Here is an article that my RAND colleague Andrew Radin and I currently have running at The Hill on Ukraine’s successful strategy of attrition against Russia. https://t.co/zH59MWDg3u
Using my understanding of ground combat in Ukraine, I apply it to what i think the implications for combat in Ukraine today might mean for a future ground centric fight along the Korean DMZ. https://t.co/glojEZosPo
@joni_askola Yes that is true but it really needs to be a true transition to Corps level formations and not just supercharged Brigades in charge of other brigades. Mick Ryan has some really good analysis on this issue at his substack Futura Doctrina
@GeoConfirmed thx for getting to the bottom of this with facts. Clausewitz said (paraphrasing) everything in war is simple but even the simplist things are very difficult. That may be why disinformation in the Ukraine war is so prevalant: it makes the diffucult seem simple to understand.
My RAND colleague Rafi Cohen and I have this piece currently running in Foreign Policy where we make the case for cautious optimism in Ukraine.
https://t.co/J4H85VOXXo
This four volume RAND history which I co-led might be a useful reference to senior US Army leaders as they think through difficult problems of end strength, modernization, and readiness. It contains numerous data visualization tools.
https://t.co/VSqkJ8PSFE.
Hi, I have been off twitter for a while, but I am back up on the net! Here's a link to a recently published RAND study that I co-led. It is a history of “The Third Offset.” I think it offers valuable insights for intellectual change within US DoD.
https://t.co/TpdaQ4S45Q
Hi, I have been off twitter for a while, but I am back up on the net! Here's a link to a recently published RAND study that I co-led. It is a history of “The Third Offset.” I think it offers valuable insights for intellectual change within US DoD.
https://t.co/TpdaQ4S45Q