Animasi peta seluruh perjalanan Prabowo:
- 26 kali perjalanan
- 58 kunjungan
- 39 kota
- 29 negara
Sumber: Wikipedia + kunjungan terakhir ke Perancis yang belum ada di sana.
Momen yang akan dikenang selamanya. Marquinhos setelah PSG memenangkan adu-penalti langsung mendatangi Gabriel dan menghibur. -mereka akan bermain untuk Brazil dalam beberapa minggu yad.- cc. @imanbr@bucin@diksat
Menlu kita sarjana teknik komputer, mantan TNI pangkat Letnan Satu yang resign sebelum naik pangkat, nol rekam jejak diplomasi.
Prabowo pilih dia bukan karena kapasitas, tapi karena dia orang kepercayaan sejak jadi sekpri.
Hasilnya?
a. Dubes RI untuk AS kosong lebih dari 2 tahun , baru keisi Agustus 2025 setelah didesak DPR, dan Sugiono sendiri ngaku di rapat resmi: "ini kesalahan kami"
b. Rapat koordinasi dubes tertunda hampir setahun
c. Para dubes pulang ke Indonesia, kesulitan menemui Menlu-nya sendiri
d. Diplomat karier demoralisasi, anggaran dipotong, merasa inisiatif mereka nggak akan pernah direspons dari atas
Sampai akhirnya Dino Patti Djalal , diplomat 40 tahun
, terpaksa bikin video di Instagram karena semua jalur komunikasi ke Sugiono diblokir berbulan-bulan.
Bukan dikritik lawan politik.
Dikritik orang dalam sendiri.
Ini bukan soal kurang pengalaman.
Ini soal Menlu yang jarang masuk kantor, ngurus negara kayak ngurus titipan boss-nya.
This chart is a brutal reflection of why public frustration toward political elites in many emerging markets continues intensifying because it shows that Indonesian lawmakers are compensated at levels that look extraordinarily disconnected from the underlying economic reality faced by the average citizen, with parliament salary reaching roughly 14.7x GDP per capita, among the highest ratios globally and second only to the Philippines in this dataset, despite Indonesia still remaining a country where purchasing power remains relatively weak, informal employment is massive, public service quality remains uneven, infrastructure bottlenecks persist, legal enforcement often feels inconsistent, and upward economic mobility for large parts of the population remains structurally difficult.
And this is precisely why charts like this become politically toxic because citizens naturally begin asking a very simple question: what exactly are taxpayers receiving in return?
In high-income countries, lawmakers may also earn very large nominal salaries, but those economies simultaneously generate far stronger productivity, higher institutional quality, better healthcare systems, stronger education outcomes, more efficient bureaucracy, higher legal predictability, and materially better public goods overall, meaning political compensation exists within a much larger and wealthier economic ecosystem.
But in Indonesia, the optics become far more uncomfortable because the political class increasingly appears capable of extracting upper-middle-class or even developed-market lifestyles from an economy that still struggles to generate broad-based prosperity for much of the population itself.
And perhaps the harshest part is that compensation alone is probably not even the real issue. The real issue is performance.
Citizens are generally willing to tolerate highly compensated leaders if the country visibly becomes richer, more efficient, more meritocratic, less corrupt, and economically stronger over time. But when corruption scandals remain persistent, policymaking appears inconsistent, infrastructure projects repeatedly face rent-seeking concerns, and wealth creation remains concentrated among political insiders, conglomerates, and connected elites, high political compensation begins looking less like professionalization and more like institutionalized extraction.
Importantly, this also helps explain why anti-elite sentiment, populism, and distrust toward institutions continue rising globally because once the gap between elite living standards and ordinary household realities becomes too visible, citizens increasingly stop believing the system operates primarily for collective national advancement and instead begin viewing politics as a mechanism for self-enrichment among those already close to power.
Ultimately, this chart reflects something much deeper than salary levels alone because it exposes the uncomfortable reality that in many emerging markets, the political class often succeeds in upgrading its own prosperity far faster than the nation it supposedly represents, and over time that divergence itself becomes corrosive to institutional trust, social cohesion, and long-term political legitimacy.
Halo @axiata@FirstlyMedia kenapa semakin buruk pelayanan pelanggan? 2x saya sengaja bertemu ke CS kalian di gedung Smart XL, dan internet saya tetap mati setelah 1 minggu ini. Apa jawab kalian?
Jaringan alfamart dan Indomaret itu jumlahnya 23 - 24 ribuan.
Menampung tenaga kerja hingga 400 ribu.
Dan jaringan Alfamart Indomart itu sistemnya franchise. Pemiliknya rakyat kecil. Alfa dan Indomart menjual brand dan manajemen.
Satu unit alfa atau indomaret butuh modal minimal 500 juta. Itu duit rakyat, bukan konglomerat.
Tumbuh dari bawah. Dengan memeras keringat selama bertahun-tahun.
Membunuh jaringan alfa dan indomart demi proyek politik bernama KDMP yang juga pakek duit rakyat..
Adalah tindakan khas rejim populis otoriter: mengadu domba antar rakyat.
Mengenang 21 Martyr dari Libya
Matius 24:9
โPada waktu itu kamu akan diserahkan supaya disiksa, dan kamu akan dibunuh dan kamu akan dibenci semua bangsa oleh karena nama-Ku (Yesus).โ
Karena rekrutmen asal-asalan oleh perusahaan taksi, mengakibatkan duka dan banyak korban yang meninggal. Harus dihukum mulai dari pemilik sampai ke sopir @id.greensm @pengemudi.greensm