Which is why no one has heard a peep from Rubio over the past 48 hours. America's most powerful secretary of state since Kissinger and yet the moment the deal was signed he magically went into occultation
Prime Minister Netanyahu has few people to blame but himself.
When President Trump posted his now-famous message, "Help is on the way," Netanyahu likely saw a historic opportunity: persuading the President of the United States to join a campaign against Iran and fundamentally alter the regional balance of power.
From that moment onward, it appeared that Israel's overriding objective was to convince Trump that the time had come for a decisive confrontation with the Islamic Republic. Every argument, every intelligence assessment, and every potential scenario seemed directed toward one goal: securing greater American involvement.
The problem was that the underlying assumptions were deeply flawed. It is difficult to believe that Netamyahu genuinely expected Kurdish groups, opposition movements, or exiled political figures to trigger regime change in Iran. Such expectations would reflect a profound misunderstanding of the resilience of the Islamic Republic and the limitations of external pressure.
That was not a strategy; it was wishful thinking.
Trump has always preferred clear victories and limited commitments. He is willing to use force, but he has consistently shown little appetite for open-ended conflicts or nation-building projects. The prospect of regime change in Tehran may have been appealing rhetorically, but once the conflict threatened broader economic consequences, particularly disruptions to energy markets and maritime trade, the calculus inevitably changed.
The Strait of Hormuz represented the critical turning point. An extended closure or sustained disruption of shipping lanes would have imposed significant costs on the global economy and directly affected American interests. For a president focused on economic performance and domestic political considerations, that was a risk not worth taking.
The Israeli PM should have understood this. They knew that Trump had no intention of deploying large-scale American ground forces to Iran under virtually any circumstances. Without such a commitment, regime change was never a realistic objective. Military pressure alone could weaken Iran, but it was unlikely to bring down the regime.
Faced with mounting economic risks and limited strategic upside, the administration's incentives shifted toward de-escalation and diplomacy. Reaching an arrangement with Tehran that preserved freedom of navigation and prevented a wider regional conflict became the more attractive option.
In that context, efforts by Netanyahu to block or complicate such an agreement only increased friction with Washington and reinforced the administration's determination to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp.
The result is that Israel risks finding itself in a strategically weaker position. It has not achieved a transformative outcome in Iran, while at the same time potentially damaging its credibility with its most important ally.
The broader lesson extends beyond this particular conflict. Future American administrations may become even more skeptical of arguments that military pressure alone can fundamentally transform Iran's political system. The war may ultimately mark the end of an era in which regime change was viewed, explicitly or implicitly, as a viable foundation for Western policy toward Tehran.
If that is the case, any Israeli policymaker will need to rethink their assumptions. Weakening Iran and overthrowing the Islamic Republic are not the same objective. The recent confrontation demonstrated that the former may be achievable through military means; the latter almost certainly is not without a level of American commitment that neither President Trump nor, likely, future U.S. presidents are prepared to provide.
The result is a diplomatic fiasco of historic proportions for Israel, one that is unlikely to fade quickly and whose political and strategic consequences may be felt for years to come.
#IranWar
The MOU appears to grant significant up-front concessions to Iran without commitments in return other than a temporary agreement not to target ships in the SoH. With @jaketapper and @sabrinasingh24 on @CNN.
NEW: Sharyn Alfonsi goes scorched earth on Bari Weiss:
"Over the weekend, my contract with CBS News expired, drawing to a close nearly twenty years with the network, including more than a decade at 60 Minutes.
Following an intense editorial dispute over our CECOT story, repeated attempts by my representation to establish a path forward were met with absolute silence from network executives. The message could not be clearer: my time at 60 Minutes is apparently over.
In the coming days, network leadership may attempt to hide behind corporate euphemisms like "modernization" and “restructuring” to explain away my departure. Don't be misled. This was not a routine corporate transition; it was a deliberate choice to penalize a journalist for refusing to sanitize factually accurate reporting, and it sends a chilling message to the entire newsroom.
Fearless, independent reporting has always been the defining standard at 60 Minutes. Today, CBS management is abandoning that mission, choosing access journalism over accountability and protecting power rather than scrutinizing it.
The wall between editorial independence and corporate interest at CBS is being methodically torn down. Journalists willing to challenge authority are being pushed aside in favor of those who will not. If this continues, the result will be a broadcast that looks like 60 Minutes but lacks the courage and character to produce journalism that matters.
To my colleagues, who became family - working beside you has been the privilege of a lifetime. You are second to none. I’ve learned exactly what it costs to hold the line right now. Hold it anyway. Viewers and the people who trust us with their stories deserve nothing less."
Backstory:
- January: https://t.co/l518elnE4b
- April: https://t.co/8pWTTjOIbk
- May: https://t.co/LfKHnm18nF
The Collapse of Deterrence Against Iran?
Paradoxically, one of the most serious consequences of this campaign may be the erosion of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, specifically, the loss of the implicit sword hanging over Tehran as it considers whether to move toward nuclear weapons capability.
For years, one of the main factors restraining the Iranian leadership under Khamenei from openly advancing toward a bomb was the fear that doing so could trigger a large-scale military campaign aimed not merely at damaging Iran’s capabilities, but at threatening the regime itself.
From Tehran’s perspective, however, Iran has now endured precisely such a confrontation and survived it.
More importantly, the conflict exposed the significant limitations facing both Israel and the United States in any future campaign against Iran: the reluctance to commit ground forces, constraints on available munitions, and Israel’s deep operational and strategic dependence on the United States.
At the same time, Iran may have concluded that its ability to threaten or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, thereby inflicting severe damage on the global economy, gives it a level of coercive leverage that the West is ultimately unwilling to challenge decisively.
It is important to acknowledge that Iran withstood an unprecedented military assault in terms of the scale of firepower directed against it, yet the regime remained intact and did not capitulate. That reality may lead Tehran to conclude that the deterrent credibility of both Israel and the United States has been fundamentally weakened.
This perception could become even stronger after the U.S. elections and under future American administrations, many of which may be even less willing to enter into direct confrontation with Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, Iran’s resilience during the conflict may have shattered the aura of overwhelming Israeli-American deterrence.
Paradoxically, deterrence may have been more effective when it remained ambiguous and untested. Once military power was actually employed, it may have demonstrated the limits, rather than the strength, of Western coercive capacity against Iran.
This is a deeply consequential development. One indication is that Iran reportedly adopted tougher positions in post-war negotiations than it held before the conflict began. The loss of the deterrence card could ultimately convince the Iranian leadership that this is precisely the moment to move toward nuclear weapons capability, believing that neither Israel nor the United States possesses either the will or the ability to stop it.
The core problem is that neither Israel nor the United States was prepared, or perhaps even capable, of going all the way in a confrontation with Iran. Instead, they appeared to rely on external variables, whether Kurdish unrest, internal regime instability, or hopes for political fragmentation inside Iran by supporting Ahmadinejad, as substitute mechanisms that could spare them the enormous manpower requirements and the prospect of a campaign stretching over months or even years.
Once those assumptions collapsed, what remained was essentially an air campaign. While tactically impressive, its achievements may ultimately pale in comparison to the strategic damage caused by exposing the actual limits of Israeli and American power in Iranian eyes.
From Tehran’s perspective, the war may have revealed not overwhelming Western dominance, but rather the boundaries of what Israel and the United States are truly willing and able to do militarily against Iran.
That, in itself, may become one of the most damaging long-term consequences of the entire campaign. This should force both Israel and the United States back to the drawing board. They will need to reassess how deterrence against Iran can be rebuilt under the current circumstances.
That will not be easy. Restoring deterrence after it has been tested , and, in Tehran’s eyes, exposed as limited, is far more difficult than maintaining an ambiguous threat that has never been put to the test. Most importantly, the conflict likely helped Iran better understand its adversaries through direct friction and real-world confrontatio.
#IranWar
#iran
Here is a link to the full NYT investigative report. Sorry, I’m out of gift links so if you’re not a subscriber, I highly recommend it or find a gift link through someone else. It’s worth it, and important. Significant reporting behind this. 2/3 https://t.co/KsDtyUj9jl
NEW: Records released tonight show that Reynolds, makers of Vuse vapes, gave $5 Million to MAGA Inc. days before the FDA wrote a policy that could allow them to make millions selling flavored vapes.
Via @kenvogel
https://t.co/CQgPfmEki0
When a federal agency tasked with protecting all Americans decides to mandate a specific religious worldview, it ceases to protect democracy and begins to threaten it.
Israel has long been one of America’s closest allies. But according to recent polls, it's rapidly losing support among the American public. I spoke with Israeli-American historian @bartov_omer, who has a new book out, “Israel: What Went Wrong?”
Ukraine carried out the biggest drone attack on Moscow in years, hitting a refinery, a fuel depot and industrial facilities. Drone debris was burning on the tarmac of the Sheremetyevo airport. Authorities say 3 people were killed, more than a dozen injured. Ukraine struck after Russia carried out a massive raid on Kyiv last week, killing 24 Ukrainian civilians.
When you listen to Trump talk about Taiwan (or many other topics) it’s the stuff he doesn’t say that is more revealing. Asked about Taiwan he blathers on about how big and strong China is, how tiny Taiwan is, about tariffs and dumb American presidents who didn’t use them. What doesn’t he talk about?
Alliances, obligations, democracy, values, honor, etc.
Keep in mind, if you don’t care whether Trump throws Taiwan under the bus, that wouldn’t be the only betrayal involved. We’d be screwing Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia too. I’m not saying we should get into a shooting war over Taiwan. I am saying Trump shouldn’t betray our allies, our values, and our national security and national honor just because he’s got a man crush on Xi.
APPLEBAUM: United States under this administration is no longer interested in leading democratic coalitions against Russia or anyone else.
President Trump has begun to align US foreign and domestic policies with values and practices of the autocratic world.
Democracy is no longer at center of United States foreign policy or American identity.
President and his administration attempted to strip funding from USAID or Radio Free Europe, American institutions that once promoted democracy around the world.
Trump verbally attacked Canada, European Union, America's Asian partners, placing inexplicably high tariffs on their goods.
Trump shouted at Ukrainian president in Oval Office, threatened to annex Greenland by force, claimed that EU was created to "screw US," and echoed Putin in calling NATO paper tiger.
Trump negotiated with Russia not to bring just peace to Ukraine or security to Europe, but also in order to help US businesses profit from lifting of Russian sanctions.
Trump effusive, supplicant to Pres Xi. China trip got nothing. Weakened Taiwan deterrence. Alarming to Japan, S Korea, Australia. Trump still mired in Iran war.
This is a huge development--a chance to firmly punish Russia for its savage aggression and help add to Ukraine's growing momentum.
Perhaps a chance to finally end this war.
UNLESS the @POTUS stands w/Putin, and Republicans in Congress are too cowed to oppose him.
Trump: "There are those that say this is maybe the biggest summit ever. They can never remember anything like it. I can say in the United States people aren't talking about anything else."
James Comey: "The Biden Justice Department indicted the president's son. Can you imagine that happening today? Honestly, while you're shaving, MAGA supporter, look in the mirror and say, could that happen today? And the answer is no, which is a really bad thing."