π¨ FWG Podcast Ep. 31
Michael Bernegger sees @Broadcom's revenue miss and softer outlook as an early sign that AI infrastructure expectations may be running ahead of reality.
Beyond AI, Michael argues investors may be underestimating the market implications of a broader Middle East conflict and the risks it poses to oil markets.
π The details matter. Watch the full episode.
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The analysis in this video is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
@cryptorover Bitcoin being down 50% without a broader equity selloff cuts both ways. Either crypto got there first, or it's simply reacting more aggressively to the same concerns.
The result of this policy is record-setting depletion of oil and product inventories not just globally in the areas directly affected by the supply shortfall (Asia, Oceania, Europe, parts of Africa), but also and above all in the United States, which significantly made up for the shortfall. The impact, moreover, is uneven among products, as physical constraints affect certain key products immediately: fertiliser, sulphur acid, helium, diesel, kerosene, jet fuel, but less so light crude oil and gasoline.
In short, the US administration was able to lower prices, mitigate the immediate effects of the shortfall both domestically and globally, give financial markets a feeling of security, but at the price of a more shaky oil market condition in the summer and fall, when inventories are depleted to operational minima.
The next article in this series covers the structure of the global oil industry. This will allow to draw much more precise conclusions for each of the three highlighted scenarios in detail, and deduct from there more refined financial market implications.
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This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
THE IRAN WAR STALEMATE: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PHYSICAL ENERGY MARKETS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS
Michael Bernegger examines the widening disconnect between physical energy market conditions and financial market expectations, with inventory depletion and developments in the Strait of Hormuz emerging as key factors for global markets.
Read the full analysis belowπ
THE IRAN WAR STALEMATE β WHAT WILL FOLLOW?
This is the first article in a series covering the stalemate in the Iran war and its implications for financial markets. The articles will appear in brief time intervals in the next weeks.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis extends and extends β and gets worse and worse. Fundamentals in the energy (oil and gas) and related (fertilizer, naphta, helium) markets continue to deteriorate. The steep decline in oil inventories β both private commercial and government/strategic reserves β is unprecedented, as various official statistics and industry voices continue to warn. The latest warning came from Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), to the G-7 finance minister meeting. Birol stated that the shortfall in crude and product supplies has depleted commercial inventories to a few weeks remaining.
But now, after the weak April/May period, the demand for oil and products will rise sharply due to seasonal factors. In the northern hemisphere, the spring planting and the summer holiday travel season will increase demand for diesel, fertiliser, jet fuel, and gasoline in coming months. In other words, a supply shortfall and inventory drawdown to operational minima will meet a seasonal peak in demand. The strategic reserves will not be able to help throughout the summer.
These are the facts. Now what was the intention and the consequences?
The US policy can be interpreted as a form of industrial policy. The objectives seem to have been foursome:
First, to limit the price increases of retail gasoline in the US, a key measure of content or discontent for households, consumers, and voters. Indirectly limiting the rate of inflation, which is important in a broader sense even for voters.
Second, to stimulate domestic supply by higher prices enough for drillers to open new wells and maximise production on idled wells.
Third, to bolster US energy exports and capture global market share and benefit from improved terms of trade.
Fourth, to supply the world economy with sufficient energy to avoid a complete breakdown of economic activity. The mechanism is that ships are all redirected to the US East Coast, as prices there are held much lower than in Asia and in Europe. Thus, US production is running at maximum capacity, and inventories are depleted there rapidly as well.
Fifth, to stabilise financial markets, above all, prevent yields from rising in order to support the stock market.
The result of this kind of industrial policy measures is that the price of oil, both domestically and globally, is way too low to cause sufficient or significant demand destruction. Energy demand has been very strong in 2026, above all also in the period since the start of the war. By historic experience, demand for energy is relatively price-insensitive anyway in the short run. If the price rise additionally is artificially reduced, then demand stays elevated.