@LoganJastremski *The trend is more and more compute
^driven by larger and larger context windows, which cause compute to scale quadratically
People thinking we can run cutting edge models on consumer devices don't understand context and compute
@TrustlessState May be worth looking into some Near eco coins...
FWIW I've been pleasantly surprised by how good the major DeFi platform is (as a user). Good UI, lots of money/investing functions bundled together - it's pretty good!
"I don't believe there was debanking. I think it's a crock of shit. An absolute crock of shit."
— @Lead_Bank CEO @jackiereses
"There's 5,000 banks in the United States. We have a lot of red states. Are you telling me that in lots of red states, including where my company is headquartered, Kansas City, Missouri—those banks were not willing to bank, for example, conservative companies?"
"What debanking actually means is that banks transitioned out of offering crypto products or risky products like adult entertainment or something like that."
"That's legit. That happened to lots of companies. But that is not systematically debanking. That's choosing not to invest in the industry."
"There might be cases where a bank decides to not include executives in a particular industry, or they choose they don't want the risk associated with something. That is their prerogative, and banks can make decisions based on their own reputational risk."
"Thankfully, you have 50 states and 5,000 banks, and there are plenty of people who would take a pro and con of each side of those judgments, and be able to offer services to many of those people who say they were excluded from the banking system."
Doomerism approach is never a helpful framing, even if it starts with "calmly" and with best intentions.
What we need is risk assessment, practical timelines, and actionable plan.
AI is starting to overturn some of the long-held assumptions on mathematical complexity. At the same time risk of more intelligence applied to these problems yielding new surprising results is growing. But so far, we haven't seen practical security timelines for elliptic cruves materially changing. It's important for crypto space to keep vigilance and flexibility, but speculating about specific "months" timeline creates an unnecessary panic.
Going "bunker mode" is not practical nor a safe approach given how complex it is in operations. We can have better approaches here, for example by recording recovery PQC keys in parallel on application level.
Better approach is making sure that blockchains and tooling around them is designed with cryptographic agility in mind, allowing to evolve cryptography and let users easily update without sacrificing user experience.
NEAR account model was design with this in mind from the start - ability to manage and rotate keys, add and remove supported cryptography.
NEAR already supports post-quantum ML-DSA and we are planning to add hash-based cryptography too over time.
User can just rotate keys on your accounts without needing to move anything or have a complex operations.
Industry should accelerate post-quantum readiness, not because we have updated timelines, but because upgrading cryptography should be a routine operation, not a crisis response.
@JustinCBram@fundstrat And if he sold? What would be the net loss if he sold at this point? A lot more than -20%
Morale of the story - don’t be the egg guy
I don't recommend anyone scramble to move their funds to new wallets today. But we should take the risks to cryptography from AI-accelerated math seriously, and minimize our exposure to not just quantum-vulnerable cryptography, but also potentially AI-vulnerable cryptography.
The core new area of risk from this viewpoint is, unfortunately, ML-DSA / FHE / lattices.
(and it's also another reason, along with quantum, why ECDSA might fall even faster than expected, hence the "fresh address" recommendation)
So far most people have been in the mode of thinking "elliptic curves broken, hashes safe, lattices safe". But there is a good chance that the concrete security of lattices will take serious hits from the next two years of AI math.
The basic threat model is: factoring is something that naively takes 2^(n/2) time, but over decades smart people have found and optimized number field sieves, and degraded that to 2^O(n^(1/3)), which is why RSA keys and signatures need to be ~400 bytes (and not 64 bytes). What if there are skeletons in the closet like that, both for elliptic curves and lattices, that we are simply not smart enough to discover - but bots soon will be?
This is a major part of the reason why for the past year ethereum's lean roadmap has been going in the "hash-only" direction: no lattices, no ML-DSA, no Falcon, no lattice-based commitments inside ZK proofs, etc. Signatures in lean ethereum are all hash-based, either WOTS or SPHINCS-.
For signatures and proofs, we already know how to go hash-only. The bigger challenge is for *public-key encryption* - and this goes far beyond blockchains. Secure communication, anonymizing protocols, lots of things need public-key encryption.
And unfortunately there are long-standing mathematical theorems showing why public-key encryption cannot be done with hashes alone. You have to have some kind of trapdoor object that has at least one form of usable "structure" - either group theory (incl. isogenies) or lattices or code-based or potentially in the future even more newfangled and spooky things (local mixing?). But for anything that has structure, you should assume that AI will make at least some progress in breaking that structure. Here, one reasonable inference is that if you want to make something plausibly long-term secure, multiply the key sizes by 10.
To me that's a very plausible world and something not at all extreme to predict. If AI will bring us 50 years of math in 2 years, then that 50 years of math may very plausibly include a "naive factoring -> GNFS" level of improvement to our ability to break lattices. In that world, lattices will still exist, but they will have to be significantly bigger to guarantee the same level of safety.
And at those new larger sizes, hash-based constructions will beat lattice-based constructions on concrete efficiency in every use case where hash-based constructions are possible at all.
Theoretically, of course it's possible that hashes are broken too (eg. P = NP would imply that). But I think P = NP is very unlikely. And intuitively, it's much more likely that a mathematical object has exactly no exploitable structure (like hashes are intended to), than that a mathematical object has exactly ~3 forms of exploitable structure (for elliptic curves: associativity, Schoof, pairings) and not some secret fourth form of structure we have not yet discovered that greatly degrades its security (for elliptic curves, ECDLP and pairing security). Similar for LWE, SVP, RLWE and the zoo of lattice problems.
For this reason, we do not yet see any reason to worry and start padding the byte size of hashes (if we start to worry more, we would pad the round count first before doing anything to the byte size).
Concrete TLDR, my own personal views:
* Hash-based > lattice-based, in those situations where hash-based is possible at all
* For anything lattice-based, be much more paranoid on param sizes. Remember that blockchains are only a small portion of the cryptography story; this point goes far beyond blockchains and applies to eg. access to websites, secure messaging, Tor / VPNs ...
* For privacy protocols, strongly favor NOT putting encrypted notes onchain. Instead, send them offchain through some third-party mechanism.
* If it's not difficult for you, keeping your funds in addresses which have not yet been used to make a transaction is a good idea. If it's easy for you, do it. **But be careful about migrations; I personally have lost more money in botched migrations than I have lost in all hacks combined**.
* For multisig wallets, doing confirmations offchain is better than onchain, because this way the signatures of signer wallets do not get exposed to the public, so if ECDSA falls to AI much faster than expected, at least the multisig "gracefully degrades" to a 1-of-1 where the 1 is whoever was gathering the signatures - a much better place to be than "anyone can take the money"
https://t.co/oVjwZog2lL
@CamiRusso Near intents isn’t a “base protocol” it’s an app (i.e., a bridge)
Arbitrum unilaterally transferring assets from a hacker’s wallet is a better example
Hackers have no right to use every app/bridge unrestrained - let’s not pretend all “noble” apps ignore OFAC sanctions lists
From reg crypto:
“A digital commodity is a crypto asset that is intrinsically linked to and derives its value from the programmatic operation of a crypto system that is “functional, as well as supply and demand dynamics, rather than from the expectation of profits from the essential managerial efforts of others.” Digital commodity does not have intrinsic economic properties or rights, such as generating a passive yield or conveying rights to future income, profits…”
Personally I don’t see how you can read the above and think the new guidance means you can tokenize any given revenue stream and still qualify as a non-security, but I’m curious where you believe it says essential managerial efforts generating the revenue stream aren’t enough for security treatment (I may just be missing that).
@HesterPeirce@milesjennings 1000% agree with Hester - it’s very clear this only applies to non-securities
“Any start up… any revenue stream…” gross overstatement. If the revenue stream depends on the managerial efforts of others, it’s a security. The other Q’s clarify what managerial efforts may be.