@Quinurum@GhostCoase If we want to revise that account for persons, I think we need a principled reason for treating persons differently from other concrete processes. The difference seems to be whether one treats consciousness as a particular causal physical process or an abstract pattern.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase I agree the substrate doesn’t matter too much. It isn’t about neurons or carbon molecules specifically, but the architecture, structure, and internal relations. A process can be multiply realizable while still being a particular process.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase I suppose my view of consciousness is that it just is the organized, ongoing activity of the brain (not in the simplistic “pain = C-fibers firing” sense, but as a higher-level physical process).
@Quinurum@GhostCoase And I’m not sure why persons should be an exception. Unless there’s some principled reason to think personal persistence differs from the persistence of every other concrete entity, continuity seems like the natural starting point.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase Relation R explains resemblance, but not why this future person is literally the subject of my current experiences. If every future experience belongs to a numerically distinct subject, then from my present perspective my stream of consciousness still ends, even if another begins
@Quinurum@GhostCoase Suppose the teleporter produces 2 psychologically continuous successors instead of one. If identity isn’t preserved because of branching, then psychological continuity alone doesn’t seem sufficient for identity. If both are me, then it seems numerical identity has been abandoned.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase I don’t think the original point depends on sleep at all, but a broad metaphysical principle outside debates about personal identity, that persistence of objects in general is a continuous evolution through time. Again consider the computer program example.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase If I’m running a program on one machine, pause it, then later create a new process on a different machine where I left off, I’ve reproduced the computational state, but that’s not the same instance or execution.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase If I’m running a program on one machine, pause it, then later create a new process on a different machine where I left off, I’ve reproduced the computational state, but that’s not the same instance or execution.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase I think it fits ordinary metaphysics of persistence, that objects persist by continuous existence through time, not by disappearing & being recreated elsewhere. I think that requires the stronger argument.
@Quinurum@GhostCoase If the teleporter just created an atom by atom replica without destroying the original body, it seems like that is a numerically distinct entity. Destruction doesn’t seem to change anything other than terminating the physically instantiated conscious process.
I’ve become more drawn to the idea that Luke knew Josephus, particularly with Gamaliel’s speech in Acts 5, and book 20 of Antiquities. It’s not just that they share the same information, but that Luke gets the chronology wrong by either skimming or misreading the text.
Christopher Nolan revealed that he wanted to include the famous “Nobody” wordplay from Homer’s The Odyssey in the film but ultimately couldn’t make it work.
The joke relies on Odysseus telling Polyphemus that his name is “Nobody,” so when the Cyclops cries, “Nobody is attacking me!”, the others leave, thinking nothing is wrong.
According to Nolan, the pun simply didn’t translate naturally into modern dialogue.
@WriterJohnBuck If God’s attributes are identical, in what sense are they distinct?
And lack of composition is ontologically simple, but a mind with intentionality, knowledge, will, & agency seem more theoretically complex than the essence of impersonal reality as identical to its existence