@agostino_harry@PAHoyeck It seems to me that every rejection of metaphysics must be premised on a nominalistic and hence metaphysical worldview, since it presupposes a certain relation between mind and matter.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry I hope it was interesting! This essay is really good: https://t.co/3oKJlilsQq. Not all Peirce is so technical by the way, since he wrote a lot of lectures that were to be delivered to a general public.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry My favorite philosopher to read on these issues is Peirce. I can recommend some essays/lectures where he addresses these very questions, if you'd like.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry You are not solving the problem. You are denying that it exists. In what does the Earth's revolution of the Sun consist? Are there not laws of gravity that ground this regular occurrence?
@JosephBenJ2@agostino_harry@BanjoAtheist It's one of the trickiest philosophical problems I've thought about. In my view, it requires a notion of "mediate identity", whereby a single nature (which is self-identical) exists in two different modes, and thus introduces a fundamental separation.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry In what does the habit of your having a hot beverage consist? That sounds pedantic, but whatever is the basis for this regularity is, metaphysically, a real habit. The regularity isn't in the mere fact that you have it each day, but in how your conduct is regulated.
@agostino_harry@BanjoAtheist Sure, but I'd consider regularities and properties to belong to the same broad category, namely that of "generality". Properties inhere in substances, but their *universality* is considered only in relation to mind. This is, roughly, the Scotistic position.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry But what do you think is the difference between the objectification and the regularity itself?
The question whether Aristotle is saved hinges on the nature of the relation between real regularities and their objectifications.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry A crucial distinction: they depend on thought *as such*, not just the human capacity for thought. If you take thought (Thirdness) to be a fundamental category of being, then that the being of entia rationis depends on thought does not deny them ontological status.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry No problem!
Historical use of the term "pragmatism" has come to be associated more with the ideas of James and Dewey, rather than Peirce.
Peirce includes abstractions (see "Thirdness") as part of his ontology, and thus confers ontological status to HA objects.
@BanjoAtheist@agostino_harry The transformation from “is curved” to “curvature” is achieved via hypostatic abstraction, a fundamental logical operation which Peirce discusses at length. It is one of the core operations of mathematical thought, where we really do develop formal definitions of eg “curvature”.