BP

Anti-sloganeering. Pro-proof. Liberal Jew who’s pro-Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish homeland, right where it is. No patience with discrimination.

[Breaking911 @Breaking911]

Thirteen moderate Democrats are breaking with Democratic socialists, signing the “Promise to America” pledge supporting strong borders, capitalism, and patriotism, with Rep. Tom Suozzi leading the effort.

[Billy Binion @billybinion]

You couldn't script this better. The World Cup randomly selecting two of the most oppressive countries on the planet—Iran and Egypt—for tonight's "Pride Night" match feels like the universe getting a massive laugh in. 10/10, no notes.

[Open Source Intel @Osint613]

Ted Cruz: "We are seeing a cancer on the right. It is rising antisemitism ... here's the scary thing: I've seen more antisemitism on the right over the last 18 months than any time in my life. And it's spreading like a cancer. Tucker Carlson is the most dangerous demagogue in America."

[Joo @JoosyJew]

If this Palestinian child had recorded a video about Israel in Gaza, it would be retweeted thousands of times. @UNSRVAW would share. @amnesty would share. @UNICEF would share. Every “pro-Palestine” account would share.

But this video is anti-Hamas.

So none of them will share.

[Rabbi Poupko @RabbiPoupko]

This is Father Bronislovas Paukštys of St. Michael the Archangel Church in Kaunas (Kovno-Slabodka), Lithuania.

During WWII Paukštys falsified and produced birth certificates and baptismal records for 120 Jewish children, saving those children's lives from certain death .
Paukštys also hid 25 Jews inside his parish and helped another 200 Jews escape certain death at the hands of the Germans, helping them find farms and safe houses where they could hide.

More than 95% of Lithuanian Jewry were murdered during the Holocaust.

We can never thank Father Paukštys and those who assisted him enough. He saved those people from certain death.

He was a true hero.

[John Aziz @aziz0nomics]

I suspect we are going through a major political realignment.

Many people who believe they are politically progressive are actually reactionary, regressive, and authoritarian.

Some of those who consider themselves conservative, by contrast, are actually quite progressive.

[Brianna Wu @BriannaWu]

Here is the truth. Progressivism was entirely irrelevant until it ditched universal healthcare and went all in on Jew hate.

That’s when it started to win elections - tapping into one of the oldest evils.

And because the Democratic Party refuses to excise it, the cancer will kill our party.

[Kosher @koshercockney]

At the Iranian-Backed Houthi Rally in Yemen. A child addresses President Trump:

"You will burn in hell, we will trample you underfoot!”

"We will teach you a lesson you will never forget."

They all then chant:

"Death to America!"

[BP @bsptx1]

@mollycrabapple Taking buildings from owners and handing them to their renters? Please explain to me the legality of this move.

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

Halkbank, a Turkish state-owned bank facing the largest Iran-sanctions-evasion prosecution in U.S. history received an extraordinarily lenient outcome last week. A personal channel of influence between the two countries' presidents has been documented to have reached into that prosecution during President Trump’s first term, and multiple paid advocates worked the case on Turkey's behalf. The president held a continuing, income-producing commercial interest in Turkey throughout his time in office.

But the favorable Halkbank outcome takes place inside a four front strategic realignment between Washington and Ankara spanning an active U.S. war with Iran, the post-Assad reordering of Syria, a multi-billion-dollar defense-industrial dispute over Turkey's ouster from the F-35 fighter program, and Gaza ceasefire diplomacy -- in every one of which Turkey’s role is pivotal. The Turkish side itself bundled the bank case together with its defense demands. That geostrategic field is, on its own, a sufficient and largely expected explanation for the leniency.

Background
From roughly 2012 to 2016, a scheme moved billions of dollars of Iranian oil revenue through the banking system by disguising it as gold trade, defeating those sanctions. A Turkish government-owned bank, Halkbank, is accused of operating the disguise. U.S. prosecutors called it one of the biggest sanctions-evasion case they had ever brought.

Separately, the U.S. president's family business had licensed its name to a luxury development in Istanbul -- Trump Towers Istanbul. The president did not own the buildings; a Turkish company paid fees to use the Trump brand. He collected those fees while in office.

The deferred prosecution agreement for Halkbank imposed no criminal fine, forfeiture, restitution, or admission. It required review, reporting and restrictions on Iran-benefiting transactions. Per the the June 10 Non-prosecution agreement, "The DPA arose from significant diplomatic and national security considerations."

Question
Despite the stated reasoning, what, if anything, do the president's commercial interests in Turkey have to do with how the U.S. government handled the Halkbank prosecution?

Bottom line up front
The conflict of interest is well documented and real, openly stated by the president himself. However, the president's personal financial interests in Turkey and legitimate national interest in accommodating Turkey point in the same direction. With the two explanations pressuring the identical outcome, distinguishing them from that outcome alone is foreclosed. The available answer is analytically inert: the president maintained financial interests in a geostrategically salient jurisdiction and accommodations to its government align with both US national interest and the president’s personal financial ones.

The result however is not politically inert: the conflict of interest hightens scrutiny of open questions regarding broader influence. The president has had to make major decisions with respect to Turkey. The President’s appointment of Amb. Tom Barrack and his policy stances, the U.S. rapprochement with Syria’s new interim president post-Assad, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his decision to lift sanctions, the decision to approve Repkon USA, subsidiary of Turkish defense company Repkon, to acquire the only US plant producing MK-80 series bomb casings, Turkey’s prominent role in the president’s 20 point Gaza Peace Plan, the president’s remarks now making waves in the media over reinstating Turkey into the F-35 program after its purchase of Russian S-400 defense systems and CAATSA implications, the controversial approval of the sale of $700 million worth of General Electric F110 jet engines to Turkey for its indigenous KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program, the Erdoğan phone call that helped block a planned Kurdish ground offensive into Iran and President Trump’s statements during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte where he acknowledged that Turkey is “a prime candidate” or “leading candidate” to get involved “maybe on the Iran side” -- all of it and more raises scrutiny on the president’s personal financial interests in Turkey, his relationship with the Turkish president, and the lobbying efforts surrounding the Halkbank case.

1. The Actors

Donald Trump -- U.S. president (first term 2017-2021; second term from 2025). Licensed his name to the Istanbul development; collected fees during both terms.

Halkbank -- The Turkish state-owned bank at the center of the case.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan -- President of Turkey. Repeatedly and personally pressed Trump to make the Halkbank case go away.

Aydın Doğan & Doğan Holding -- The Turkish business family and conglomerate that built and owns Trump Towers Istanbul and pays for the Trump brand. Important nuance: historically an opponent of Erdoğan, not a loyalist. The family's media outlets were critical of Erdoğan for years before selling those outlets in 2018. Doğan is a pragmatic business group that made peace with the government, not a member of Erdoğan's inner circle.

Mehmet Ali Yalçındağ -- Aydın Doğan's son-in-law. Ran the family's media arm, later chaired a Turkish-American business council. Widely described as an informal go-between linking the Trump and Erdoğan camps. His business-diplomacy role grew partly out of the Trump Towers relationship.

Berat Albayrak -- Erdoğan's son-in-law and, at the time, Turkey's finance minister. Met senior U.S. officials, including Trump, in April 2019.

Reza Zarrab -- A Turkish-Iranian gold trader, the central architect of the sanctions-evasion scheme. Arrested in the U.S. in 2016, pleaded guilty, became a cooperating witness, and testified that the scheme reached the top of the Turkish government. Key detail: one of his shell companies listed its registered address inside Trump Towers Istanbul.

Geoffrey Berman -- The federal prosecutor in Manhattan who refused to soften the Halkbank case and was fired in 2020. (Distinct from Judge Richard Berman, who presides over the case.)

William "Bill" Barr -- U.S. Attorney General who, by multiple accounts, pushed prosecutors toward a lenient Halkbank deal.

John Bolton -- Trump's national security adviser, whose memoir recorded Trump promising Erdoğan he would deal with the prosecutors.

Jay Clayton -- The prosecutor who signed off on the lenient 2026 Halkbank deal. Notably, Barr had tried to install him in that same prosecutor's office in 2020, during the effort to replace the prosecutor who would not soften the case.

Brian Ballard & Rudy Giuliani -- Paid advocates who worked on Turkey's and Halkbank's behalf with access to the president.

2. What Is Firmly Established

The conflict of interest is real and was active in office (Documented)

Trump licensed his name to the Istanbul development; the Turkish owner paid for the brand. Trump collected fees throughout both presidencies -- public disclosures show figures ranging from roughly one to several million dollars across the two terms. In a December 2015 interview, Trump himself acknowledged the problem, saying he had "a little conflict of interest" because of his major building in Istanbul. The property could also be used against him: when Trump made anti-Muslim campaign statements, Erdoğan publicly called for the Trump name to be stripped from the towers. The conflict was therefore both real and a usable pressure point.

3. The Halkbank outcome was favorable and anomalous (Documented)

After years of litigation -- including the U.S. Supreme Court rejecting Halkbank's attempt to claim immunity -- the case ended in March with a deferred prosecution agreement. (A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, is a deal in which the government suspends and ultimately drops a criminal case in exchange for conditions, normally a substantial fine plus compliance reforms.) The Halkbank DPA required no fine, no forfeiture, no admission of wrongdoing, and no compensation for victims -- only a compliance monitor. It required an agreed sanctions and anti-money-laundering review, cooperation with that review, reporting to Treasury and prosecutors, and restrictions on Iran-benefiting transactions. The case was dismissed by a federal judge last week on June 17 after the non-prosecution agreement filed on June 10.

Why "anomalous": members of the U.S. Senate noted that every other such agreement struck by the same administration included millions of dollars in penalties, and that the deal contradicted the administration's own enforcement policy announced by DOJ days later. By comparison, earlier Iran-sanctions cases against private banks carried very large penalties (for example, one European bank paid roughly $8.9 billion in 2014). A zero-dollar resolution for one of the largest such cases was a sharp outlier.

4. A personal channel reached the prosecution (Documented)

This is the best-supported part of the entire story, and it concerns the first term:

Treasury's own later response to a Senate inquiry confirmed that Erdoğan raised Halkbank directly with Trump in April 2019, after which Trump referred the matter to Treasury and the Justice Department.

Bolton's memoir recorded Trump promising Erdoğan he would handle the Manhattan prosecutors.

The prosecutor who refused to soften the case (Geoffrey Berman) was fired; major reporting tied his removal directly to that refusal.

5. The Attorney General pushed for a lenient deal that career prosecutors regarded as improper.

The bank was finally indicted in October 2019, within days of a falling-out between Trump and Erdoğan over Turkey's military action in Syria -- that is, the case advanced when the personal relationship cooled.

In short, it is documented that personalized U.S.-Turkey diplomacy could and did reach this prosecution. That finding is not in serious dispute.

6. The advocacy environment was saturated (Documented / Reported)

At least three paid or personal channels worked the Halkbank matter for the Turkish side:

Yalçındağ (the Doğan son-in-law and Trump-Erdoğan go-between) publicly included Halkbank in a package of issues Turkey wanted resolved in April 2019, and reporting states he pressed administration officials about the bank. His U.S. access was run in part through a registered lobbying firm. (Note: "registered lobbying" here means disclosures filed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, a U.S. law requiring paid foreign-influence agents to log their government contacts. Those filings are how much of this is knowable.)

Brian Ballard, a lobbyist with access to the president, earned roughly $2 million representing the Turkish government and Halkbank, then dropped both right after the 2019 indictment.

Rudy Giuliani, Trump's personal attorney, worked as a go-between in an attempt to resolve the related Zarrab case.

The property even touches the scheme physically: gold trader Zarrab's shell company listed its address inside Trump Towers Istanbul. That makes the conflict unusually vivid -- the branded property is the registered address of the scheme's central figure.

7. The geotrategic terrain: Why Turkey matters in 2025-26

The Halkbank settlement did not occur in a vacuum or against a single thin rationale but inside a comprehensive U.S.-Turkey realignment across simultaneous, high-stakes fronts, in each of which Turkey was close to indispensable. And those fronts are already embedded in Turkey’s role as the second largest military in NATO, its strategic role in providing ME ground radar access, missile defense, and leverage over the Bosphorus Strait and European migration.

Iran nuclear crisis
Before the launch of combined U.S.-Israel operations on Feb. 28, U.S.-Iran nuclear talks were scheduled in Turkey where U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi were expected to meet on Friday (February 6) in Istanbul -- just days and weeks before the March 6 Halkbank deferred prosecution agreement respectively. Turkey is Iran's NATO-member neighbor and was both serving as a diplomatic venue during an active U.S.-Iran crisis as well as geostrategically motivated to prevent chaos on its borders and the empowerment of Kurdish factions in Iraq and northern Iran.

Syria’s post-Assad reordering
In December 2024 Turkish-backed forces toppled Syria's Assad regime; their leader, al-Sharaa, became president. The second Trump administration effectively treated Syria as a Turkish sphere of influence. Trump met al-Sharaa in Riyadh in May 2025 and lifted U.S. sanctions on Syria; the main Syria sanctions law, the Caesar Act, was repealed in December 2025. By January 2026 the U.S. had largely subordinated its former Kurdish partner force, the SDF, its principal ground ally against ISIS, to the new Turkish-aligned government in Damascus. Turkey's cooperation was central to every part of this.

Defense-industrial: the F-35 program and CAATSA
Turkey was expelled in 2019 from the F-35 program after purchasing the S-400 Russian air-defense system, and was sanctioned under a U.S. law called CAATSA. Reentry and sanctions relief became a top Turkish priority, with roughly $20 billion in defense technology at stake. Decisively, Erdoğan raised F-35 reentry and Halkbank at the same September 25, 2025 White House meeting, and the Turkish side's own account listed them together as bilateral issues alongside F-16 sales. The administration was reportedly exploring a workaround to declare the Russian system "inoperable" to satisfy the sanctions law.

Gaza
Turkey was a major participant in the Gaza ceasefire and hostage diplomacy that saw the release of remaining Israeli hostages and the ceasefire that follows. This was part of the rationale the government formally cited for the Halkbank settlement.

Per the prosecution's filing, "As described in the DPA,President Donald J. Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and leadership within the U.S. Department of State engaged in complex, multi-faceted, and multi-lateral efforts to arrange a ceasefire between the State of Israel and Hamas. In connection with those efforts, (i) high-level diplomatic discussions between the United States and the Republic of Turkiye were ongoing; (ii) the discussions related to addressing the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization, and obtaining the release of all hostages; and (iii) in the State Department’s view, a commitment by the United States to resolving the Halkbank matter on mutually agreeable terms was an important component of those diplomatic discussions. As has been publicly reported, those diplomatic discussions between the United States and the Republic of Turkiye led to assistance from Turkiye that was instrumental in the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s commitment to release all remaining hostages."

Upshot
Turkey in 2025-26 was pivotal across Iran, Syria, defense, and Gaza at once, and Halkbank sat explicitly inside that bargaining matrix as one Turkish ask among several. The government's stated reason -- national security and foreign policy -- is not a fig leaf. Even if it narrowly describes the deal as Israel-Hamas based, it is a concession that took place in a broader, dense, multi-front strategic reality.

8. The President’s conflict of interest reframed

With the wider geostrategic field in view the question isn’t whether the president’s financial interests in Turkey influenced the Halkbank disposition at all -- that’s prima facie not only unknowable on the current evidence, it simply misunderstands the issue at hand: did the president’s interests influence, or create exposure to influence on much larger U.S. geostrategic imperatives? That field hightens scrutiny over the documented conflict of interest, not lessens or obscures it. The answer lies in whether one views U.S.-Turkey decision making as coherent with U.S. interests at all. On that, if one expects the identical policy outputs from a president without a conflict of interest, the matter is settled; if not, the matter is radioactive. Given the lack of consensus and heavy controversy over the ongoing U.S.-Turkey realignment the Halkbank affair is likely to remain politically toxic for this presidency.

Put differently, what makes the president‘s financial interests here and this entire affair so radioactive is that it boils down to a much broader discussion about US foreign policy and it shouldn’t. It politicizes foreign policy decisions where now analysts have to be mindful that disagreements with the administration’s Turkey-related policies implicate the president. Analytical neutral output is now de facto colored by an uncomfortable political dichotomy: is this good U.S. policy? or is the president self-dealing? Thus, the president’s financial stake in Turkey is corrosive not because it can be shown to have bought any decision -- it cannot on current evidence -- but exactly because it makes that question unanswerable while turning every debate over US-Turkey policy into a proxy referendum on the president's integrity.

---
Pamuk, H. (2026, June 25). US moves ahead with $700 million jet engine sale to Turkey despite lawmaker concerns. Reuters. https://t.co/7NA2Od0VDK

[UN Watch @UNWatch]

.@UNSRVAW In response to your press conference and offer that “If Madame Kimchi who spoke, or any other survivor of the 7th of October is ready to finally meet with me, I am always ready to meet,” we hereby inform you that Ms. Ilana Gritzewsky Kimchi accepts your offer to meet.

[Hananya Naftali @HananyaNaftali]

Israel is already on its way.

The first Israeli rescue delegation is heading to earthquake-stricken Venezuela. Sixteen rescuers from Ready for Rescue, Magen, and SmartAID are deploying to search for survivors and save lives.

Despite having no diplomatic relations with Venezuela, Israel is once again among the first countries to offer help when disaster strikes. This is what Israel does. We save lives. 🇮🇱 🇻🇪

Photos by: Magen Disaster Management

[Henshi @HenshiG]

On July 20, 1944, in sun-drenched Rhodes, 30-year-old Turkish Consul General Selahattin Ülkümen walked into German military headquarters.

Through the windows, he saw troops rounding up nearly 1,700 Sephardic Jews — descendants of Spanish refugees who had lived on the island for 450 years, still speaking Ladino.

The Gestapo had summoned them for “registration” and a supposed short trip nearby. But Ülkümen knew the truth: the boats, the trains to Piraeus, and Auschwitz awaited.

He carried a list — officially 13 Jews with Turkish passports. Quietly, he had added 25 to 30 more names.

Born in 1914 and multilingual, Ülkümen had arrived in 1943 as the last Turkish diplomat in Axis Europe. After the Germans seized Rhodes, they pressured Turkey to close the consulate. Turkey refused.

Tragedy struck on February 18, 1944, when bombs hit the consulate. His pregnant wife Mihrinissa was critically wounded; two staff died. An emergency delivery saved their son Mehmet, but Mihrinissa passed away.

Her mother then took her own life. At 30, Ülkümen was a widower with a newborn.

Five months later, the Nazis arrested the Jewish men and ordered the women and children to report — or their husbands would be shot.

Ülkümen confronted German commander General Ulrich Kleemann. Turkey was neutral — his only leverage.

He demanded the release of all Turkish citizens. When challenged on the expanded list, he calmly declared: “Under Turkish law, spouses and families of Turkish citizens are automatically protected.”

There was no such law. He invented it on the spot.

He argued for hours, invoking neutrality and the threat of diplomatic crisis. Kleemann relented. More than 40 families — roughly 50 people, up to 200 by other counts — were released.

The rest of Rhodes’ Jews were deported. Only about 150 survived Auschwitz.

The Germans detained Ülkümen after Turkey broke relations with Germany.

He endured under their guard until liberation in 1945, learning his Jews had reached safety in Turkey. He continued his diplomatic career quietly, never remarrying, and rarely spoke of Rhodes.

His son Mehmet followed in his footsteps.

In 1989, Yad Vashem named him Righteous Among the Nations, the first Turkish citizen honored. Israel issued a postage stamp; Turkey later awarded him the Distinguished Service Medal. He died in Istanbul in 2003 at 89.

Selahattin Ülkümen had every reason to do nothing — grieving his wife, raising an infant, isolated under Nazi watch. He could have stopped at the 13 verified names.

Instead, this young widower wrote extra names, invented a law, and outbluffed the Gestapo. Whole bloodlines survive today because one Turkish consul chose to lie for strangers on a July afternoon.
His crime? Inventing a law that didn’t exist.
His legacy? Families who never boarded the train to Auschwitz.
Selahattin Ülkümen — quiet hero, guardian of life.

May his memory be a blessing.

[Jonah Platt @JonahPlatt]

⚡️Antisemitism is not merely a Jewish or an Israeli problem.

This is a civilization challenge.

— Ritchie Torres @RepRitchie

[Israel War Room @IsraelWarRoom]

🚨EXPOSED: Israeli forces uncovered a 25-meter-deep tunnel near the A-Zaim crossing in the Jerusalem area that police say was allegedly intended for terrorist activity and the smuggling of illegal infiltrators into Israel.

Following a forensic investigation, two suspects were arrested: a Palestinian Authority Arab from al-Eizariya and an Arab from Jerusalem.

Forces also recovered digging tools, water bottles, gloves, face masks, and other equipment from the site.

Israeli police stated, "We will continue to operate with zero tolerance against any attempt to harm the security of Israel's citizens, using all operational and intelligence tools at our disposal."

[Greg - Israelite in Exile (surviving the Galut) @anexiledjew]

Unfortunately, despite me having muted him for more than a year, @PiersMorgan from @PiersUncensored has taken it upon himself to block me, as I believe he does to many Jews.

Should he see this, he may be interested to know how journalism has always worked in Gaza, even before this war.

And even with his so-called international colleagues.

[Ihab Hassan @IhabHassane]

BREAKING: Thousands of people across the Gaza Strip have launched massive anti-Hamas protests.

This man holds a banner that reads: "For God's sake, Hamas out out."

[OctaPokta @OctaPokta]

אלפי חות'ים מחכים ליום פקודה על מנת לפלוש לעיר אילת

לפני כמה ימים דווח על כך שנרשמה כמות חריגה של אזרחים תימנים שנוחתים בעיר עקבה בירדן. בנוסף, אירע מקרה בו תימן שלחה כשב"מ - כלי שיט בלתי מאויש לעבר אזור המלונות, בניסיון לבחון את צה"ל. הנושא עדיין נמצא בחקירה.

עוד מראשית המלחמה ואף מלפני כן, החות'ים בתימן היוו בעיה אסטרטגית רצינית עבור ישראל. מדובר במס' גבוה של מחבלים ששבוע אחר שבוע בימי שישי מתפללים לטבוח ביהודים ולהגיע לירושלים הבירה

נא ראו את הסרטון פרופגנדה המצורף, תודה ל- @Hadassaexpress על התרגום. תראו כמה הסתה מילדות, "מוות ליהודים", גבורה.. מזכיר לכם משהו?

במהלך השנים האחרונות, המשטר האיראני דאג לאמן את אותם לוחמים ח'ותים ולהכין אותם לתרחיש פלישה פוטנציאלי לישראל (בדומה לנוח'בות בעזה).

בגבול המערבי גובלת מצרים אשר בינה לבין העיר אילת ישנו רצף טופוגרפי טקטי (הרי אילת) שהופכים את ההגנה על העיר אילת לקלה יותר, לאורך ההרים ישנם בסיסי צה"ל שמהווים חוצץ בין העיר המרכזית למצרים.

אך בגבול המזרחי המצב שונה לגמרי, הגבול עם ירדן בחלקו פרוץ לחלוטין, ממוקם במרחק של 1 ק"מ בלבד מאזור המלונות.

החשש האמיתי אינו דווקא מגיע מאזור המלונות בפרט, חדירה מהגבול עם ירדן צפונית לאילת בשילוב של מתקפה מהים (כשב"מים - כלי שיט בלתי מאויישים) והסחה באזור המלונות, עלולה לגרום לתרחיש קשה הרבה יותר (תרחיש תיאורתי):

1. טנדרים חודרים את הגבול במגוון פרצות שונות מצפון לאילת ועוצרים את התנועה בכביש 90 לחלוטין.

2. צה"ל מתמודד במקביל עם פיגוע המוני סמוך לאזור המלונות וכשב"מים מתאבדים בסמוך לחופי המתרחצים ולכן רוב המאמצים מופנים לאזור הזה.

3. במקביל, הכוח התוקף מנצל את הסחת הדעת וסוגר על העיר עם מאות/עשרות טנדרים מכיוון צפון, ואופנועי ים עם חמושים מחופי עקבה אל חופי העיר.

אחת החולשות המרכזיות במפרץ אילת זה העובדה שהוא מרוחק באופן ניכר משאר חלקי הארץ ועד שהתגבורת תגיע באירוע מתפרץ עלול לקחת זמן רב. בנוסף, בשל הקרבה לעקבה, חיל האוויר לא יוכל לסייע בתרחיש של קרבות רחוב בשל חשש לירי דו-צדדי. הדבר היחיד שיכול למנוע תרחיש כזה, זה מודיעין מוקדם וסיכול!

אז מה הפתרון?

צריך לצאת מנקודת הנחה שלא ניתן לדעת את כוונותיו של האויב בזמן נתון, אלא רק את היכולות. בהנחה ולא ניתן לחזות מתי אירוע כזה עלול להתפרץ בכל רגע הפתרון המיטבי זה לתגבר את כיתות הכוננות באילת ברובים חצי אוטומטיים, לאמן מתנדבים להשתמש במקלעים וברובי צליפה. בנוסף, לכל אזרח זכאי לנשק צריך להיות אקדח פרטי להגנה עצמית זמין בכל העת.

כולנו ראינו את כוחה של ההכחשה ב-7 באוקטובר ואת הנזק שהיא עלולה לגרום. אילת היא עיר מהממת ביופיה הטבעי, עיר נופש שרבים מגיעים אליה על מנת להירגע ולנפוש. אך התדמית הזאת אינה צריכה להשפיע כלל על ההיבטים הביטחוניים.

תרחיש פלישה לעיר אילת זהו תרחיש ריאלי! שצריך להתכונן אליו גם ברמה הנפשית. האויב לא מסתיר מאיתנו את כוונותיו, הוא מאיים בגלוי ובמפורט, מתאמן, מתחמש וגם מעז.

אם לא נהיה מוכנים - נהיה אבודים.

[MEMRI @MEMRIReports]

Turkey-Based Family Therapist Dr. Mona Sobhy on U.K. Muslim Brotherhood TV: Jews Knead the Blood of Gentile Children into Their Matzah; Muslims Used to Hide Their Children from the Jews before Passover

[BP @bsptx1]

@afalkhatib @ElliotMalin Hamas & IRGC are learning from each other. Testing methods to suppress internal dissent and sharing the results. This is what the enables by failing to act.