hwatever

not knowledgeable

[hwatever @hwateverman]

Just something that doesn’t make you want to rip your hair out.

[Science girl @sciencegirl]

Feeding a red panda

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@FactApparatchik @dilanesper It’s not a trans thing. It’s a human thing. Bullied people harm themselves all the time. If they don’t outright hurt themselves, they still grow to hate themselves. Cruelty serves no purpose. I think compassion is important. That simple.

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@dilanesper I have a hard time looking at Twitter these days because there is such viciousness on all sides of every “debate”. I appreciate you calling it out. I don’t want trans women in women’s sports but I also don’t want them to just kill themselves. Some people seem to think that’s fine

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@ViralNewsNYC @LeeroyPress https://t.co/OXGTg1vbgy

2021 rule change eliminated proof of citizenship for emergency housing. Now that program is ending and the people in the program are being transferred directly to Section 8. Native NYers on the list will wait 18 extra months as the others get preference.

[Angela Van Der Pluym @anjewla90]

Holy cow. You can literally click a button to “refute” people they deem unworthy and “support” people they like.

This is insane propaganda backed by AI.

[Dilan Esper @dilanesper]

But the problem is that the symbolic deliverables embolden the Palestinian Cause to continue to oppose conciliation with Israel, release of hostages, cessation of "resistance", and the unsexy work towards a messy 2 state solution years down the line. They think they are winning.

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@wil_da_beast630 Made up statistics aside, do you think a lack of focus on female specific issues (including situations where most research is done with men and then applied to women) is a legitimate problem? That was the overall point of those posts.

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@jonkay @Women___Exist @CanadasLifeline It’s interesting that if someone who was not indigenous by DNA identified as indigenous, these people would be extremely offended but there is no XX requirement to identify as a woman. They say both race and gender are constructs but only one is off limits for self-ID. Why?

[FJ @Natsecjeff]

😂

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@E92184306 @RichardHanania The darkness emanates from within.

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@MonthlySandwich @RichardHanania Yes.

https://t.co/DhEZ6NXX7q

[Richard Hanania @RichardHanania]

Candace Owens: Someone in the White House told me that Macron is demanding I stop talking about his wife being a man as a condition to the end the Ukraine War.

Alright, I think this settles something. She’s a psychopath and a conscious grifter more than she believes this stuff.

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

Statutory Notification and Leak Issues Arising from the Preliminary Battle Damage Assessment for Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER

On Saturday, 21 June, POTUS, SecDef, CJCS Gen. Caine and other principals were in the Situation Room when, at 6:40 p.m. EDT (02:10 Iran local), seven B-2 Spirit bombers—accompanied by a 125-aircraft joint support package and a submarine-launched Tomahawk salvo—struck Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

The operation opened when at approximately 5 p.m. Eastern a U.S. submarine launched more than two dozen Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles against key surface-infrastructure targets at Esfahan. Between the 6:40 p.m. and 7:05 p.m. EDT strike window the three sites were attacked with 14 MOPs. ~75 precision-guided weapons were deployed in Operation Midnight Hammer.

Principals in the Room had granular intelligence from DIA, USAF, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission programming, with precise location, architecture and geotechnical data of the mission space from fifteen years of program development that saw the evolution of the 30,000 pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator titled GBU-57A/B—a Special Access Program set up with the single mission of defeating hardened subterranean sites like Fordow.

On live feed, they watched the first two penetrators blow the concrete covers off the central ingress shafts that the Iranians had cast the prior week, blowing the two connecting side shafts out on either side clean off as they penetrated. Four MOPs followed through each pilot bore with programmed depth charges. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Caine stated the MOPs moved “down into the complex at greater than 1,000 feet per second, and explode[d] in the mission space.” Six MOPs struck each of the two main shafts along the ridge line of Kuh-e Dagh Ghui over the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). “Weapon number six was designed as a flex weapon to allow us to cover if one of the preceding jets or one of the preceding weapons did not [succeed],” Gen. Caine explained.

The following Sunday morning at 10:00 AM EDT Secdef Hegseth and CJCS Caine presented a verbal BDA to press stating with high confidence that the targets were destroyed. (https://t.co/gwq0bGpS0D). That assessment made, by SecDef Hegseth and CJCS Gen. Caine, was not based on finalized intelligence or a vetted Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) from DIA. DoD’s initial high-confidence assessment was a strategic inference—not an after-action forensic conclusion—based on real-time ISR, pre-mission intelligence, munitions design, mission engineering, operational rehearsals and simulations spanning back fifteen years of mission programming.

So when Potus says they obliterated the Ayatollah’s nuclear toys, he watched it happen via live satellite, airborne surveillance, and near real-time ISR like infra-red and multi-spectral battle damage indicators. The Joint Chiefs, with granular visibility into strike architecture and synchronized ISR, made the assessment that the mission effected “extremely severe damage and destruction” across all three Iranian nuclear targets while also noting that final BDA would take time to complete. That’s what Potus attested to the Senate and House Armed Service Committees within the 48-hour war powers resolution mandated report window, on Monday June 23rd (https://t.co/FUetX3O9mV)

DoD and JCS stamped that war powers report affirming the strike resulted in “eliminating Iran’s nuclear program”. That report and its significant conclusion was produced with DOD’s Legistlative Affairs (ASD(LA)) review. DoD Legislative Affairs and ODNI Legislative Affairs act as the primary conduit between the executive-branch security agencies and Congress; they are the institutional backbones that feed the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees with official information.

When the first Battle Damage Assessment came in, its low-confidence judgment contradicted what the President, DoD and JCS attested to House and Senate Armed Service Committees; instead it assessed the damage to the three sites could be overcome and the program reconstituted in months. What DIA Director Lt Gen Kruse had on his desk was a high-impact low-confidence assessment with clear implications. DIA leadership followed Gates Procedures applying three thresholds to determine how to process the intelligence product.

ICD-112 § 5 (a) thresholds
(1) Intelligence activities that entail, with reasonable foreseeability, significant risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of human life;
(2) Intelligence activities that are expected to have a major impact on important foreign policy or national security interests;
(5) Deployment of new collection techniques that represent a significant departure from previous operations or result from evidence of significant foreign developments, [ICD 112 PDF: https://t.co/RrnHDprdGM]

It was protocol and mandatory to stamp the BDA as a Significant Intelligence Activity (SIA) product and move to notify congressional intelligence committees through the Office of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Legislative affairs under IC directive 112 and Gates Procedures. ICD mandates reporting when thresholds under §5.a(1), (2), or (5) are reasonably met.

The BDA rendered programmatic judgments on the Iranian nuclear timeline. Those judgments contradicted the President’s WPR letter to House and Senate Armed Services Committees assessing “elimination” of the nuclear file. The strategic implication of reconstitution in “months” impacts regional deterrence; DIA was conducting force-protection ISR for downstream assets and personnel, assessing IRGC and proxy force postures, including al-Hashd al-Shaabi faction’s UAV targeting of Taji Camp——within the 48 hour window of a major military strike. That BDA had strategic value to decision makers. It held potential to impact Congressional oversight decisions under War Powers deliberations. (https://t.co/deDaqOCNLQ…). Because the BDA directly contradicted presidential public reporting on a nuclear strike, criterion (2)—‘major impact on foreign-policy or national-security interests’— is plainly satisfied.

Under ICD-112 § E.4.a, when DIA Director Lt Gen Kruse determines that an activity constitutes a “significant intelligence activity”, a written notification must be sent to Senate and House intelligence committees (SSCI and HPSCI) within 14 days. ICD-112 makes ODNI Legislative Affairs the exclusive clearing house for written SIA notices to SSCI/HPSCI via CAPNET. The directive tells each IC element (including DIA) to send its packet directly to ODNI-LA, which then formats and transmits it via CAPNET. This notification process is coordinated solely through ODNI’s Assistant DNI, Legislative Affairs Office and signed off by their General Counsel’s office before being recorded in CAPNET by ODNI LA in compliance with congressional notification protocols.

DNI Gabbard supervises Art Miller, Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Legislative Affairs. Miller’s office received DIA’s battle‑damage assessment for the clandestine operation carried out under the unified command of DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DTRA, and the U.S. Air Force. DNI Gabbard was in the Situation Room at T‑0 and saw the same strike that the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, President, and senior mission leaders described as a direct hit that “eliminated the Iranian nuclear program,” delaying it for years.

The DoD, including the Secdef and CJCS channels, would have had access to the preliminary DIA BDA as soon as it was internally generated. The NYPost reports the “DIA report was circulated Sunday, just hours after B-2 bombers dropped “bunker busters” on the Fordow enrichment site, and says it was compiled without input from other intelligence agencies, sources told The Post.” Open‐source record shows no hard evidence that DIA personnel leaked the preliminary BDA to press or intermediaries before ODNI posted it to CAPNET.

As one open source analyst shared, “after a major nuclear-related strike, news of the DIA’s battle damage assessment would spread quickly through secure intelligence channels. Staffers on the congressional intelligence committees (SSCI and HPSCI) stay in close contact with DIA and ODNI liaisons and would rapidly push to see any such report. They have the authority to formally request intelligence products and likely knew about the BDA through interagency chatter or classified leaks, putting pressure on ODNI to upload it quickly.”

The DNI maintains discretion on when within the mandated 14-day window the significant intelligence activity is uploaded to CAPNET. In the interim oral reports would suffice to fulfill the DNI’s Title 50 section 3024 obligations to keep congressional intelligence committees fully informed. Within U.S. intelligence-community tradecraft, raw or preliminary products should remain on the originating element’s classified dissemination channels until (1) analytic confidence is upgraded, (2) cross-agency corroboration is completed, and (3) “need-to-share” is formally established. ICD-112 allows a summary placeholder for congressional notice while those steps finish; best practice is to attach only a tightly scoped memorandum of key judgments—not the full, low-confidence product—until vetting and higher-confidence sourcing are in hand.

Axios cites a senior White House official: “Almost as soon as we put the information on CAPNET, it leaks,” reporting the document was posted late Monday 23 Jun and that media excerpts surfaced within 24 hours. ABC, CNN, Reuters and The Times all attribute the leak to “congressional sources” who viewed the CAPNET posting; none describe a separate DIA-to-press pipeline—no mention of a prior DIA channel. The only recent DIA leak case in open reporting is a May 29 indictment of a DIA Insider Threat Division employee who attempted to pass unrelated classified material to a foreign ally—weeks before Midnight Hammer.

Oversight of any unauthorized-disclosure investigation is coordinated with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight under DoDD 5148.11 and DoDD 5148.13. If a DIA employee is suspected of leaking Top-Secret material, uniformed personnel are handled through military justice (JAG), and civilian cases start with DIA Counterintelligence, potentially elevating to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) and the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC); ultimate criminal jurisdiction lies with the FBI and the DOJ National Security Division.

Provided the DIA followed established security protocols, any uniformed, civilian, or contractor personnel found to be the source of the leak represent individual acts of compromise and do not reflect on DIA leadership or implicate institutional integrity.

Beyond this aspect of the ongoing leak probe, the CAPNET upload itself presents open questions. There is no legal or procedural mandate that ODNI-LA and ASD(LA) jointly clear or “co-sign” a DIA BDA notification. Courtesy coordination can and often does occur, but it is discretionary rather than compulsory. Did the DNI notify SecDef and Potus that ODNI LA was cleared to post the Significant Intelligence Activity (SIA) to CAPNET on Monday before midnight when the deadline for the ceasefire was scheduled—before it had taken effect?

What exactly was included in the CAPNET upload—how much it was stripped down, and whether the leak originated from an ODNI-generated tear sheet—remains a separate question from the White House’s allegation that a DIA employee directly and illegally disclosed information to the press or an intermediary.

DNI Gabbard’s failure to publicly exculpate CAPNET implies the upload content and leak overlap remain under investigative review; public comment is constrained by classification and DOJ media-comment policy (Justice Manual § 1-7.400) that bars officials from characterising evidence mid-probe. Congress will ultimately see the audit-log and tear-sheet text in closed session.

In response to the leak POTUS has reportedly considered suspending CAPNET uploads—solely provided to congressional intelligence committees via ODNI—and according to senior White-house officials speaking with Axios, “ordered his national-security team to limit the posting of future classified notifications to Congress on CAPNET until new safeguards are in place.”

—— Timeline
June 21, 2025, 6:40 PM EDT – U.S. B-2 Bomber Strikes on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites; Trump Claims Success. U.S. forces Sources: DoD: https://t.co/gwq0bGpS0D CBS News: https://t.co/HGQwM5jh8m, CNN: https://t.co/0TaSL3fUQ8,

June 22, 2025, 10:00 AM EDT – Segdef Hegseth and CJCS Gen. Caine Hold Initial Press Briefing on Strikes. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth held a Pentagon briefing, describing the Iran strikes as “intentionally limited” but extremely powerful, affirming President Trump’s claims of success. Secdef emphasized that the operation devastated Iran’s nuclear program while avoiding a broader conflict. Sources: DoD: https://t.co/gwq0bGpS0D NPR: https://t.co/Sk6CZGrDXp, Department of Defense (X post): https://t.co/hQqCJhb0ZO, White House (X post): https://t.co/G3JvuxGT62

June 22-23, 2025, ~ Sunday to Late Monday – ODNI Submits Low-Level Classified Battle Damage Assessment via CAPNET. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence provided congressional committees with a preliminary intelligence assessment indicating the strikes had only set back Iran’s nuclear program by a few months. This early, low-confidence report suggested that while significant damage was done, Iran’s core nuclear capabilities were not eliminated. The NYPost reports the “DIA report was circulated Sunday, just hours after B-2 bombers dropped “bunker busters” on the Fordow enrichment site, and says it was compiled without input from other intelligence agencies, sources told The Post.”

Sources: Axios: https://t.co/xLr8xuYmxf Just Security: https://t.co/7NH1qiEvdK, New York Post: https://t.co/bScPGirJro

June 24, 2025, ~Tuesday – Leaked Assessment Published by CNN and NYT around 18:00 ET; Trump Admin Contradicts. Media outlets (CNN and The New York Times) reported on a leaked intelligence assessment which found that the U.S. strikes did not destroy the core components of Iran’s nuclear program, potentially delaying it only briefly. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt blasted the leak, calling the alleged assessment “flat-out wrong” and accusing a “low-level loser leaker” of trying to undermine the success narrative. Sources: CNN: https://t.co/KmChpcy3sH , New York Times: https://t.co/oeWlculPkt

June 25, 2025, ~2:00 PM EDT – Tulsi Gabbard Confirms Trump’s Assessment. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard issued a public statement (via social media) confirming that new intelligence showed Iran’s nuclear program was severely damaged by the U.S. strikes. This bolstered Trump’s assertions of success. Shortly thereafter, CIA Director John Ratcliffe also released a statement saying credible intelligence indicated the targeted facilities were destroyed and would take years for Iran to rebuild. ABC News sources at the National Security Council said the administration was “considering a temporary freeze on CAPNET uploads and, in the meantime, routing only brief oral updates to the intelligence panels.” Sources: Politico: https://t.co/KMwzoVwGk9 , CIA: https://t.co/2V3UatcFD4, CIA (X post): https://t.co/nWpUUpK32e

June 26, 2025, 10:00 AM EDT – Hegseth Briefing Contradicts Leaked Assessment. In a second Pentagon press conference, Hegseth vigorously defended the operation’s outcome as a “historically successful” attack, reiterating that Iran’s nuclear program was totally obliterated. He harshly criticized CNN, NY Times, and other media for giving “fawning coverage” to the leaked preliminary report. Senior White-house officials told Axios that, in the wake of the leak of the DIA battle-damage assessment, the President had “ordered his national-security team to limit the posting of future classified notifications to Congress on CAPNET until new safeguards are in place.” Hegseth confirmed a leak investigation was underway, suggesting the leaker intended to “muddy the waters” about what he called a resounding success. Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Dan Caine detailed the operation’s timeline and deferring damage assessment to the intelligence community.

CJCS Gen. Caine also shared the missions fascinating history: “In 2009, a Defense Threat Reduction Agency officer was brought into a vault at an undisclosed location and briefed on something going on in Iran. For security purposes, I'm not going to share his name. He was shown some photos and some highly classified intelligence of what looked like a major construction project in the mountains of Iran. He was tasked to study this facility, work with the intelligence community to understand it, and he was soon joined by an additional teammate. For more than 15 years, this officer and his teammate lived and breathed this single target, Fordo, a critical element of Iran's covert nuclear weapons program. He studied the geology. He watched the Iranians dig it out. He watched the construction, the weather, the discard material, the geology, the construction materials, where the materials came from. He looked at the vent shaft, the exhaust shaft, the electrical systems, the environmental control systems, every nook, every crater, every piece of equipment going in and every piece of equipment going out. They literally dreamed about this target at night when they slept. They thought about it driving back and forth to work. And they knew from the very first days what this was for. You do not build a multi-layered underground bunker complex with centrifuges and other equipment in a mountain for any peaceful purpose. They weren't able to discuss this with their family, their wives, their kids, their friends, but they just kept grinding it out. And along the way, they realized we did not have a weapon that could adequately strike and kill this target. So they began a journey to work with industry and other tacticians to develop the GBU57.”

Sources: C-Span:
https://t.co/2PNFdQSNyN, Politico: https://t.co/rLYdL1kme6 , NPR: https://t.co/DGanNO1pqD , Department of Defense (X post): https://t.co/6yCLRyGK2A

——

1, Department of Defense.  (2025, June 22).  Hegseth, Caine laud success of U.S. strike on Iran nuke sites. https://t.co/gwq0bGpS0D
2, CBS News. (2025, June 22). Pentagon briefing: U.S. strikes Iran nuclear sites. https://t.co/HGQwM5jh8m
3, Neukam, S., Solender, A., & Santaliz, K. (2025, June 26). Congress feuds over Trump limits on sharing intel. Axios. https://t.co/Jnq06evQRE
4, CNN. (2025, June 24). Intel assessment: U.S. strikes did not destroy Iran nuclear sites. https://t.co/KmChpcy3sH
5, Crowley, M., & Sanger, D. (2025, June 24). Leaked report questions damage from Iran strikes. The New York Times. https://t.co/oeWlculPkt
6, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2017). Intelligence Community Directive 112: Congressional notification. https://t.co/RrnHDprdGM
7, Rosen, B. (2025, June 26). Intelligence implications of the shifting Iran strike narrative. Just Security. https://t.co/7NH1qiEvdK
8, Bade, R. (2025, June 25). New intel: Iran’s nuclear facilities destroyed. Politico. https://t.co/KMwzoVwGk9
9, C‑SPAN. (2025, June 26). Defense Secretary and Joint Chiefs Chair press conference [Video]. https://t.co/GjLrMDOXwN
10, Samuels, B. (2025, June 25). Feds hunt leaker of incomplete intel assessment of Iran strikes. New York Post. https://t.co/bScPGirJro
11, White House. (2025, June 23). Letter to Congressional leaders on the deployment of United States Armed Forces.

[Secretary Linda McMahon @EDSecMcMahon]

Today, @HHSOCR found that Harvard is in violent violation of Title VI due to their persistent indifference toward Antisemitism on campus.

The Trump Administration’s work to restore equal enforcement of civil rights on American campuses continues.

[Bruce Leroy 🇺🇸 @BruceLeroyRVA]

@MsMelChen

[Ihab Hassan @IhabHassane]

Activists in Gaza are holding photos of Israeli children who were killed on October 7th by Hamas militias—or kidnapped and later killed in Gaza—in response to Israeli activists protesting in Israel, who hold photos of Palestinian children killed by Israeli airstrikes.

[emily @north0fnorth]

THREAD OF MY FAVORITE LORI LIGHTFOOT MOMENTS

1: losing re-election and immediately going to walgreens to buy a 24 pack of modelo

[hwatever @hwateverman]

@eigenrobot She’s saying we bleed monthly, have significant hormonal shifts through our cycles, experience unexplained and unexplored pain, often presumed normal even when it’s not - our uteri are central to our overall health even when we’re not cooking up babies so please acknowledge this.