Georgia

Policy officer and researcher @ldnsocmedobs. Into political communication, social media research, elections, and parties. Formerly @TPIlebanon & @LCPSLebanon

[Oxford Social Media Observatory @Oxsocmedobs]

📣 We’re launching the London Social Media Observatory! 🎉

➡️ We are a new multidisciplinary research centre, directed by @CasAndreu & funded by the @UKRI_News Future Leaders Fellowship

🧵[1/4]

[Joost van Spanje @joostvanspanje]

New team member!

Delighted to welcome 🇱🇧Georgia Dagher to our 🇪🇺ERC (@ERC_Research) Consolidator Grant 🇯🇵🇭🇺🇲🇦🇬🇷🇱🇧🇿🇦🇳🇱team.

Georgia works on the project as a research assistant. She recently obtained a PoliSci Master’s degree from @rhulpirp 🇬🇧London.

See
https://t.co/ACZoq4fj79

[Mouin Rabbani @MouinRabbani]

It is fairly common for diplomats and senior officials to fudge the truth, tell half-truths, provide misleading statements, etc. It's part of the job description.
Yet contrary to popular belief it is less common for such individuals to resort to outright lies (statements they know to be entirely false), because credibility is a hard-won currency and without it their job becomes impossible.
The most prominent exception in recent years has been Antony Blinken. He's set new standards for mendacity, exceeding even his role model Henry Kissinger and approaching his partner Binyamin Netanyahu, who remains in a class of his own.

[Andreu Casas @CasAndreu]

New report: "Academic Access to Social Media Data for the Study of Political Online Safety", w. @georgidag @Ben_OLoughlin: https://t.co/HvqSK1KTKk
As new threats reach the social media environment, platforms continue to obstruct independent research. It’s time to act!

[Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur oPt @FranceskAlbs]

May 2025 lead us to see the end of the Israeli Apartheid in Palestine. Everyone has a role to play in that, as workers, bureaucrats, consumers, voters, citizens. No one should rest until this monstruosity becomes the past.

[sarah @sahouraxo]

This is not Gaza.

This is not Beirut.

This is Damascus.

Israel is bombing Syria’s capital—one of the oldest cities in human history, standing for over 11,000 years—with some of its heaviest bombardments ever.

[Thomas van Linge @ThomasVLinge]

#Syria: incredible scenes from the moment the prison cells were opened at the women's detention area of Sednaya prison.

[Nour Naim| نُور @NourNaim88]

“The precedent set in Gaza is going to spread everywhere… it signals the demise of the rule of law. When I was in #Gaza, I felt like it was the prelude to the end of humanity.”

- Dr. Tanya Hassan, a witness to Israel’s genocide of civilians in #Gaza.

[Rania Khalek @RaniaKhalek]

Israel has been violating the ceasefire since it went into effect two days ago, even bombing north of the Litani river while repeatedly firing at people in the south.

At some point the Lebanese resistance will have to respond because otherwise Israel’s pattern of firing when it wants will continue.

And when that happens, the west will accuse the Lebanese resistance of violating the ceasefire.

Just remember it was Israel.

[Mike Azar @AzarsTweets]

An analysis of the ceasefire deal:

The question of who won and who lost this war is not particularly interesting. Each side will claim whatever is in its best interest to claim. The more meaningful question is: what will be its impact on the various actors, particularly in Lebanon?

Hezbollah's local opponents view the ceasefire deal, and the war in general, as having diminished its domestic power. With provisions aimed at dismantling its military infrastructure and bolstering the Lebanese army, the ceasefire seems intended to reduce Hezbollah's influence by weakening its military capabilities.

But Hezbollah’s strength within Lebanon has never been confined to its weapons. Even if it were disarmed tomorrow, its domestic political objectives, its popular grassroots support, and its representation within state institutions would remain intact. This ceasefire, far from sidelining Hezbollah, nudges it to deepen its power domestically by turning its attention inward.

The structure of this agreement, if implemented as written, risks further fracturing the country. It pits an already weakened Lebanese state—represented by its army—against Hezbollah. Hezbollah remains the country’s strongest and most organized political and military entity, as well as the legitimate representative of the largest community in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Army

The Lebanese army finds itself in an impossible position. Its mandate to enforce the ceasefire is undermined by its inability to challenge Hezbollah directly. To suggest that it can disarm or dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure is, frankly, absurd. Hezbollah is not just an armed group; it is a deeply rooted political force with widespread popular support that extends far beyond its weaponry. It is represented in the army, in the army leadership, and in the political branches that command the army. It is not an external force but an integral part of Lebanon's social and political structure.

The army, one of the few entities that enjoys broad-based respect across sectarian lines, is being set up to fail. Any perceived weakness in fulfilling the ceasefire’s terms risks further eroding its credibility, domestically (with half the country) and internationally. Yet confronting Hezbollah, if it were even plausible, risks political and societal backlash, along with a backlash within the army ranks, further destabilizing the country.

This leaves the army walking a fine line: attempting to meet international and domestic expectations without overstepping into conflict with Hezbollah. Ultimately, this fragile balancing act reinforces the narrative that Lebanon’s state institutions are ineffective, which they are when perceived to be acting against the interests of one of Lebanon's communities.

Hezbollah

This brings us to the core issue: Hezbollah’s internal strength lies not in its arsenal (at least not exclusively) but in the fact that it is the legitimate representative of millions of Lebanese. This war and ceasefire do little to change that basic fact.

To frame Hezbollah solely as an armed militia and foreign proxy is to misunderstand its role in Lebanon and the basis of its power. It is a domestic political project as much as a regional military one—a project that, like it or not, champions the interests of the community it represents. It is fundamentally a rational actor whose actions are driven by clear incentives. It pays lip service to national unity and power-sharing while steadily increasing its control over the state and its institutions in line with the growing numbers and strength of its community. That is exactly what any other actor in its position would do given the incentive structure created by Lebanon's political system (i.e., maximizing your share of power/resources relative to others is an existential imperative in a system designed to pit communities against one another).

This is what makes the ceasefire’s disarmament provisions largely symbolic. Far from weakening Hezbollah, the terms of the ceasefire incentivize it to further entrench itself within legitimate state institutions like the army and the government (the enforcers of the ceasefire).

Lebanese communities opposed to Hezbollah’s dominance may find themselves increasingly sidelined due to their fatal misreading of the true source of Hezbollah's power and the incentives that shape its actions. These groups charactarize their problem as being *only* with Hezbollah's weapons. They demand it be disarmed and its military wing folded into the army, as if these actions would weaken the group's domestic influence or alter its political objectives.

The reality is that Hezbollah's domestic political objectives are shaped by incentives—primarily, the pursuit of power and resources within the state structure to serve the perceived interests of the community it represents (as understood by that community itself, not by Hezbollah’s opponents). The group’s influence is fundamentally tied to the size and cohesion of that community. Consequently, Hezbollah’s influence will inevitably pull the state and the army toward its own objectives rather than away from them. Even if its military capabilities were partially or entirely dismantled, the group’s domestic power and objectives would remain largely unaffected. For Hezbollah’s opponents, the core problem therefore lies elsewhere even if they fail to see it.

Israel

Israel, by agreeing to the ceasefire, consolidates international support, particularly from the United States, and positions itself as a cooperative actor regardless of the actual reason why it agreed to the ceasefire. Should the ceasefire unravel, Israel will be well-positioned to act with the moral and political backing of its allies, especially given incoming Trump administration.

For Israel, the ceasefire is a low-cost gamble. If it works, it buys temporary stability. If it fails, Israel retains the freedom to strike (as it would regardless of whether this provision is explicitly stated in the terms of the ceasefire), with the added justification of Lebanon’s inability to uphold its commitments. This ensures that Israel can respond to violations on its own terms, while placing the burden of enforcement squarely on the Lebanese government and army.

A Fragile Illusion

The ceasefire offers a welcome break after many months of war. But its terms risk worsening Lebanon's serious domestic challenges by hastening shifts in the balance of political power among Lebanon's communities and exposing the failure of its power-sharing system to manage these changes effectively. Unless these underlying issues are confronted, Lebanon's society will remain fragile and continue to fragment with communities being provoked against one another. Unfortunately, Lebanon's political leadership has absolutely no vision for how to resolve these challenges.

[feral& (it/its) ☭ 🌟♿️🏳️‍⚧️⚢⚣ @Ibushi_Hanyuism]

except that many people who didn’t vote CHOSE not to vote because they didn’t support either of these two, so with 100% turnout you would have gotten more third party votes, not magically forced people into voting the way you want

[Jackson Frank @jackfrank_jjf]

Voting for Jill Stein is a vote for Jill Stein. Kamala would have to be ideologically similar to Stein rather than Trump for it to be a lost vote on her behalf. But she’s not, so.

[trans judeo-bolshevik @transjewtalian]

october 7th permanently shaped postcolonial studies as a discipline in that it revealed beyond all doubt just how many scholars are careerist unprincipled charlatans who wouldn’t know what solidarity looked like even if it set up camp occupying the center of campus for weeks

[Peter Daou @peterdaou]

"A third party can't win so I won't vote for them" is the most circular and self-defeating logic.

[Liam 🇵🇸 @Hezbolsonaro]

There’s a certain type of journalist on here who seem incapable of expressing outrage at Israel’s attacks on Beirut without waxing poetic about how beautiful and soulful the city is, which comes off as both slightly fetishistic and ignorant of Beirut’s many more mundane problems.