Ethereum the protocol has done a lot of work to guarentee censorship resistance.
Yet Ethereum apps often end up with compromising centralised defaults.
IMO the Access Layer org within the EF has the sole goal of changing that! Here is a great write up by Charles on this:
@kassandraETH haha ya, from my experience there will be many small improvements over time that happen so subtlety and then all of a sudden you’re a 10x better swimmer
RAI Dollar is built to Ethereum's CROPS principles: censorship resistance, open source, privacy, security.
The RD stablecoin will be uncensorable and all protocol contracts will be verified and published with a FLOSS license.
Long live the Money God! 🗿
CROPS mandate: https://t.co/dc1S8k9Azg
good to be working with you all on this from Account Interface.
same Access Layer cluster. App Enablement and Account Interface are both focused on the places where protocol guarantees can quietly disappear.
making the self-sovereign path the default one is our shared mission.
Canada is going through its own version of the Chat Control mess with the C-22 bill:
https://t.co/BTXwaRJ3Ws
Highly encourage fellow Canadians to contact senators and make clear how you feel about the importance of (backdoor-free, no asterisks) end-to-end encryption, and its benefits to a secure, free and open society.
Particularly given that we're entering a difficult transition period for cybersecurity due to AI, it's even more important than before that we (i) minimize all backdoors and mass data collection, and (ii) give users very clear and legible guarantees about what kind of security they are getting, with no weasel language.
Let's make an Ethereum where Cloudflare goes down and you don't lose access
Let's make an Ethereum where a hacked website can't trick you into signing your money away
Let's make an Ethereum where no single company can shut you out
Let’s make an Ethereum where you never have to trust a middleman to use it
Ethereum can be running just fine while a frontend or RPC outage blocks access to DeFi.
The protocol's guarantees don't automatically extend to the apps people use.
Sharing some thoughts on CROPS and our App Enablement work within the EF's Access Layer 👇
EIP-8037 and EIP-8038 are on today’s ACDT agenda.
I encourage application developers, infrastructure providers, and enterprise teams to join the discussion.
Your input matters, and it’s important that devs hear different perspectives as Glamsterdam moves forward.
https://t.co/4PgH0bsefY
#ACDT #Ethereum #eip8037
Over the past few weeks I've gone from thinking leanPCS is total bull to being a total bull. So let me explain some of these buzzwords in more detail.
At the core, 8288 is about hyper-scaling data and execution for any computation that needs to get performed on a piece of data once, the chain learns the answer, and then we never need to see that data again. This sounds very specific, but it includes most "heavy" things happening on Ethereum:
* Signatures
* STARKs
* Merkle branches
* FHE computation
* ...
Really the first two are the most important.
Once we go quantum-safe, signatures get bigger (65 bytes ECDSA -> 1-6 kB WOTS/SPHINCS depending on params) and ZKPs get much bigger (200-1000 bytes with groth16, PLONK, etc -> 128 kB with STARKs). This is unsustainable to put on chain, and 8288 fixes this.
8288 works by aggregating STARKs in the mempool. First, you as a user generate the STARK or SPHINCS signature or PCS opening (more on that last one later), and publish it. Then, each node listens. Each tick, each node takes all of the new objects that it has seen, and generates a STARK containing a list of "claims":
"pubkey P has signed message M"
"program X run on data D has output Y"
"p(X) = Y for some polynomial P whose hash is H"
and a proof that it has seen a signature, STARK or PCS opening verifying those claims. So the only information getting re-broadcasted is:
(i) hashes of inputs and outputs (~64-96 bytes per claim)
(ii) a single STARK proof per tick
These aggregate proofs themselves get re-aggregated, and eventually you get to a single "master proof" in the block, that verifies that all of those statements are true. And so the only other data that has to actually go on chain is the statements (the (P, M), (X, D, Y), (X, Y, H) tuples I described above), not the actual signatures or proofs. This gets put into a specialized frame type.
Now, let's get into the leanSPHINCS vs leanSTARK vs leanPCS part.
The core distinction is: *what is the underlying object that the user is creating?*
In leanSPHINCS, it's a signature, and specifically this particular type of purely-hash-based signature: https://t.co/HOazliHq9N
If we add leanSPHINCS, then users will be able to make quantum-safe accounts, and pay only a little bit of gas (4096 for the 64 bytes) for each signature. So we get scalable quantum-safety for regular accounts, multisigs, etc. But it's only one specific signature scheme, you can't do anything else.
In leanSTARK, it's a STARK. This means it's fully general: the user runs whatever computation they want, and publish a STARK of it. So you can use it for:
* Any signature scheme (including eg. lattice-based ones if you like those)
* A multisig that hides its internal logic
* Privacy protocols
* Private account abstraction: authorization logic that depends on some value hidden elsewhere in the state, so you can have one key that controls all your accounts without publicly linking them to each other
Basically, it's a free for all, in the same way the EVM is a free for all.
But leanSTARK has a practical downside. The protocol would have to specify the language in which users write their programs (we call this the "ISA"). So we would have to agree on that language. This is a really big deal - it's the first big case of "Ethereum moving beyond the EVM" - and so it's likely to take time to agree on the details of it, especially since the ISA would be hard to upgrade. There are benefits to taking longer on this, figuring out the ideal ISA, and then even giving access to it inside regular contracts.
LeanPCS is the third option. PCS stands for "polynomial commitment scheme": a proof that P(x) = y. The most important thing to know about PCSes is that they are by far the most important "hard" component of a STARK (see here: https://t.co/EEQWMU0gAf ). If you have a "magic PCS oracle" (which from the EVM's point of view, 8288 is), you can verify a STARK in ~20-40k gas.
The most important gain with PCS is that there is far less that we need to choose. Specifying a PCS only requires specifying a field, and there is a natural option: the 128 bit binary field (technically, we can go more general than that, and say the 2^k-bit binary recursive tower field, going up to 256)
LeanPCS is less efficient than leanSTARK onchain, because you would have to put multiple claims to prove one thing. But it's arguably more efficient offchain, because you have much more flexibility to choose proof systems.
But most importantly, leanPCS gives you the same generality as leanSTARK, in a way that could potentially be implemented very quickly. And once we figure out the ISA, we can add leanSTARK later.
So there is a route to getting "the cryptographic proof singularity" much faster than any of us expected, and that route runs through 8288 with leanPCS.
https://t.co/dUHONMh75g
With EIP-7906, we can even make these protections a part of the Ethereum protocol! Apps would define such "circuit breakers" as part of their contacts - no third parties involved. Protecting 1 in 2 blocks is cool - now let's make it 2 out of 2 blocks!
App developers: Please join Monday's call with Ethereum core devs and contract auditors to discuss Glamsterdam gas repricings (EIP-8037/8038)!
The goal is to gather evidence and understand the impact on deployed contracts.
Your input is important!
🗓️ Mon Nov 16, 14:00 UTC