JC

Techie.

[JC @jdcguy]

@bzartlerJr @lance_corporate Mood. I've eaten there twice. Both times it was awful.

I remember the "million dollar bacon" coming out cold and hard as a rock...an impressive feat

[JC @jdcguy]

@WIRED Probably will worsen the spiral
There were hosts that were charging insane cleaning fees with insane rules but putting the trash outside so it didn't stink and loading dishes into the dishwasher were not hard

That being said I did find the stripping/making of beds absurd

[JC @jdcguy]

@ghidraninja The questions from the Chrome team on Mozilla's bug tracker are brutal. 99.9999% chance the entire company gets taken to the woodshed and disrrusred
https://t.co/2eECaLaoRo

[JC @jdcguy]

@Scott_Helme They are going to be taken out to the woodshed over this. The Chrome team questions based on the history are absolutely brutal and reminiscent of how they treated Wosign.

[JC @jdcguy]

@NotNicholasGurs @jloftin27 @AmericanAir The boarding pass barcode contains the ticket number and AAdvantage number which is not plaintext in the screenshot and facilitates social engineering

[JC @jdcguy]

@NotNicholasGurs @jloftin27 @AmericanAir Don't be an asshole, delete the screenshot for the PII it contains.

Someone with plat or above status probably has reservations that a motivated party would change for a free or try to engineer a password change to get the miles out

[JC @jdcguy]

@NotNicholasGurs @jloftin27 @AmericanAir Didn't save the screenshot but OP was AAdvantage platinum elite lmao

[JC @jdcguy]

@ghidraninja "there appears to be a flaw in the KGC script that was used on that specific day to create these ECC issuers"
Sounds like they used a script for the wrap/unwrap and either it directed the HSM to generate extremely weak keys for testing or the script made them directly

[JC @jdcguy]

@ghidraninja https://t.co/avjYalQnuI
"an approved deviation to our usual KGC to test a wrap/unwrap was introduced as these keys were meant for export for this instance c) a flaw in the code resulted in the second pair of keys being created onboard which were weaker"

[JC @jdcguy]

@RudeOnion @bleureivers On the EFTA/FCBA: the protections are not the same. But also a credit card will only go on its branded network for Visa/MC zero liability policies beyond federal law. The debit card can and often does process debit transactions under non Visa/MC networks
https://t.co/xMSEYduPNU

[JC @jdcguy]

@RudeOnion @bleureivers ... These networks are cheaper. So the Krogers and Walmarts and Home Depots of stores use these cheaper networks.

Visa logo on your card means jack in that case. You're at the mercy of your bank's fraud department since Visa wasn't involved in processing the transaction

[JC @jdcguy]

@sudo_ml Sectigo was cross signing for extra compatibility on a few older devices. eMudhra already had the certificates chained up to their own trusted global root...

[JC @jdcguy]

@chrylis @LinusMixson We'll have to wait for Mozilla/Google/etc. to complete the postmortem, but my guess is in a couple years, eMudhra is distrusted entirely by the major players in the CA store space over this.

[JC @jdcguy]

@chrylis @LinusMixson Because the key is so weak it was noticed by third parties and now intermediates are being revoked, which reduces any value of it if indeed the Indian govt knew of the weak keys the entire time.

I'm going with legitimate screwup over forcing the most obvious weak keys ever

[JC @jdcguy]

@kingslyj @LinusMixson https://t.co/avjYalPPFa

[JC @jdcguy]

@LinusMixson We'll have to wait for the postmortem but I can't see any reason you'd have keys from an HSM, an "approved deviation", and then secondary keys that were so weak.
Bugzilla comment from the CA:
https://t.co/avjYalQnuI

[JC @jdcguy]

@LinusMixson The impacted CA mentions checking that similar other issuers were not effected by AI, and then that "an approved deviation to our usual KGC to test a wrap/unwrap" and "flaw in the code resulted in the second pair of keys being created onboard which were weaker" = VIbecoding