “Allahu Akbar” written on his military uniform.
Both men repeatedly pray to survive another day. They complain about the food, the harsh conditions, and the roughly 40 kg of military equipment they must carry. Each carries at least 12 loaded ammunition magazines. Abu Shararah has written “Arab” on his arms and military gear.
In one video, he describes walking 25 km while carrying his equipment. He says they sometimes receive so much ammunition that they abandon the excess along the way.
Their preferred food is canned tuna, largely because many of the other canned meals contain pork. He also demonstrates how he warms his canned food in the field.
Abu Shararah jokes that he is fortunate to be short because most Russian soldiers are tall, making them easier for Ukrainian FPV drone cameras to spot from a distance. He even uses beauty filters to improve his appearance while recording videos from the battlefield.
At least four other Yemenis and Sudanese appear to be serving alongside them in the same squad.
Like many Yemenis fighting for Russia, Abu Shararah repeatedly warns other Yemenis against coming. He tells them the money is not worth the risk, the hardship, or the possibility of never returning home.
His videos also offer glimpses of his life before Russia. He shares older footage of himself dancing with friends, chewing khat, and enjoying life in southern Yemen. Based on some of these clips, he appears to have previously been involved with southern resistance forces in Aden, although this remains unconfirmed.
In one particularly personal video, he expresses concern for his comrade Ibrahim after the two are separated and assigned to different combat routes. Abu Shararah tells followers that he misses Ibrahim and worries about his safety. He also tries to update his audience whenever he enters the front lines or moves into underground positions.
Abu Shararah maintains a WhatsApp channel and has more than 107,000 followers on Facebook. Although he insists he is not recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia, aspects of his online activity raise questions about whether his presence on social media serves a recruitment purpose.
He also claims that most Yemenis struggle to communicate with Russian soldiers, but that his personality and ability to express himself have helped him build relationships with them.
What stands out is the contradiction between his warnings and his online presence. He repeatedly tells Yemenis not to come to Russia, while documenting his military experience, sharing battlefield footage, maintaining a following, and presenting himself as someone who has managed to adapt to life among Russian troops.
Read more about southern Yemeni fighters in Russia in the @BashaReport@Substack report 👇
Part III of the Series | From Southern Yemen to Russia’s Frontlines in Ukraine: From trench digging to drone supply runs, a Yemeni recruit shares rare footage from inside the Russian war effort.
https://t.co/Ll0lmbJoll
For @BashaReport's @Substack subscribers:
Yemen's Houthi Military Evolution: Order of Battle, Military Command Structures, and Active Units
Understanding the Houthi Military Framework: A Live, Real-Time Analysis
https://t.co/w5aMT39XGg
What blockade?
You’ve heard about Iran’s swarm attack boats and drones, but have you heard about its swarms of fuel smugglers?
An estimated 6 million liters of Iranian diesel and gasoline enter Pakistan daily, transported by small boats, trucks, motorbikes, and even pack animals. Along the Balochistan coast, smuggling networks operate around Gwadar, Jiwani and Pasni.
Another Day, Another Houthi Missile Misfire in North Yemen?
A video circulating this morning appears to show the aftermath of a possible failed missile launch near Al-Turbah in southern Taiz Governorate, where potentially two missiles crashed into the home of Habib Hizam al-Masah.
The wreckage may belong to the Houthi Badr-series missile family, what do you think, @fab_hinz?
Yemenis Flock to Join Russia’s War in Ukraine
Malik al-Humaiqani, a Yemeni man in his late 20s from the Al-Humaiqani tribe in Al-Bayda governorate, is among hundreds of Yemenis reportedly fighting for the Russian army in Ukraine. His home governorate is largely under Houthi control.
In a series of videos posted online, al-Humaiqani documents his daily life on the Russian front lines, from the constant threat of Ukrainian FPV drones to the high cost of living and the isolation of military positions deep in the forests.
He openly warns other Yemenis against coming to Russia to fight. In one video, he questions the value of earning money when there is nowhere to spend it. What is the point of having money, he asks, “when you cannot even buy fried chicken or satisfy a simple craving because you are stuck in the middle of a forest,” with what he estimates is a greater than 50% chance of being killed?
He describes Russia as extremely expensive, claiming that someone could easily spend $1,000 a day. He also shows a $2,000 FPV drone detection device he purchased to warn of incoming drones and give soldiers time to take cover.
According to al-Humaiqani, FPV drones are among the greatest dangers they face. Whenever they leave their bunkers, they must remain constantly alert. His videos include reviews of Russian military-issued MREs and footage of FPV drones reportedly shot down near their positions.
He says he and another Yemeni fighter are fortunate to have a Russian commander who treats them well. Their current assignment, he explains, largely involves digging tunnels and preparing underground positions.
What I find particularly surprising is how freely he appears to document his military surroundings. He regularly posts videos while connected to the internet, showing areas around his positions and where he spends his time. Given the operational security risks associated with smartphones, Internet connectivity, and publicly sharing footage from a war zone, it raises questions about how much oversight Russian commanders exercise over foreign recruits’ social media activity.
For a young Yemeni in his 20s who traveled thousands of miles to fight in a foreign war, his videos offer an unusually candid account of the experience. Rather than encouraging others to follow him, he repeatedly warns them to stay away.
For more on Yemeni fighters recruited to serve in the Russian military, read my earlier reporting at @BashaReport’s @Substack.
Yemeni Mercenary Captured in Ukraine Says Russia Recruited Him With $10,000 Promise: Former Yemeni soldier says recruiters offered $16,000 monthly salaries, sent 30 Yemenis into battle, and only he survived after Russian artillery allegedly shelled their own unit.
https://t.co/3gVZ9xEvKP
Heavy fighting is underway in western #Lahj between government-backed @alamalikah@diralwatan@nrfyemen forces and the Houthis. The Houthis are throwing everything they have into this offensive, making Lahj one of the most intense fronts for ground war at this stage of the war.
قرأت العديد من المنشورات لأشخاص ي��برأون من أقاربهم القتلى في صف الطرف الخصم.
حجم الدمار والتشوهات التي تعرض لها نسيج #اليمن الاجتماعي كبير ومؤلم بسبب طول أمد الحرب! وأقول طول أمد الحرب وليس الحرب، لأن آثار الحرب تختلف عن آثار حرب مستمرة منذ ١٢ سنة!
كم يحتاج اليمنيون عشان تلتئم جراحهم الاجتماعية والنفسية! أما المسؤول الأول فهو الحوثي صاحب الطلقة الأولى في هذا الدمار.
Houthi accounts, including @Jubran_Alfaqih, @hamedrizq01, @AliSharafA92991 and @MohammedAlfrah, are claiming that Major General Hamdi Shukri, commander of the 4th Military Region, was targeted. A senior military official tells @BashaReport that Shukri was not killed, contradicting rumors circulating among Houthi accounts.
Shukri has survived multiple assassination attempts and was previously held captive by the Houthis. He remains a staunch opponent of the group.
Read more about General Hamdi Shukri: https://t.co/VEVGWbLEqj
[Free article from @BashaReport@substack] Senior Yemeni Counter-Smuggling Commander Targeted After Major Seizures
More than 1.5 tons of narcotics, over 634,500 synthetic pills, seven weapons shipments, multiple drones, and an antiquities smuggling operation were intercepted by Shukri’s forces.
Please subscribe, read, and share.
https://t.co/RccXs7cJZt
#التحقق_من_الحقائق
الفيديو المتداول من @Sam45moh قديم، وسبق نشره على أنه من مدينة المكلا بمحافظة حضرموت، وليس من مدينة عدن كما يُروّج له حالياً.
https://t.co/s2kUYlMuuI
#التحقق_من_الحقائق: حساب «طارق البحري» @Tariq_Al_Bahri يزعم أنه من أنصار الفريق طارق صالح، لكنه ينشر أخباراً مضللة ومحتوى يثير الفتنة بين حزبي الإصلاح والمؤتمر الشعبي العام، ويشكك في الجبهات العسكرية، وينشر روايات من شأنها زعزعة الثقة بالقوات الحكومية وإثارة الخلافات بين مكوناتها.
وفي الصورة أدناه، تظهر صورة شخصية مولّدة بالذكاء الاصطناعي، وليست للواء حمدي شكري قائد المنطقة العسكرية الرابعة. مما يشير إلى ارتباط الحساب بحملات الحرب النفسية والتضليل الإعلامي.
https://t.co/RbWvmyVRWp