John Foy

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@Big12Pokes You self identified yourself as one

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@realJoelFischer I believe he can plead the 5th, and if he does he can be held in contempt of court and hopefully that would result in him being put in jail to compel him to testify.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@NYCMayor I guess they have to pay for the 17% pay raises they voted for themselves.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

I worked at a gas station in 1974 at 13 years old. I even did oil changes and light mechanical work and received a commission. Worked summers like that through high school and college. I don’t make $7K a week now. I am a CFO now. I have so much more purchasing power today than I ever did then. This is the most misleading comment I have ever read on X. Just a communist posting lies. I can’t believe some people believe this stuff.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@geola388 Are you seriously saying you spend 100M to keep Dort? Because that is what it would have cost. Tell me you are not this stupid. Has to be click bait.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

All of these hot takes from people that can't carry Sam's jock strap is really funny. Always easier to spend other people's money. Dort's fouls and 3 point shooting was a real hindrance to the team these past playoffs, he has lost a step. His play is in decline. Cason will replace him in the lineup, a younger player with more upside and is a good defensive player. Cason should end up a better overall player than Dort. This is how you manage the roster, don't overspend (crazy second apron) on players that are descending, and keep younger players that are ascending. No one should be surprised with this move.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@CAlmanza1007 Hideous logo. Way too busy and the colors are awful. How about something simple?

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@mitchellvii Iran has explosives all over the island and if they feel they will lose the island they will blow up everything they can. That will not win them war, but they will want a severely damaged asset falling in to US hands.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@shaisprint And Joe has to be paid in cash, and not all of that is liquif for the ownership group.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@Aaron_Jones11 They have no sports books

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@Ostate_Daily The Osage Casinos do not have a sports book.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

Just so Tech fans know, you can't bet on sports at Osage Casinos. Sorsby and Tech players would have to go somewhere else to feed their sports betting addictions.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@JustinMargolius You can't bet at games at Osage Casinos, Sorsby would have to go somewhere else.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

As long as the Big 12 applies its bylaws and rules properly and not in a capricious and arbitrary manner? This should be a slam dunk for the Conferece. Tech went judge shopping and got a bogus ruling.

This situation is a genuinely important and fascinating legal crossroads for college athletics. Let me give you a thorough explanation of why courts have historically been reluctant to police the internal rules of voluntary associations, and why the Sorsby situation represents such a significant departure from that tradition.

The Doctrine of Judicial Deference to Voluntary Associations

The Foundation: Freedom of Contract and Private Ordering

At the core of American jurisprudence is a deeply rooted principle that private parties who voluntarily organize themselves into associations have the right to govern themselves by their own rules. Courts have long recognized that when individuals or institutions freely agree to join an organization and accept its bylaws and governance structure as a condition of membership, they have entered into a form of contract. The courts respect that private agreement.

The NCAA, the Big 12, and their member institutions are all voluntary associations. No university is compelled to join. When Texas Tech became a Big 12 member, it affirmatively agreed to abide by the conference's bylaws, including those governing player eligibility. The Big 12 is now seeking declaratory and injunctive relief precisely to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure. That framing is not accidental. It is a direct appeal to this foundational doctrine.

The Longstanding Common Law Rule

For well over a century, courts across the United States have articulated a clear rule: they will not substitute their judgment for that of a voluntary association on matters of internal governance, so long as three conditions are met. First, the association must have followed its own rules and procedures. Second, those rules must not violate public policy or statutory law. Third, the decision must not be arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith.

The seminal principle traces back to nineteenth century cases involving fraternal organizations, labor unions, and professional societies. Courts reasoned that they lacked both the institutional competence and the constitutional mandate to serve as appellate bodies for private organizations. A judge is not equipped to second guess whether a quarterback violated the spirit of a gambling prohibition any more than a judge is equipped to decide whether a mason violated the rituals of a lodge.

The "Internal Affairs" Doctrine

Building on this common law foundation, courts developed what is sometimes called the internal affairs doctrine for associations. Under this principle, so long as an association acts within the scope of its own bylaws and does not violate external legal constraints such as antitrust law, civil rights statutes, or constitutional due process where state action is present, the judiciary will defer entirely to the association's conclusions.

Applied to college athletics, this meant for decades that the NCAA and conferences could determine eligibility, enforce sanctions, and discipline members without meaningful judicial review. Courts repeatedly dismissed challenges to NCAA eligibility decisions, citing their unwillingness to become a "super appeals board" for athletic governance.

Why Courts Declined to Intervene: The Policy Reasons

The reasons courts articulate for this deference are both practical and philosophical.

Institutional competence. Courts do not have expertise in the nuanced governance of athletic conferences. Judges are not positioned to weigh the competitive integrity concerns of a conference against the individual interests of a single player. The Big 12's member institutions and their athletic directors collectively possess that institutional knowledge. Athletic directors, coaches, and conference officials are wrestling with implications of a decision that many believe could set a precedent for years to come, precisely because they understand the governance ramifications in ways a single judge cannot.

Flood of litigation. If courts routinely entertained challenges to voluntary association bylaws, every aggrieved member or participant could seek judicial relief, rendering the association's rules unenforceable and its governance paralyzed. The NCAA alone sanctions thousands of eligibility decisions each year. Judicial review of each would be unworkable.

Respect for private ordering. A foundational value in American law is that competent parties who freely enter agreements should be held to those agreements. When Texas Tech accepted Big 12 membership, it accepted the conference's authority over matters including player eligibility. Courts are reluctant to unwind that bargain.

Separation of institutional roles. Courts exist to resolve legal disputes and protect legal rights. They are not designed to manage the internal affairs of sports conferences. When courts assume that role, they distort both the judicial function and the associational function.

The Erosion of Deference: Where the Sorsby Case Stands

What makes the Sorsby situation so legally significant is that it represents the latest and most dramatic example of courts stepping into precisely the space they have historically refused to occupy.

The Lubbock judge ruled that Sorsby would suffer "probable, imminent and irreparable injury" if he were not allowed to participate in college athletics while his case proceeds through the legal system, specifically that he would lose access to high-level training and the ability to maximize his athletic potential, thereby complicating his decision to enter the 2026 NFL Supplemental Draft.

That reasoning is a sharp departure from tradition. Courts once routinely rejected exactly this type of argument, holding that the loss of athletic eligibility, however painful to the individual, did not constitute the kind of irreparable harm that justified judicial intervention into association governance.

The NCAA ruled Sorsby ineligible after it discovered he wagered approximately $90,000 on professional and college sports over four years, including 40 bets involving Indiana football when he was a freshman with the Hoosiers in 2022. The NCAA followed its own procedures, conducted its review, and applied its bylaws. Under the traditional doctrine, that process should have been the end of the matter for purposes of judicial review.

The Antitrust Complication

The Texas Attorney General's intervention introduces a further layer of complexity. The Texas Attorney General's office warned that any attempt to sanction Texas Tech would constitute a per se antitrust violation and expose the conference to more than $200 million in liability. This is the one area where courts have consistently been willing to examine voluntary association conduct, because antitrust law is a statutory constraint that applies regardless of the private nature of the association.

However, most legal scholars would argue that a conference enforcing its own eligibility bylaws against a member school that knowingly played a player declared ineligible bears little resemblance to the kind of horizontal price fixing or output restriction that constitutes a per se antitrust violation. That argument is legally aggressive, and the Big 12's decision to file in federal court in Dallas reflects a strategic effort to get that question resolved by a court outside Texas state jurisdiction.

The Broader Significance

The Big 12 is asking for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure, and conference leadership has already discussed possible penalties if the school moves forward with playing Sorsby, including monetary sanctions and a ban on competing in the Big 12 Championship Game.

The conference is essentially asking a federal court to reaffirm the traditional doctrine: that a voluntary association has the right and the authority to enforce its own bylaws against its own members without state court interference. The irony is profound. The very doctrine the Big 12 now invokes to protect itself is the same doctrine the Texas state court discarded when it granted Sorsby his injunction against the NCAA.

What the Sorsby case ultimately reveals is a fracturing of the legal consensus that sustained college athletic governance for a century. As courts become more willing to grant individual plaintiffs injunctive relief against NCAA and conference decisions, the enforcement architecture of college sports becomes increasingly unworkable. The Big 12's federal lawsuit is an attempt to rebuild that wall, one legal filing at a time.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

The Big 12 should win their lawsuit against Texas Tech as a matter of law in a slam dunk.

This situation is a genuinely important and fascinating legal crossroads for college athletics. Let me give you a thorough explanation of why courts have historically been reluctant to police the internal rules of voluntary associations, and why the Sorsby situation represents such a significant departure from that tradition.

The Doctrine of Judicial Deference to Voluntary Associations

The Foundation: Freedom of Contract and Private Ordering

At the core of American jurisprudence is a deeply rooted principle that private parties who voluntarily organize themselves into associations have the right to govern themselves by their own rules. Courts have long recognized that when individuals or institutions freely agree to join an organization and accept its bylaws and governance structure as a condition of membership, they have entered into a form of contract. The courts respect that private agreement.

The NCAA, the Big 12, and their member institutions are all voluntary associations. No university is compelled to join. When Texas Tech became a Big 12 member, it affirmatively agreed to abide by the conference's bylaws, including those governing player eligibility. The Big 12 is now seeking declaratory and injunctive relief precisely to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure. That framing is not accidental. It is a direct appeal to this foundational doctrine.

The Longstanding Common Law Rule

For well over a century, courts across the United States have articulated a clear rule: they will not substitute their judgment for that of a voluntary association on matters of internal governance, so long as three conditions are met. First, the association must have followed its own rules and procedures. Second, those rules must not violate public policy or statutory law. Third, the decision must not be arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith.

The seminal principle traces back to nineteenth century cases involving fraternal organizations, labor unions, and professional societies. Courts reasoned that they lacked both the institutional competence and the constitutional mandate to serve as appellate bodies for private organizations. A judge is not equipped to second guess whether a quarterback violated the spirit of a gambling prohibition any more than a judge is equipped to decide whether a mason violated the rituals of a lodge.

The "Internal Affairs" Doctrine

Building on this common law foundation, courts developed what is sometimes called the internal affairs doctrine for associations. Under this principle, so long as an association acts within the scope of its own bylaws and does not violate external legal constraints such as antitrust law, civil rights statutes, or constitutional due process where state action is present, the judiciary will defer entirely to the association's conclusions.

Applied to college athletics, this meant for decades that the NCAA and conferences could determine eligibility, enforce sanctions, and discipline members without meaningful judicial review. Courts repeatedly dismissed challenges to NCAA eligibility decisions, citing their unwillingness to become a "super appeals board" for athletic governance.

Why Courts Declined to Intervene: The Policy Reasons

The reasons courts articulate for this deference are both practical and philosophical.

Institutional competence. Courts do not have expertise in the nuanced governance of athletic conferences. Judges are not positioned to weigh the competitive integrity concerns of a conference against the individual interests of a single player. The Big 12's member institutions and their athletic directors collectively possess that institutional knowledge. Athletic directors, coaches, and conference officials are wrestling with implications of a decision that many believe could set a precedent for years to come, precisely because they understand the governance ramifications in ways a single judge cannot.

Flood of litigation. If courts routinely entertained challenges to voluntary association bylaws, every aggrieved member or participant could seek judicial relief, rendering the association's rules unenforceable and its governance paralyzed. The NCAA alone sanctions thousands of eligibility decisions each year. Judicial review of each would be unworkable.

Respect for private ordering. A foundational value in American law is that competent parties who freely enter agreements should be held to those agreements. When Texas Tech accepted Big 12 membership, it accepted the conference's authority over matters including player eligibility. Courts are reluctant to unwind that bargain.

Separation of institutional roles. Courts exist to resolve legal disputes and protect legal rights. They are not designed to manage the internal affairs of sports conferences. When courts assume that role, they distort both the judicial function and the associational function.

The Erosion of Deference: Where the Sorsby Case Stands

What makes the Sorsby situation so legally significant is that it represents the latest and most dramatic example of courts stepping into precisely the space they have historically refused to occupy.

The Lubbock judge ruled that Sorsby would suffer "probable, imminent and irreparable injury" if he were not allowed to participate in college athletics while his case proceeds through the legal system, specifically that he would lose access to high-level training and the ability to maximize his athletic potential, thereby complicating his decision to enter the 2026 NFL Supplemental Draft.

That reasoning is a sharp departure from tradition. Courts once routinely rejected exactly this type of argument, holding that the loss of athletic eligibility, however painful to the individual, did not constitute the kind of irreparable harm that justified judicial intervention into association governance.

The NCAA ruled Sorsby ineligible after it discovered he wagered approximately $90,000 on professional and college sports over four years, including 40 bets involving Indiana football when he was a freshman with the Hoosiers in 2022. The NCAA followed its own procedures, conducted its review, and applied its bylaws. Under the traditional doctrine, that process should have been the end of the matter for purposes of judicial review.

The Antitrust Complication

The Texas Attorney General's intervention introduces a further layer of complexity. The Texas Attorney General's office warned that any attempt to sanction Texas Tech would constitute a per se antitrust violation and expose the conference to more than $200 million in liability. This is the one area where courts have consistently been willing to examine voluntary association conduct, because antitrust law is a statutory constraint that applies regardless of the private nature of the association.

However, most legal scholars would argue that a conference enforcing its own eligibility bylaws against a member school that knowingly played a player declared ineligible bears little resemblance to the kind of horizontal price fixing or output restriction that constitutes a per se antitrust violation. That argument is legally aggressive, and the Big 12's decision to file in federal court in Dallas reflects a strategic effort to get that question resolved by a court outside Texas state jurisdiction.

The Broader Significance

The Big 12 is asking for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure, and conference leadership has already discussed possible penalties if the school moves forward with playing Sorsby, including monetary sanctions and a ban on competing in the Big 12 Championship Game.

The conference is essentially asking a federal court to reaffirm the traditional doctrine: that a voluntary association has the right and the authority to enforce its own bylaws against its own members without state court interference. The irony is profound. The very doctrine the Big 12 now invokes to protect itself is the same doctrine the Texas state court discarded when it granted Sorsby his injunction against the NCAA.

What the Sorsby case ultimately reveals is a fracturing of the legal consensus that sustained college athletic governance for a century. As courts become more willing to grant individual plaintiffs injunctive relief against NCAA and conference decisions, the enforcement architecture of college sports becomes increasingly unworkable. The Big 12's federal lawsuit is an attempt to rebuild that wall, one legal filing at a time.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

The Big 12 should win this in a slam dunk, here is why:

This situation is a genuinely important and fascinating legal crossroads for college athletics. Let me give you a thorough explanation of why courts have historically been reluctant to police the internal rules of voluntary associations, and why the Sorsby situation represents such a significant departure from that tradition.

The Doctrine of Judicial Deference to Voluntary Associations

The Foundation: Freedom of Contract and Private Ordering

At the core of American jurisprudence is a deeply rooted principle that private parties who voluntarily organize themselves into associations have the right to govern themselves by their own rules. Courts have long recognized that when individuals or institutions freely agree to join an organization and accept its bylaws and governance structure as a condition of membership, they have entered into a form of contract. The courts respect that private agreement.

The NCAA, the Big 12, and their member institutions are all voluntary associations. No university is compelled to join. When Texas Tech became a Big 12 member, it affirmatively agreed to abide by the conference's bylaws, including those governing player eligibility. The Big 12 is now seeking declaratory and injunctive relief precisely to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure. That framing is not accidental. It is a direct appeal to this foundational doctrine.

The Longstanding Common Law Rule

For well over a century, courts across the United States have articulated a clear rule: they will not substitute their judgment for that of a voluntary association on matters of internal governance, so long as three conditions are met. First, the association must have followed its own rules and procedures. Second, those rules must not violate public policy or statutory law. Third, the decision must not be arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith.

The seminal principle traces back to nineteenth century cases involving fraternal organizations, labor unions, and professional societies. Courts reasoned that they lacked both the institutional competence and the constitutional mandate to serve as appellate bodies for private organizations. A judge is not equipped to second guess whether a quarterback violated the spirit of a gambling prohibition any more than a judge is equipped to decide whether a mason violated the rituals of a lodge.

The "Internal Affairs" Doctrine

Building on this common law foundation, courts developed what is sometimes called the internal affairs doctrine for associations. Under this principle, so long as an association acts within the scope of its own bylaws and does not violate external legal constraints such as antitrust law, civil rights statutes, or constitutional due process where state action is present, the judiciary will defer entirely to the association's conclusions.

Applied to college athletics, this meant for decades that the NCAA and conferences could determine eligibility, enforce sanctions, and discipline members without meaningful judicial review. Courts repeatedly dismissed challenges to NCAA eligibility decisions, citing their unwillingness to become a "super appeals board" for athletic governance.

Why Courts Declined to Intervene: The Policy Reasons

The reasons courts articulate for this deference are both practical and philosophical.

Institutional competence. Courts do not have expertise in the nuanced governance of athletic conferences. Judges are not positioned to weigh the competitive integrity concerns of a conference against the individual interests of a single player. The Big 12's member institutions and their athletic directors collectively possess that institutional knowledge. Athletic directors, coaches, and conference officials are wrestling with implications of a decision that many believe could set a precedent for years to come, precisely because they understand the governance ramifications in ways a single judge cannot.

Flood of litigation. If courts routinely entertained challenges to voluntary association bylaws, every aggrieved member or participant could seek judicial relief, rendering the association's rules unenforceable and its governance paralyzed. The NCAA alone sanctions thousands of eligibility decisions each year. Judicial review of each would be unworkable.

Respect for private ordering. A foundational value in American law is that competent parties who freely enter agreements should be held to those agreements. When Texas Tech accepted Big 12 membership, it accepted the conference's authority over matters including player eligibility. Courts are reluctant to unwind that bargain.

Separation of institutional roles. Courts exist to resolve legal disputes and protect legal rights. They are not designed to manage the internal affairs of sports conferences. When courts assume that role, they distort both the judicial function and the associational function.

The Erosion of Deference: Where the Sorsby Case Stands

What makes the Sorsby situation so legally significant is that it represents the latest and most dramatic example of courts stepping into precisely the space they have historically refused to occupy.

The Lubbock judge ruled that Sorsby would suffer "probable, imminent and irreparable injury" if he were not allowed to participate in college athletics while his case proceeds through the legal system, specifically that he would lose access to high-level training and the ability to maximize his athletic potential, thereby complicating his decision to enter the 2026 NFL Supplemental Draft.

That reasoning is a sharp departure from tradition. Courts once routinely rejected exactly this type of argument, holding that the loss of athletic eligibility, however painful to the individual, did not constitute the kind of irreparable harm that justified judicial intervention into association governance.

The NCAA ruled Sorsby ineligible after it discovered he wagered approximately $90,000 on professional and college sports over four years, including 40 bets involving Indiana football when he was a freshman with the Hoosiers in 2022. The NCAA followed its own procedures, conducted its review, and applied its bylaws. Under the traditional doctrine, that process should have been the end of the matter for purposes of judicial review.

The Antitrust Complication

The Texas Attorney General's intervention introduces a further layer of complexity. The Texas Attorney General's office warned that any attempt to sanction Texas Tech would constitute a per se antitrust violation and expose the conference to more than $200 million in liability. This is the one area where courts have consistently been willing to examine voluntary association conduct, because antitrust law is a statutory constraint that applies regardless of the private nature of the association.

However, most legal scholars would argue that a conference enforcing its own eligibility bylaws against a member school that knowingly played a player declared ineligible bears little resemblance to the kind of horizontal price fixing or output restriction that constitutes a per se antitrust violation. That argument is legally aggressive, and the Big 12's decision to file in federal court in Dallas reflects a strategic effort to get that question resolved by a court outside Texas state jurisdiction.

The Broader Significance

The Big 12 is asking for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what it describes as outside interference with its governance structure, and conference leadership has already discussed possible penalties if the school moves forward with playing Sorsby, including monetary sanctions and a ban on competing in the Big 12 Championship Game.

The conference is essentially asking a federal court to reaffirm the traditional doctrine: that a voluntary association has the right and the authority to enforce its own bylaws against its own members without state court interference. The irony is profound. The very doctrine the Big 12 now invokes to protect itself is the same doctrine the Texas state court discarded when it granted Sorsby his injunction against the NCAA.

What the Sorsby case ultimately reveals is a fracturing of the legal consensus that sustained college athletic governance for a century. As courts become more willing to grant individual plaintiffs injunctive relief against NCAA and conference decisions, the enforcement architecture of college sports becomes increasingly unworkable. The Big 12's federal lawsuit is an attempt to rebuild that wall, one legal filing at a time.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@mrlongshore Suicidal empathy. Cry me a river.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@TechAthletics @TexasTechFB We need states that allow gambling to rule he can’t play for Tech.

[John Foy @foy_john48925]

@On3 We need states that allow gambling to rule he can’t play for Tech.