Humam

@humam21

Joined December 2009

230 Following

104 Followers

437 Posts

humam21 retweeted

Ricky Ho

@rickyho_1989

about 2 months ago

Prabowo’s Political Honeymoon Is Over, and the Economy Is the Reason The most important signal in these charts is not simply that President Prabowo Subianto’s approval rating has fallen to 49.5%. It is that the collapse in political satisfaction is occurring alongside a severe deterioration in household economic security. The two charts tell the same story from different angles: public confidence in the presidency is weakening because a large share of Indonesians no longer feels that the economy is working for them. The decline is extraordinary. Prabowo’s approval rating has fallen to a record low of 49.5%, approximately 22 percentage points below the long-term survey average of 71.8%. It is also dramatically below the approval levels of around 75% to 80% recorded during much of the early presidency. A fall of this magnitude is not ordinary political volatility. It suggests that the administration has exhausted much of the goodwill associated with its electoral mandate and is now being judged on delivery rather than promises, symbolism or continuity with the previous government. The household data explain why. According to the nationwide survey of 4,250 respondents, 72.4% experienced difficulty meeting their food needs during the past year, while 71.2% said basic necessities had become less affordable than a year earlier. More than half, 56.5%, reported having little or no savings cushion, and 44% described the overall economy as worse than the previous year. With a stated margin of error of only ±1.6% at the 95% confidence level, these are not marginal shifts that can easily be dismissed as statistical noise. The sharpest interpretation is that Indonesia’s macroeconomic stability is becoming increasingly disconnected from household reality. The government may still point to GDP growth of around 5%, manageable headline inflation, fiscal discipline and continued investment, but households do not consume GDP statistics. They consume rice, cooking oil, fuel, electricity, school fees, transport and healthcare. When more than seven out of ten respondents say food needs are becoming difficult to fulfill and basic necessities are less affordable, the headline macro numbers are no longer translating into perceived economic security. This also reinforces the view that Indonesia’s economy is increasingly K-shaped. Higher-income households continue to benefit from financial assets, formal employment, premium consumption and access to credit, while lower- and middle-income families face declining purchasing power, limited savings and rising essential costs. Strong automobile sales, luxury consumption or investment realization can coexist with deep weakness in mass-market retail, motorcycles, clothing and household goods. Aggregate growth can therefore remain respectable while the median household feels poorer. The absence of savings is particularly dangerous. When 56.5% of households report having little or no financial cushion, even a modest shock can become destabilizing. A fuel-price increase, medical expense, job loss or food inflation spike cannot be absorbed through savings and must instead be financed by cutting consumption, borrowing, selling assets or delaying essential expenditure. This makes household demand increasingly fragile and magnifies the political consequences of any policy mistake. The risk becomes even greater if oil prices remain elevated. Indonesia is a net importer of crude oil and refined fuel, meaning higher global prices place pressure on the rupiah, the fiscal deficit and the energy-subsidy bill simultaneously. The government will eventually face an uncomfortable choice between allowing subsidies to expand, cutting other expenditure or increasing administered fuel prices. Any reduction in fuel support would affect precisely the households already reporting difficulty affording basic necessities. Higher fuel prices would not stop at the petrol station. They would raise transportation, logistics and food-distribution costs, placing further pressure on household purchasing power. For a population with limited savings and a large informal workforce, even a relatively modest inflation shock could create a disproportionate deterioration in consumer confidence and loan-repayment capacity. That would also have consequences for microfinance institutions, consumer lenders and banks exposed to lower-income borrowers. The political implication is that the administration may be approaching the point where communication alone is no longer sufficient. Public dissatisfaction cannot be reversed by repeatedly asserting that the economy is strong when households experience the opposite. Nor can it be solved entirely through large flagship programs whose benefits may be delayed, unevenly distributed or offset by deterioration elsewhere. When food affordability becomes the dominant household concern, voters will judge the government through the price of daily life. The data also raise questions about policy prioritization. Programs can be ambitious, nationally symbolic and politically popular, but they must still compete for limited fiscal resources. If households are struggling to buy food while the government directs substantial capital toward projects with uncertain near-term multipliers, public frustration will intensify. The relevant question is not whether every flagship initiative is inherently wrong. It is whether current spending priorities match the immediate economic distress experienced by the population. There is also an important distinction between absolute hardship and the direction of change. Only 44% say the overall economy is worse than the previous year, yet more than 70% report difficulty meeting food needs or declining affordability of basic necessities. This suggests that some respondents may not describe the entire national economy as deteriorating even while acknowledging significant pressure on their own household finances. In political terms, that gap represents a warning. Personal economic frustration often precedes a broader loss of confidence in national economic management. Approval ratings are not election forecasts, and one survey should not be treated as a definitive judgment on the entire presidency. The precise result can be influenced by question wording, fieldwork timing, respondent composition and short-term events. However, the consistency between the approval collapse and the household-economy indicators makes the signal difficult to dismiss. This does not look like a temporary communications problem. It looks like a material deterioration in economic legitimacy. Prabowo still has time to reverse the trend, but the solution requires more than stimulus headlines or political messaging. The government needs policies that quickly improve household disposable income, contain food and transportation costs, protect employment, strengthen social assistance targeting and restore confidence among the middle class. It must also avoid measures that worsen inflation or force monetary policy to remain tighter for longer. Ultimately, political capital is a form of economic capital. It gives governments room to undertake difficult reforms, absorb temporary pain and maintain public confidence during shocks. At 49.5% approval, that reserve is being depleted rapidly. The honeymoon is over because households are no longer evaluating the administration based on expectations. They are evaluating it based on whether they can afford food, whether their savings are disappearing and whether life feels better than it did a year ago. For a growing share of Indonesians, the answer is increasingly no.

rickyho_1989's tweet photo. Prabowo’s Political Honeymoon Is Over, and the Economy Is the Reason

The most important signal in these charts is not simply that President Prabowo Subianto’s approval rating has fallen to 49.5%. It is that the collapse in political satisfaction is occurring alongside a severe deterioration in household economic security. The two charts tell the same story from different angles: public confidence in the presidency is weakening because a large share of Indonesians no longer feels that the economy is working for them.

The decline is extraordinary. Prabowo’s approval rating has fallen to a record low of 49.5%, approximately 22 percentage points below the long-term survey average of 71.8%. It is also dramatically below the approval levels of around 75% to 80% recorded during much of the early presidency. A fall of this magnitude is not ordinary political volatility. It suggests that the administration has exhausted much of the goodwill associated with its electoral mandate and is now being judged on delivery rather than promises, symbolism or continuity with the previous government.

The household data explain why. According to the nationwide survey of 4,250 respondents, 72.4% experienced difficulty meeting their food needs during the past year, while 71.2% said basic necessities had become less affordable than a year earlier. More than half, 56.5%, reported having little or no savings cushion, and 44% described the overall economy as worse than the previous year. With a stated margin of error of only ±1.6% at the 95% confidence level, these are not marginal shifts that can easily be dismissed as statistical noise.

The sharpest interpretation is that Indonesia’s macroeconomic stability is becoming increasingly disconnected from household reality. The government may still point to GDP growth of around 5%, manageable headline inflation, fiscal discipline and continued investment, but households do not consume GDP statistics. They consume rice, cooking oil, fuel, electricity, school fees, transport and healthcare. When more than seven out of ten respondents say food needs are becoming difficult to fulfill and basic necessities are less affordable, the headline macro numbers are no longer translating into perceived economic security.

This also reinforces the view that Indonesia’s economy is increasingly K-shaped. Higher-income households continue to benefit from financial assets, formal employment, premium consumption and access to credit, while lower- and middle-income families face declining purchasing power, limited savings and rising essential costs. Strong automobile sales, luxury consumption or investment realization can coexist with deep weakness in mass-market retail, motorcycles, clothing and household goods. Aggregate growth can therefore remain respectable while the median household feels poorer.

The absence of savings is particularly dangerous. When 56.5% of households report having little or no financial cushion, even a modest shock can become destabilizing. A fuel-price increase, medical expense, job loss or food inflation spike cannot be absorbed through savings and must instead be financed by cutting consumption, borrowing, selling assets or delaying essential expenditure. This makes household demand increasingly fragile and magnifies the political consequences of any policy mistake.

The risk becomes even greater if oil prices remain elevated. Indonesia is a net importer of crude oil and refined fuel, meaning higher global prices place pressure on the rupiah, the fiscal deficit and the energy-subsidy bill simultaneously. The government will eventually face an uncomfortable choice between allowing subsidies to expand, cutting other expenditure or increasing administered fuel prices. Any reduction in fuel support would affect precisely the households already reporting difficulty affording basic necessities.

Higher fuel prices would not stop at the petrol station. They would raise transportation, logistics and food-distribution costs, placing further pressure on household purchasing power. For a population with limited savings and a large informal workforce, even a relatively modest inflation shock could create a disproportionate deterioration in consumer confidence and loan-repayment capacity. That would also have consequences for microfinance institutions, consumer lenders and banks exposed to lower-income borrowers.

The political implication is that the administration may be approaching the point where communication alone is no longer sufficient. Public dissatisfaction cannot be reversed by repeatedly asserting that the economy is strong when households experience the opposite. Nor can it be solved entirely through large flagship programs whose benefits may be delayed, unevenly distributed or offset by deterioration elsewhere. When food affordability becomes the dominant household concern, voters will judge the government through the price of daily life.

The data also raise questions about policy prioritization. Programs can be ambitious, nationally symbolic and politically popular, but they must still compete for limited fiscal resources. If households are struggling to buy food while the government directs substantial capital toward projects with uncertain near-term multipliers, public frustration will intensify. The relevant question is not whether every flagship initiative is inherently wrong. It is whether current spending priorities match the immediate economic distress experienced by the population.

There is also an important distinction between absolute hardship and the direction of change. Only 44% say the overall economy is worse than the previous year, yet more than 70% report difficulty meeting food needs or declining affordability of basic necessities. This suggests that some respondents may not describe the entire national economy as deteriorating even while acknowledging significant pressure on their own household finances. In political terms, that gap represents a warning. Personal economic frustration often precedes a broader loss of confidence in national economic management.

Approval ratings are not election forecasts, and one survey should not be treated as a definitive judgment on the entire presidency. The precise result can be influenced by question wording, fieldwork timing, respondent composition and short-term events. However, the consistency between the approval collapse and the household-economy indicators makes the signal difficult to dismiss. This does not look like a temporary communications problem. It looks like a material deterioration in economic legitimacy.

Prabowo still has time to reverse the trend, but the solution requires more than stimulus headlines or political messaging. The government needs policies that quickly improve household disposable income, contain food and transportation costs, protect employment, strengthen social assistance targeting and restore confidence among the middle class. It must also avoid measures that worsen inflation or force monetary policy to remain tighter for longer.

Ultimately, political capital is a form of economic capital. It gives governments room to undertake difficult reforms, absorb temporary pain and maintain public confidence during shocks. At 49.5% approval, that reserve is being depleted rapidly.

The honeymoon is over because households are no longer evaluating the administration based on expectations. They are evaluating it based on whether they can afford food, whether their savings are disappearing and whether life feels better than it did a year ago.

For a growing share of Indonesians, the answer is increasingly no.

276

19K

Humam

@humam21

Who to follow

Last Seen Users on Sotwe

Trends for you

Most Popular Users