I’ve used Namecheap for about 14 years, after trying 6 different hosting platforms, and today is probably the biggest disruption I’ve experienced with them.
But one bad day doesn’t erase 14 years of reliability.
#Namecheap
🚨 IBADAN, THIS ONE IS FOR YOU! 🚨
Your next meal just got ridiculously cheaper! 🔥
For the next 7 days, enjoy FOODBOLT’s delicious Jollof Rice & Beef for just ₦1,500 instead of ₦3,500.
Good food. Crazy price. Limited time. Only on Shride
Open the app, order now, and enjoy every bite before the offer ends.
If you’re not on Shride, you’re paying too much.
Foodician Spag & Turkey:
Was ₦4,000.
Now just ₦2,000.
Same meal. Half the price.
The tribe is eating differently.
Download Shride:
https://t.co/QCHaSGnuAE
X has quietly launched its complete rewrite of X Web, starting with Logged-Out pages
Built with Tanstack Router and Tailwind, which brings in SSR Streaming, Vite, Rolldown, ES Modules, etc all the modern web practices
Congrats to the @Engineering Web team for pulling this off!
Why did Uber have 5,000+ microservices, a few years into the company being started? Thuan Pham, Uber's first CTO, who oversaw this massive boom:
"None of us wanted to go through that extreme of thousands of services. But when you are under a lot of pressure, and no time to react other than just survive to scale, you have to make a decision that increases speed and velocity! Because this speed and velocity allows us to build things quickly enough to survive.
We knew that backend (called "API" at the time), a monolith: this will prevent speedy development from happening.
So we made a declaration: anything that is NEW needs to be built outside of that (the "API"), as a microservice.
Then there's a team that's dedicated to decomposing that monolith into a bunch of services. This project (to decompose the monolith) was called Darwin.
The philosophy we operated with, at the time, was that no team should be blocking anybody else. (...) So that's how it came up to thousands of microservices. It was out of necessity ,so that we can just fan out and solve every problem all at once.
After things stabilized and the business became more mature, and growth was not as violent as that anymore, then the team, we actually had a project called Arc, to rationalize services."
🇳🇬 Nigerian Developer
Writes production APIs
Fixes midnight outages
Manages databases
Salary: ₦600K/month
🇬🇧 UK Junior Dev
Pushes small commits
Salary: £2,000/month (~₦1.5M)
🇺🇸 US Junior Dev
Uses the same StackOverflow
Salary: $3,000/month (~₦2.2M)
Same internet
Same GitHub
Same skills
Different passports
Different opportunities
Time to leave this country, FAM!
Inertia 3 beta is here! 🚀
This is a big one. New Vite plugin, optimistic updates, standalone HTTP requests, layout props, simplified SSR, and Axios has been replaced with a built-in XHR client.
Here's what's new 🧵
yes we over-hired during covid because i incorrectly built 2 separate company structures (square & cash app) rather than 1, which we corrected mid 2024. but this misses all the complexity we took on through lending, banking, and BNPL. and that we’re now targeting $2M+ gross profit per person, 4x our pre-covid efficiency, which stayed flat at ~$500k from 2019 until 2024. we have and do run an efficient company... better than most.
Tech is no longer about skill.
It’s about visibility.
There are insanely talented developers nobody knows. And average ones making 3x more because they show their work online.
In 2026, silence is expensive.
Your GitHub isn’t enough. Your CV isn’t enough. Your portfolio isn’t enough.
Distribution > talent.
If nobody sees you, you don’t exist.
So let me ask you…
Are you building in private or building in public?
Don’t hire an expert too early.
It was an expensive lesson that almost cost me $300,000.
After raising our pre-seed round (over $300,000), we felt unstoppable. Validated. Funded. Ready to “build properly.”
So we did what seemed logical.
We hired an experienced operator from a company that had raised over $30M.
On paper, she was perfect:
• Strong pedigree
• Structured
• Process-driven
• Operationally excellent
But we made one critical mistake.
We were still pre–product-market fit.
We were iterating weekly.
Sometimes daily.
Testing positioning.
Changing messaging.
Tweaking the product.
There was no stability.
And that’s where the friction started.
She needed structure to operate effectively.
Clear scope. Defined systems. Predictable workflow.
We had chaos.
She also came with rules: no work beyond 4 PM.
No work on weekends.
No after-hours email.
And to be clear, she wasn't wrong.
It just wasn’t compatible with our stage.
At that time, it was just my co-founders and me.
She was our first hire.
We were constantly experimenting, trying to reach product-market fit.
Despite having cash in the bank, we were still searching.
Speed mattered more than structure.
Eventually, we parted ways.
No villains. Just a stage mismatch.
Here’s what I learned:
Early stage (pre-PMF) → Hire generalists.
Post-PMF → Hire specialists.
Scaling → Hire experts.
Generalists thrive in ambiguity.
They can switch hats mid-day.
They optimize for momentum, not perfection.
Experts optimize for efficiency and structure, but structure only works when something is already working.
Many founders burn through their runway trying to install enterprise-grade processes in a startup that hasn’t found traction.
Don’t hire for pedigree.
Hire for stage-fit.
The right talent at the wrong time can still be a wrong hire.
Founders: what’s a hiring mistake that taught you something expensive?