In this tactical analysis, I’ll focus on how Liverpool build from the back, with particular emphasis on their first phase of build-up.
One of the most noticeable issues was the limited variety of solutions Liverpool used in this phase. They struggled to progress the ball against Brentford’s well-organised defensive block and to bypass their man-oriented pressing.
Throughout the analysis, I’ll examine Brentford’s pressing mechanisms, the problems Liverpool encountered when building from the back, and the alternative solutions that could have helped them break through the opposition’s pressing lines and progress the ball into higher areas of the pitch #LFC
Como Başkanı Mirwan Suwarso:
"Her maçtan 24 saat önce Fabregas, kulüp sahiplerine maç planını sunar. Bu şekilde sahipler, maçın dinamiklerini daha iyi anlayabilirler.
Maçtan sonra Fabregas, maçın ilk beklentilere kıyasla nasıl geliştiğini açıklayan başka bir rapor hazırlar.
Aynı zamanda veri ekibimiz, maçın seyrine dair bağımsız bir analiz hazırlar ve gün sonunda verileri paylaşırız.
Örneğin, düşük blokla oynadığımızda 0.8 ile 0.9 arasında bir gol beklentisi öngörebiliriz.
Maç sonunda 1.3 gol beklentisine ulaşmışsak, 0-0 berabere kalmış olsak bile memnun oluruz çünkü beklentileri aşmış oluruz."
Çağın ötesinde değiller çağın karşılığı onlar. Bizler çağın gerisindeyiz. Maç öncesi şut ihtimalini, gol beklentisi ihtimalini, şutların hangi bölgeden kimlerle gelebileceğine kadar hesaplıyorlar. Oyunun gidişatında maç önünde gol tahminleri zayıf kalıyor. Günümüzün data çeşitliliği sayesinde kullanılacak korner, yapılacak isabetli pas, pdda ile xt beklentileri, her şey öngörülebiliyor. Dolayısıyla skora göre çıkarımlar, skora göre hocalar hakkında değerlendirmeler yapmak günümüzde yetersiz bakış açısı anlamına gelir. Dönem bundan ötesini gerektiriyor.
Despite Araujo being given the freedom to attack, starting at least one full-back who is more competent defensively makes Liverpool a lot more balanced. Hopefully Iraola sticks with it long term and we do not see a full-back pairing of Kerkez and Frimpong again.
What I think we should see more of is one of the double pivot dropping to the left of Van Dijk during build-up. It would reduce Kerkez’s involvement in the deeper phases and give him more freedom to make forward runs, making much better use of his profile.
It would also allow Van Dijk to remain central more often as the central centre-back. Despite being quite good in build-up from the left for a right-footer, there are still moments when he gets pulled too wide and the angles become awkward for him. A midfielder can build from those positions much more naturally. Keeping Van Dijk central would also reduce how often he has to defend the wide left channel and give him better access to his trademark long diagonal passes to the wingers.
At the same time, it would push Jacquet wider on the right as the wide centre-back, making better use of one of his biggest strengths: defending the channel.
As Atletico were chasing the game, they tried to break down Liverpool's 4-4-2 (narrow at the back, with a flexible midfield line to press Atletico back towards their goal) with a 3-2-5 structure to overload their back-line, with their forwards dropping deeper to facilitate progression.
The 3-2-5 also turned into a 3-1-6 with Llorente trying to primarily exploit the central channel by popping around the Liverpool centre-backs.
Liverpool, did very well to tackle that issue as:
1. Frimpong did very well to monitor that right-flank of his, tracking the runner until the end.
2. Gravenberch dropping deeper into the back-line to track the half-space exploiter and create a 6v6 scenario (whenever Llorente moved further).
In essence, Atletico's third-man combinations out-wide failed as Liverpool covered the central channel and half-spaces comprehensively.
Furthermore, Liverpool also created suffocation zones by utilising collective pressing by their midfield and frontline, to try to win the ball higher up the pitch and counter. The tactic was successful on a multiple occasions.
The improvement was that in the first-half it was an individual and dis-organized press by Liverpool which created gaps for Atletico to exploit but in the second-half, it was about the collective and systemic pressing.
Our deep analysis of the semi-finals with a short preview of the finals.
We focus on why Spain were so dominant and why France looked so toothless. We also break down exactly what changed once England scored and the tactical adjustments Scaloni made.
Luis Enrique, sobre la polivalencia de los jugadores del PSG:
"Mi sueño es tener a 20 jugadores que puedan jugar de todo. Me encantaría tener a 20 futbolistas que jueguen por todo el campo: Nuno Mendes de lateral, de interior, de delantero, de 9... Salvo el portero. Imagina al entrenador rival que ve la alineación y se pregunta que un jugador ocupa todas las zonas del terreno de juego. Será difícil. Intentaré conseguirlo en ese sentido”.
(Pep) Positional chess → winning through control and preparation.
Controls the centre, improves every piece, removes your options until you’re in zugzwang → wins by making the position impossible to survive.
(LE) dynamic chess → winning through activity and initiative.
They don’t aim to make the game perfectly controlled from the first move. They create an unstable position aggressive pressing, rotations, high defensive line, constant movement forcing the opponent to make difficult decisions every second.
To gain territory the ball is passed using a ‘play around/ security ring’ to find the right moment to launch attacks by:
• a run for a pass
• running with the ball
• crosses
• combination play
• dribbling / turns
Combinations & running with the ball are neglected in the UK
Bradley Barcola v Yan Diomande: The Duellists?
Mohamed Salah. 9 years. 442 appearances. 257 goals. 120+ assists. A contribution every 95 minutes. Liverpool should not be trying to replace him like-for-like. The task is narrower: find the right-sided attacking midfielder for an Andoni Iraola team. Not just a touchline outlet. Not just a final-third finisher. The role demands an Intelligent Engine who can regain-carry-create.
That is why Yan Diomande is still the first choice, not Bradley Barcola.
Barcola is excellent and has very specific strengths. He is the better receiver: received VAEP 97th percentile to Diomande’s 23rd, progressive receptions 99th to 15th. He is the sharper receive-to-shoot attacker: deep shots 99th to 75th, big chances 99th to 75th, own-shot generation 100 to 82. Receive. Carry. Combine. Shoot. Barcola turns high receptions and carries into shots. Repeatedly.
Barcola offers elite-system threat. But Diomande is his own engine.
Diomande separates himself as a creator. Productive dribbles: 99th to 79th. Successful dribbles: 99th to 73rd. Progression follows the same pattern: 97th to 76th, with progressive actions 97th to 85th. Then comes the burden number: share of team progression, 91st to 23rd. He is 98th on open-play xA to Barcola’s 89th; 99th to 88th on pass-plus-carry VAEP. The volume makes the point: Diomande generated 161 progressive or threatening carries and 134 passes, compared with Barcola’s 74 carries and 76 passes. Barcola adds real value, but Diomande wins on passing and carrying. Defensively, Barcola leads for tackles & interceptions; Diomande dominates recoveries, 91st percentile to 13th.
The right-side answer is Diomande. But one variable changes the plan: where does Wirtz play?
If Wirtz plays from the left, Liverpool can rebalance the front line with one major winger addition. Leverkusen-Wirtz was not just a passer: 98th percentile for open-play xA, 93rd for creation via carries, 91st for productive dribbles, 96th for successful dribbles and 72nd for recoveries. The actions tell the story: 106 progressive or threatening carries, 150 passes and only 10 crosses. In a compressed pitch, Szoboszlai operates as the Engine-10, Kerkez supplies width, overlap and rotation. Wirtz provides left-side creation and Diomande owns the right. Rio Ngumoha, Victor Muñoz and Cody Gakpo stay supplementary, not structural. Gakpo serves as striker cover while Hugo Ekitike is out.
If Wirtz plays as the 10, that creates a squad-planning problem. Centrally, Wirtz is more pass-led: 131 progressive or threatening passes at 4.9 per 90, 55 carries at 2.1 per 90, 0 crosses. Creation via passes sits at 94th percentile and recoveries rise to 87th. The counter-pressing force-multiplier case is strong, but productive dribbles fall to 48th, successful dribbles to 56th and carry xThreat to 36th. That pushes the carry-create burden onto the wingers. Diomande solves the right side, but the left becomes too dependent on projection. If Gakpo moves left, Isak loses striker cover; if Rio or Muñoz moves left, development becomes dependency; if Diomande needs rest, the drop-off out wide is stark.
Ultimately, Wirtz is the Salah replacement by gravity, not by position. Left-sided Wirtz? Diomande may be enough. Wirtz as the 10? Liverpool needs Diomande and Barcola. The engine on one side, the elite-system threat on the other. They may not duel at high noon after all.
Saddle your horses. They may have to ride together.
Raport o Barcelonie dla Mourinho jako dowód pracy w FC Porto!
2005: bardzo dokładnie analizowałem te mecze w wieku 11 lat przed TV (tylko pierwszą połowę, bo tata kazał kłaść się spać), ale już wtedy byłem w sztabie The Special One (choć on sam jeszcze się tak nie nazywał).
Víctor Muñoz brings a lot to the table. Direct, quick and decent with the ball at his feet. He is still VERY raw and has lots to improve but the versatility and promise that he is shows is exciting.
He was among the best ball carriers in La Liga (5th), a league with the likes of Yamal, Vini, Kubo etc.
But it's the action after these carries that needs improvement. As can be seen in the visuals below, he gets the ball into the box (high penetration rating) but most of the crosses/passes he puts after that are unsuccessful. While he has had some success from the left, his passing from the right has been mostly unsuccessful.
A couple of positive things (footnotes of the carrying card):
-0.21 xT per 90 from his carrying alone.
-High Speed rating, covers an average of 3.8m with a median carry time of 3s. Really good at those long strides/carries in space.
(1/7)
Víctor Muñoz is not Yan Diomande. Full stop. Quick audit.
Diomande already looks like the real deal. He is a near-complete right-sided #IntelligentEngine. Elite or near-elite across final product (97th), progression (96th), creation via passes (99th) and carries (98th), dribbling (99th), pass accuracy (98th), and total VAEP (100th). Muñoz?
Different animal. More volatile. A carry-first left winger built for explosive transition moments, not the full multi-phase package.
The attraction is right there on the radar. He receives in space, drives past defenders with real thrust, and turns running power into danger. Elite dribbling (91st). Strong creation via carries (86th). Solid progression (71st). Good own-shot generation (69th). Strong finishing quality (78th). Useful Total VAEP (60th). On the dribble side, he is posting 1.01 productive dribbles per 90 at the 90th percentile with solid successful dribble volume too. This is a vertical accelerator who injects quick ball progression and one-v-one bite. The kind of runner who punishes transitions and stretches defences.
But the limitations are loud. Final product only 46th. Pass creation almost non-existent at 7th. Pass accuracy lagging at 39th. Active defending weak at 11th. These are not the numbers you want from an Iraola wide player. This is a direct, carry-dominant attacker who still has to prove he can connect phases, create for others, and do damage when the ball leaves his feet.
The gap between Diomande and Muñoz is stark. Final product (97th vs 46th), creation via passes (99th vs 7th), progression (96th vs 71st), pass accuracy (98th vs 39th), active defending (38th vs 11th), total VAEP (100th vs 60th). One is a specialist accelerator. The other is the full archetype.
Drop Muñoz into a Liverpool-style system as a squad weapon and he brings vertical punch, depth, and transition sting. The fit can work. Sell him as the polished left-sided answer? The profile does not match. Not yet. And that is fine. Buy the potential. Build the final product.
Right now it is Carry -> Generate -> Shoot more than the complete circuit. Create and regain still lagging.
I have added in possession and out of possession matchup graphics to our World Cup 2026 dashboard. I will be updating the formations throughout the tournament.
Japón no improvisa, planifica 🇯🇵
Comparto un informe del Modelo de Juego de su Selección en los últimos 4 años
🔍 Análisis de:
• Cómo ataca
• Cómo defiende
• Patrones principales
• Principales falencias
Cada vez más reconocible desde lo conceptual!
https://t.co/jFIzM3NLa4
Japan's use of "False FB" concepts to create space against man-to-man marking - Nice wrinkle to allow 10s & CMs to create width:
- Importance of using ball recirculation as a trigger
- Complementary players (WBs high/wide) to leave space free
- Manipulating CHs tendencies OOP
I joined Ruxi to analyse Group A, including a deeper look at the hosts, Mexico.
In the lead-up to the World Cup, we will be breaking down every team in the tournament on the Game Changer account, covering one group each day.