Jangan punya mindset gini ya teman
"Tau gitu gue serok kemarin"
"Tau gitu gue cl dulu terus masuk di bawah"
"Tau gitu gue profit 20%"
"Tau gitu.."
"Tau gitu.."
Masalahnya ya emang ga akan ada yang bisa tau
Taugitumology only kill your edges
Disiplin aja pegang trade-plan dan strategi investasi yang lu punya. Profit by the book, loss by the book
Yang terjadi di luar trade-plan lu cuma noise, just focus on your journey
Salam hijau daun
Asli ini orang kebangetan sih.
Ngaku PhD tapi masa yang begituan gak diitung. Nanti kasih data yang salah lagi ke Presiden trus bikin berantakan semua.
Mundur aja lu poor-bye-ah
Jadi sebenere boleh kritik government ga ini?
Soale tiap kritik dicounter, seolah2 yg kritik tu “ga nasionalis” bahkan dijawab “nyenyenyenye”
Ditanya “trus solusimu apa!”
Banyak juga yg udah kasi solusi. Ttp aja dibales dengan narasi offensive.
"Krisis pasokan listrik PLN akibat stok batubara tidak cukup"
Meanwhile..
produksi batubara indo terbesar ke-3.
dan eksportir batubara no 1 di dunia.
unbelievable
Betul
Kalau kalian keberatan biaya transum untuk komuter dari Jabar ke Jakarta naik (karena subsidi dicabut), solusinya ya:
1. Pindah, jangan tinggal di Jabar tapi kerja di Jakarta
2. Vote out gubernur kalian yg gamau ikut subsidi (krn kalian ga dianggep prioritas)
Despite the strong rally in Indonesian equities today, foreign investors continued to sell the three largest banks: BBCA, BMRI, and BBRI.
That remains the most important signal. A sustainable bull market is difficult to achieve without foreign participation because these three banks collectively represent a significant portion of the market’s capitalization, liquidity, and institutional ownership base. Foreign investors still own a substantial share of Indonesia’s banking sector, which means their positioning continues to influence overall market direction. As long as they remain net sellers or stay on the sidelines, it is difficult to argue that sentiment has fundamentally turned.
This is why today’s rally should be viewed with some caution. Price action can improve temporarily, but a durable rerating requires fresh capital. Without meaningful foreign inflows, rallies risk becoming positioning squeezes rather than the beginning of a new upcycle.
The bond market tells a similar story. Indonesia’s bond selloff deepened after Bank Indonesia delivered an off-cycle rate hike aimed at stabilizing the rupiah. The 10-year government bond yield surged to 7.51%, the highest level since November 2022, while the 5-year yield briefly touched levels last seen during the pandemic period in 2020. Rising yields suggest investors continue demanding higher compensation to hold Indonesian duration despite the central bank’s intervention.
That said, the latest move from Bank Indonesia appears more measured than the previous surprise 50bps hike. The tone was more targeted and less indicative of emergency policy action. Policymakers appear to be signaling that they are willing to defend the currency while avoiding unnecessary damage to domestic growth.
What is particularly interesting, however, is that market participants are already looking beyond this move. Expectations are building for additional tightening at the June 18 meeting, with some investors discussing the possibility of another 50bps hike.
If that becomes the base case, the question shifts from whether Bank Indonesia can stabilize the rupiah to why such aggressive tightening is still perceived as necessary. Monetary policy can slow speculation and improve interest-rate differentials, but it cannot single-handedly restore confidence if investors remain concerned about growth, fiscal policy, earnings momentum, and capital flows.
Ultimately, the message from both equities and bonds is similar. Indonesia’s challenge is no longer purely about valuation. Many assets already look cheap. The challenge is confidence. Until foreign investors become buyers rather than sellers, it is difficult to argue that the market has fully turned the corner.
The issue is not whether children should receive nutritious meals. The issue is whether Indonesia has chosen the most expensive way possible to achieve that goal.
If the numbers in this chart are broadly correct, Indonesia is allocating 8.3% of its national budget to the MBG program, far above the proportions seen in countries such as the United States, Japan, India, and Brazil. That alone should trigger a serious discussion about efficiency, targeting, and implementation.
A well-designed nutrition program should begin with data. First, identify which schools actually need assistance. Many students already come from households that can afford meals or attend schools that already provide food. There is little reason for taxpayers to subsidize lunches universally when resources are limited.
Second, prioritize existing infrastructure. If a school already has a functioning cafeteria and kitchen, funding should flow directly there. If a school lacks facilities, build the kitchen and cafeteria first, creating a permanent asset that can serve generations of students. Corporate CSR programs, philanthropic foundations, and international development grants can help finance part of this expansion before relying entirely on the national budget.
Only when schools are too remote, too small, or lack the scale to operate efficiently should centralized kitchens such as SPPGs be deployed to serve multiple schools. In other words, SPPGs should be the exception, not the default solution.
Many successful school meal programs around the world are highly targeted. The United States focuses heavily on low-income households through free and reduced-price lunch programs. Japan integrates school kitchens directly into schools and treats meals as part of the educational process. Brazil prioritizes local procurement and community participation. None rely on a one-size-fits-all national model.
The challenge with MBG is not the objective. Few would disagree that better nutrition improves learning outcomes and long-term productivity. The challenge is making sure every rupiah spent maximizes impact.
Every rupiah allocated to MBG is a rupiah that cannot be spent on teachers, healthcare, sanitation, housing, irrigation, or infrastructure. That is why scale alone should never be the measure of success. The real measure is whether the program delivers the best nutritional outcome at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers.
Good policy is not about spending more. It is about spending smarter.
Gue jujur aja, sedikit banyak nyalahin kaum nyinyir!
Tiap hari kerjanya ngereog tentang Pemerintah kurang inilah kurang itu lah, semua salah!
Akhirnya membawa dapak buruk untuk IDR kita.
Gegara mereka, semua kena imbasnya.
Dikondisikan lah efek dari postingan sosmed kalian.
Setuju banget.
Memang benar, kok rupiah ini melemah karena netizen tiap hari ngereog pemerintah di sosmed.
Saya juga yakin waktu tahun 1998 rupiah juga jatuh gara-gara netizen tiap hari nyinyirin pemerintah di mading sekolah (karena waktu itu belum ada sosmed).
Our president, leader of the Republic of Indonesia, watches the poor eat their meal.
He does the watching from a lavish setting, his own plate stacked with expensive food.
Poverty as an evening's entertainment.
Katakanlah asumsi Prabs disabotase asing itu benar, lalu yg udah dia lakukan apaan?
Udah bijak ngatur sektor fiskalnya? Naruh orang yg kompeten gak di jajaran kabinetnya? Ngapain malah merapat jd "bestie" Israel?
Dia sendiri juga gak bisa menjaga public trust.