L/S mgr, banks specialist. ExSBCWarburg/UBS. Securities industry since March1987. BSc(Syd, Biology) Skier. Cyclist. General advice only for wholesale investors.
The bust rolls on, and will continue to do so until Beijing decides to take its medicine. Bailing out the HH sector is what's needed. Will it happen? Highly unlikely at this stage. How? Stand in the market, say at a 10% discount to current levels, and take all comers. Gradually increase the bid price until the selling stops. Will cost how much? I'm estimating 25%-30% of GDP. If they don't do it? Then HH consumption will continue to weaken, for all the other reasons as well. The wealth effect is pernicious and ongoing.
The NSW govt's (appropriate) decision to defer further underquoting laws is akin to not mandating rigorous MTM rules. We know what effect MTM had during the depths of the GFC. The outlook for the dwelling market in Australia continues to deteriorate. $XXJ https://t.co/h0vdFBo150
TLDR: we should think about what a Central Bank of AI moving from easing to tightening mode could mean for the system at large.
Given that $NVDA has been named the "Central Bank of AI", there's at least some analogue to LTCM, dubbed the "Central Bank of Volatility" back in 1998. No, Jensen Huang is not short $80mln of 5 year vega on global equity indices. He's short (personal) vol, for sure, and has sold options, just not on the SPX or SX5E. But both Central Bank monikers speak to the roles each firm played in their respective ecosystems.
LTCM sold vol (short equity vol; long swap spreads and other carry generating trades) in such size that it set the price of insurance. Nvidia has been doing something structurally similar. As recently as September, it revealed plans to mobilize more than 500bln of investment in AI infrastructure with six firms, by guaranteeing the value of the equipment it sells to such projects.
A residual-value guarantee is economically a written put on GPU collateral. LTCM wrote puts (and calls) on the SPX; Nvidia is writing puts on the asset its own revenue depends on. That's very wrong-way correlation. Its math models saying otherwise, LTCM was vastly concentrated and undiversified. NVDA may be the same.
More broadly, LTCM's capital and risk appetite kept the system of financial market insurance running. NVDA's capital has done the same with respect to the AI financing system.
Most tie LTCM's downfall to Russia's default in 1998. That's not incorrect, but events earlier in 1998 mattered as well. Salomon was acquired by Citi in late 1997. The bond arb effort that Meriwether left behind was largely dismantled in early 1998 as a result. The disappearance of this "copycat" capital that also absorbed risk put even greater onus on LTCM to keep vols and spreads in line.
It's hard to imagine a post-Jensen NVDA as having such a healthy appetite for reinvesting the firm's profits back into the ecosystem that bought chips from it. That cash has greased the wheels in many ways and as firms like $CRWV see ballooning costs of capital, we should think about what a Central Bank of AI moving from easing to tightening mode could mean for the system at large.
I agree that chained CPI is probably the best of the official statistics, for monetary policy as well. It keeps CPI’s conceptual superiority to PCE (no nonmarket prices, better observed weights by focusing on consumer outlays rather than producer sales, and doesn’t account for things households consume but don’t pay for and therefore for which they never observe prices; this last is problematic in eg healthcare, which because of unique market structure often contains prices that are ultimately determined by government or are otherwise uninformative with respect to supply-demand imbalances). And chaining fixes the weighting problem in CPI that biases it upward but which PCE does better and is the primary reason for preferring PCE. Overall, this is the best of both worlds.
This of course still does not address deeper inflation measurement problems. But it would be an improvement. @federalreserve inflation task force should examine its benefits.
🚨 NOW: Treasury Sec. Scott Bessent just made it clear that Nvidia Board forcing out Jensen Huang does NOT let the rest of the company off the hook ‼️
"We don't know for a fact Jensen Huang knew this."
"The story was on Jensen Huang's personal foibles. The REAL story should be, did Nvidia know their client? Was there a robust effort to make sure there was no leakage? That they were selling to what were obvious pass-through shell companies!"
"It's important ANYONE at the company THERE be held accountable for THAT."
Megaspeed became one of Nvidia's BIGGEST AI chip customers, reportedly spending more than $4 BILLION
There were already questions as to whether they were being routed to China. We can't hand China an inch!
The Board cannot just push out Huang and think it all goes away.
@stevehou@jeffcafe_ Did the Republicans bring this into daylight now to get the process going whilst still in control of Congress, to try and save him? Will the Dems seek to oust him?
They are not poached. They are voting with their feet. Why blame them for choosing a better, higher paying employer? Until the governance of Australian Rugby is fixed the "poaching", as some call it will continue, as it should. AFL kickers become NFL punters. Vita Vea plays NFL, he makes Taniela look undernourished.
So is Warsh right about communications? Dan's paper suggests a tradeoff: less discussion might mean better economic forecasts, but at the cost of worse economic forecasts about the Fed
We should see now Warsh is cutting back communications
The latest Australian bank results reflected little in the way of anticipatory provisioning/overlays for the deteriorating housing market. Clearly #APRA feel there is nothing to see here. Ridiculous. base:0xeec468333ccc16d4bf1cef497a56cf8c0aae4ca3 $CBA $NAB $WBC
Sydney is the market leader, it is down 11% from the peak (3/2026) and falling at 18%pa. The vast majority of loans are variable (ARM) rate, typically at a rate 180bp above the RBA cash rate.
At the peak Australian housing stock was worth about A$11tn, or ~400% of GDP. About 1/3 of the housing stock is mortgaged with $2.6 Tn of debt, about 2/3 owner occupiers, 1/3 investors.
Since the peak, actual listings have risen 20% to about 40k or 1.3% of all Sydney houses. There are probably another 10k available for sale but unlisted. Sydney, at the peak auctioned about 900 properties a week and sold about 75% of those. Now about 600 are offered each week, and only 35% (200) are sold. Apart from auction sales, another 1800 are sold each week via private treaty.
Regulators tell us about 2% of all mortgages currently have negative household cashflow but other comments about negative equity are very rubbery as they lack a price level. From what we can see about 10% of borrowers are distressed, 5% very distressed.
There is not enough regulatory pressure on our banks to tell the truth about asset quality in resi mortgage books. Banks have to offer changed loan conditions to borrowers who declare themselves suffering hardship. These changes may include principle repayments deferred if the loan is P&I, maybe repayments are suspended if there is enough borrower equity. Actual interest rates charged are not amended.
The regulator, APRA, doesn't require banks to report their stock of hardship loans, or the flows in and out of the bucket. $CBA.AX recently reported 147k new hardship cases, so sector new hardship cases are likely running well over 500k pa. Technically hardship loans can be thought of as loans that have been evergreened. Hardship loans are a type of substandard loans, with a few being currently classified as non-performing.
NPA rates reported by banks remain very low (~1%) , as do relevant provisions. In my view the real NPA rate in Australian banks resi books (75% of total loans) is now about 3-5%. Resi mortgage portfolios typically carry a risk weight density of 25%. Overall CTE/Asset leverage ratios are about 4.7% whilst Tier 1 ratios are obviously much higher, and flatter the banks.