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trading / investing

[Citrini @citrini]

We only write 1-2 primers a year because we want them to be durable. It’s simple to publish something market relevant for 6 months, but our goal is a piece you can return to years later and still derive value.

Our Robotics primer meets that standard.

https://t.co/qPSAXaLgYN

[Spencer Applebaum @SpencerApplebau]

1/ Today, @multicoin publishes our HYPE analysis and valuation

HYPE is now one of our largest liquid fund positions and we've been accumulating aggressively since February

Full report and disclosures in link. Link here -

https://t.co/tA2kwWbG9Q

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[Colossus @colossusmag]

This is the story of Hyperliquid, the most profitable startup per employee on earth, told from a guarded office in Singapore.

Last year, its team of 11 generated $900 million in profit. It's 3 years old, has never taken a dollar of venture capital, and is beginning to change how century-old markets work.

Its founder, Jeffrey Yan (@chameleon_jeff), had never taken a physics class when he picked up a textbook at 16. Two years later, he won gold at the International Physics Olympiad. In 2019, he started trading with $10,000 from a living room in Puerto Rico—working off a television because he didn't own a monitor.

Within 3 years, he was running one of the largest anonymous crypto trading firms.

Then he shut it down. Yan was rich and free, but he had spent years inside crypto, watching it betray itself. Bitcoin's central premise was decentralization. Yet the biggest exchanges were centralized. Crypto kept reintroducing the dependence on trust it was built to eliminate. He set out to create what should have existed.

Hyperliquid is a blockchain with a trading exchange on top, and anyone can build on it. Yan's vision is to house all of finance. In 3 years, it has done over $4 trillion in volume. And in the past few months, it has begun to outgrow crypto.

Markets for oil, silver, and the S&P 500 now trade on Hyperliquid around the clock, weekends included, and are growing roughly 40% week on week. When the US and Israel bombed Iran on a Saturday in February, Hyperliquid was the venue traders turned to.

Hyperliquid's success has cost Yan his freedom. He works out of a secret office in Singapore and cannot travel without two bodyguards. Even the team's housekeeper doesn't know what they do.

In January, @domcooke spent a week at their office. Read his profile on Yan and @HyperliquidX below.

[proji @helloproji]

@offgridcash @mango_ @juliusonchain Hell yeah!

[Hyperliquid @HyperliquidX]

Hyperliquid is built on a foundation of onchain transparency. A recent article made several claims that are factually incorrect:
+ Solvency: Every dollar is accounted for; the author failed to count native HyperEVM USDC.
+ Integrity: Testnet functions are exactly that - testnet only for testing. They cannot be executed on mainnet.
+ Transparency: Hyperliquid is more transparent and decentralized than all other major venues for perps trading. The entire state is independently maintained by a permissionless validator set and verified through BFT proof-of-stake consensus by each node. Every order, trade, and liquidation is available in real time during execution. Anyone can run a node and index the chain’s state and transitions. No major perps platform comes close to this guarantee for users.

See our response to the writer’s individual points below.

Claim: The system is undercollateralized by $362M

False: The Hyperliquid blockchain state is fully and verifiably solvent. The author excluded the HyperEVM USDC (a publicly announced and much anticipated integration), which exists in parallel to the Arbitrum bridge. Every USDC in circulation on HyperCore is accounted for transparently, by summing up the balances of https://t.co/Fk2lhZvpXD and https://t.co/pGBPcsJUTl. At the time of writing, this amounts to 3.989B + 362M = 4.351B USDC on HyperCore. USDC on the HyperEVM can be computed by subtracting 362M from the 421M on the HyperEVM USDC contract (https://t.co/ohiJm3WzN8), totaling another 59M USDC on HyperEVM.

The sum of the Arbitrum bridge and native USDC balances can be compared against the sum of user balances on HyperCore. As highlighted in the introduction, this exercise of verifying complete system solvency against user balances is uniquely possible on Hyperliquid compared to competitors.

The current Arbitrum bridge was an important stepping stone in bootstrapping the Hyperliquid network and will be deprecated as the migration to native USDC is complete, bringing Hyperliquid to parity with other major L1s.

Claim: There is retroactive volume manipulation via TestnetSetYesterdayUserVlm

False: This is a testnet-only function to allow for comprehensive testing. The author states that “the function’s presence is the problem…capability alone violates the trust model.” Testnet-only features that enable more rigorous testing of edge cases do not undermine the chain’s integrity. The fee schedule on Hyperliquid interacts in a complex way with inputs: user volume, aligned quote token status, maker vs taker, HIP-3, etc. It’s important to test these interactions on testnet, and therefore the testnet chain has a set of admin testing functions that do not exist on mainnet. The related TestnetAddMainnetUser action is to mark a testnet user as having corresponding mainnet state, to avoid DDOS and other attacks that are “free” on testnet. None of these functions are callable on the mainnet state.

While the execution source is not available, anyone can verify every trade onchain by running a node, and sum up the values to confirm that volume numbers are reflected accurately in onchain state. Similar to onchain solvency verification against the sum of all user account values, this is possible on Hyperliquid but not on most competitive platforms.

Given that this code path is entirely unreachable on mainnet, future development work will entirely compile out this testnet-only logic on mainnet nodes to avoid any possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

Claim: Some users have special privileges such as fee exemptions or retroactive volume manipulation used to influence the airdrop

False: Like system solvency, user balances, and individual trades, the fees paid by any address is available onchain. Each trade along with its fees paid or rebates received are transparently indexed by nodes, API servers, and third party analytics providers. There are no such mechanisms to distort fees, and no such mechanisms could have influenced the HYPE airdrop. Furthermore, the genesis distribution of HYPE is fully available onchain, and users can verify the historical behavior of every such address.

Claim: “CoreWriter” godmode can mint tokens, move user funds without signatures, crash random validators and basically do whatever it wants

False: The CoreWriter spec is fully documented here https://t.co/TTMWI5pDBB and replicable in the open source HyperEVM execution. CoreWriter is a way for smart contracts on HyperEVM to send HyperCore actions as part of HyperEVM block execution. It supports various actions that are normally sent by EOAs such as staking and placing orders, but has no such features to “mint tokens, move user funds without signatures, crash random validators and basically do whatever it wants.” This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how HyperCore interacts with the HyperEVM.

Claim: Chain can freeze via governance, and no undo function exists

Misinterpreted: The chain freezes during network upgrades. There is no undo function because the validators adopt a new binary at that height. This is analogous to how other networks perform hard forks at future heights determined by social consensus.

Suspicious activity on POPCAT in Nov 2025 did not cause the L1 to freeze, nor were any user funds frozen. The L1 was entirely operational, and any observer can see the blocks that were produced during this time. The Arbitrum bridge was automatically locked after the incident due to abnormal variation in account balances. As explained above, the Arbitrum bridge is not as secure as natively minted USDC, and therefore requires several conservative automated locking mechanisms as safeguards. The Arbitrum bridge’s locking mechanism is audited and open sourced, and the bridge is being deprecated with the transition to native USDC.

Claim: A single private key can set any oracle price instantly: no timelock, no limits

Misinterpreted: The author is likely mistaking the HIP-3 oracle updater logic with the validator-operated perps. HIP-3 oracle updates are indeed set by a single address, but this is up to the deployer to configure. The updater address need not be an EOA. For example, current HIP-3 deployers use a combination of MPC and CoreWriter architecture.

For validator-operated perps, multiple validators can submit oracle price updates. The final prices are a robust weighted median across major centralized exchanges. There is no timelock and no limits explicitly because these limits make the system less, not more, safe. The events of 10/10 show the danger to solvency if ADL is not accurately triggered in a timely manner during high volatility. Hyperliquid was one of the only venues without performance degradation or a network outage during this time. If Mango Markets or a similar protocol with oracle rate limits were active during 10/10, they would have likely accrued bad debt. Further decentralization will involve other validators actively running independent and open-sourced oracle update binaries.

Claim: 8 undisclosed addresses control all transaction submission

False: Some transactions are already sent directly from the validators. Some such as orders are not, in order to minimize MEV, but a future upgrade will incorporate this logic for all transactions in a mechanism that is both MEV- and censorship-resistant. The careful consideration of MEV is in response to trader and researcher feedback based on predatory behavior observed on other chains. There is almost unanimous agreement that toxic transaction ordering degrades the end user experience. Ultimately, the validator set is permissionless, and there is no guarantee that validators in the mainnet set are always fully aligned with the ecosystem. A major milestone in decentralization will be solving this problem, including a multiple-proposer block building setup.

Claim: There is a liquidation cartel with unfair advantages

Misinterpreted: Only HLP may backstop liquidate users, and HLP subvaults are the only addresses in this set. However, depositing into HLP is permissionless, so HLP is a community-owned liquidity vault supporting the protocol. The fact that HLP has privileges is no different from other protocol liquidity vaults.

Relatedly, all liquidations are first attempted against the order book, which handles the vast majority of liquidated positions without backstop liquidation. This allows users to keep any remaining collateral, and allows all other users to compete in providing the best price to the liquidation flow, benefitting the liquidated user.

Claim: There is a hidden lending protocol with $1M+ supplied and no documentation

False: Portfolio margin, borrow lend, and the HLP supplied value were all publicly announced and are currently in pre-alpha rollout. The current documentation can be found at https://t.co/vvE8EhpIhX and has been progressively fleshed out over the past several weeks.

Claim: ModifyNonCirculatingSupply allows changes to token supply

False: The full supply of HIP-1 tokens on HyperCore is fixed at deployment. The non-circulating supply is a purely informational number that can optionally mark addresses as “non-circulating” for display purposes. Whether an address is marked as “non-circulating” does not affect execution. This is an example of onchain information that might make more sense offchain, but is not a vulnerability.

Thank you to the author for spending the time to verify the execution of Hyperliquid. The fact that this investigation could be done at all proves the transparency and decentralization that Hyperliquid has already achieved. Concretely, Hyperliquid is the only major perps venue where the entire state and every input diff is transparently available to anyone running a node.

A similar analysis on any of the other top perp DEXs is impossible. For example, Lighter uses a single centralized sequencer whose execution logic and ZK circuits are unavailable. Aster uses centralized matching and even offers dark pool trading, which is only possible with a single centralized sequencer without verifiable execution. Other protocols with some open source contracts do not have a verifiable sequencer.

On Binance, Lighter, Aster, or similar exchanges, it is impossible for anyone other than the sequencer to see a full snapshot of onchain state including order books, positions, and other user information. The centralized sequencer can also upgrade its software without any constraints. On Hyperliquid, the entire state is onchain, which means there are 24 validators executing the same state machine under BFT consensus rules. There is plenty left to do on the journey towards greater decentralization, but it’s important to highlight just how far Hyperliquid and its ecosystem have come compared to competitors.

Decentralization is progressive, and Hyperliquid will ultimately be fully open sourced. Hyperliquid is the most transparent of all major venues, even though this leaks advantages to competitors (all of whom are closed source), who can copy Hyperliquid’s innovations more easily. We think this is the correct tradeoff to balance value accrual to the community, speed of innovation, and upholding the values of defi.

The HyperEVM execution is open source, and Sprites, an independent community member, maintains a full archival node that powers many important integrations. HyperCore will follow the same path as soon as it reaches feature completion.

[echo @echodotxyz]

We started building Echo around 2 years ago in an attempt to try and change the market dynamics around crypto fundraising.

Today, we're joining Coinbase, but the mission stays the same.

We're gonna use the firepower of this behemoth to provide better opportunities to investors and better fundraising options to founders.

Just getting started. Cheers.

Cobie

[Brian Armstrong @brian_armstrong]

The rumors are true, we bought the NFT. @UpOnlyTV is coming back.

[smartestmoney.hl @smartestmoney]

OPERATION NOCEX starts today.

Say no to dirty CEX.

[proji @helloproji]

@avotoast No fucking withdrawal possible tho for my side

[Ping @DegenPing]

10/10 bid
11/05 sell

[zoomer @zoomerfied]

[ ZOOMER ]

SEC TO CREATE NEW RULES TO ALLOW CRYPTO COMPANIES TO LAUNCH PRODUCTS IN THE US WITHOUT HAVING TO COMPLY WITH PREVIOUS REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, CALLING IT AN "INNOVATION EXEMPTION": BBG

[jeff.hl @chameleon_jeff]

Debunking Hyperliquid FUD (Part 1: HLP, liquidations, and platform guarantees)

It's sad to see coordinated misinformation campaigns targeting Hyperliquid, which have led to widespread misunderstanding of what we are all working so hard to build.

In response, this series of posts provides detailed, factual explanations of how Hyperliquid works. As a community, we must actively fight FUD by spreading the truth. The tone with which we do this also matters: the best way to grow as a protocol and ultimately house all finance is to remain humble and welcome more users into the ecosystem.

--

The first post focuses on HLP and liquidations on Hyperliquid.

High level summary
The FUD is that the Hyperliquid protocol is subject to large losses stemming from manipulation. On the contrary, Hyperliquid's margining design mathematically guarantees platform solvency. Note that HLP’s losses are isolated to the vault itself, and Hyperliquid does not depend on HLP’s operation to exist. This was true even before the JELLY incident. After the JELLY incident, there is an additional change to protect HLP from losses during backstop liquidations. The fundamental changes are to HLP, not the platform itself.

HLP background
HLP is a permissionless protocol vault pioneered by Hyperliquid. HLP does not collect fees from depositors, and historically has returned 60M USDC in pnl to its depositors. On CEXs, this profit typically goes to the internal market making desks instead of users.
HLP plays two roles: market making and backstop liquidations. In terms of market making, HLP runs a passive strategy that accounts for less than 2% of Hyperliquid's total volume. The vast majority of volume on Hyperliquid is between two non-HLP users.

Liquidations
On Hyperliquid, liquidations are first sent to the book as a market order. This allows any user to participate in providing liquidity to liquidations, which is profitable flow on average. On other exchanges, this flow is internalized by the exchange as a revenue source.
HLP only performs backstop liquidations, which involves taking over positions that are unable to be market liquidated. When account values go negative, the last resort for platform solvency is auto-deleveraging (ADL). ADL closes underwater positions against the most profitable and highly leveraged positions on the other side, ensuring the protocol's solvency. ADL is extremely rare but importantly targets the attacker's position on both sides during manipulation attempts as described below.

JELLY incident
An attacker recently attempted to exploit HLP by opening a large long and short against themself. Open interest caps allowed a position worth 4M USDC at the time of trade, but the logical issue was that HLP collateralized the liquidation with its full balance. It is false that the platform itself had solvency risks, but HLP was indeed overexposed to the manipulation.

Changes made
Now the liquidator component vault of HLP has capped collateral, limiting its potential loss by backstop liquidations. A historical analysis was conducted based on this new system. Apart from the JELLY incident, this change would not have caused additional ADLs in the past, even during extreme volatility. However, it would have minimized HLP’s losses during the JELLY incident to low six figures, which is far less than the attacker spent on market manipulation. In particular, ADL would have closed the attacker’s momentarily profitable long position, leaving other JELLY positions untouched.

Validators now actively discuss delistings in an open governance forum on Discord. Several interesting dashboards have been created by users and validators: https://t.co/szhzxLnfr5, https://t.co/nvOxx9UfEV.
Market cap of the underlying spot assets will likely be an important input into delisting considerations. While delistings are important to ensure that users on the platform do not suffer from potential price manipulation, they are not required for platform solvency.

New state of margining system and HLP
Hyperliquid still functions as before, handling under-collateralized positions in the order of 1) market liquidations 2) backstop liquidations 3) ADL. Backstop liquidations on HLP now have additional protections to cap the total losses, making mark price manipulation attacks more expensive than the limited available gain from HLP. HLP's role continues to shrink as Hyperliquid grows, and at this point is nonessential to the protocol's operation. HLP still exists as a source of protocol yield through backstop liquidations and providing consistent background liquidity.