The best traders aren't following the crowd.
They're positioning before the crowd even sees the opportunity.
Today, Mentis detected:
🔴 A top-ranked wallet opening a fresh $2.8M SHORT on $HYPE
🟢 Another elite wallet maintaining $13M+ in leveraged LONG exposure across $BTC and $XRP
When smart money disagrees, volatility follows.
When volatility arrives, Alpha emerges.
Mentis helps you see it first.
#SmartMoney #BTC #XRP #HYPE #Mentis
@HyperliquidX 3/ And it's working at real scale.
@HyperliquidX has done $800M+ in revenue in 2025 and now ranks among the largest crypto exchanges — CEXs included — by both volume and open interest.
This is no longer a "perp DEX" story @HyperliquidX
兄弟们,有个库今天直接炸了——将近 8 万收藏,叫 TradingAgents,是个多智能体交易系统。
说人话就是:一群 AI 分工合作帮你炒币炒股。
① 有的 AI 专门盯行情
② 有的 AI 出策略决策
③ 有的 AI 管风险控制
支持接入市场数据、自动生成策略、还能持续优化,相当于给你配了个完整的 AI 交易团队。
做加密、量化、搞副业的,跑通了想象空间真的很大。
🔗 https://t.co/dRDrAj9oup
Aftermath Finance lost $1.14M to an integer overflow bug. The kind of mistake covered in week one of every intro-to-programming course.
The fee was stored as u256 (always positive) but read elsewhere as signed (positive or negative). Pass a number close to the max, signed reading wraps it to a huge negative. Fee becomes rebate. Protocol pays you to trade.
Aftermath's perp source is private. Here's the exploit reconstructed from the on-chain trace:
1. Call create_integrator_info with u256 fee = 2^256 - 10^17 (looks like a huge positive number, reads as -10^17 signed)
2. Place matching limit and market orders between two of their own accounts
3. Each trade fires PaidIntegratorFees - protocol sends USDC to the integrator (attacker)
4. Atomic, repeatable, ~$79K profit per cycle
Final on-chain proof from the exploit tx:
PaidIntegratorFees event records:
- fees: 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563689698454007913129639936 (= -3.5×10^17 in signed i256)
- integrator_address: 0x1a65086c... (the attacker)
The protocol logged itself paying a wrapped-negative fee to the exploiter. Function signature on-chain confirms: clearing_house::create_integrator_info(Address, U256) with no bounds check.
The April pattern of missing parameter bounds:
- Singularity: oracle fee tier set to 42 (Uniswap only supports 100/500/3000/10000)
- Aftermath: u256 fee parameter wraps to negative when read as signed
- Scallop: spool created without last_index initialization
Same root cause across all three: setters that don't enforce the value range invariants the rest of the contract assumes. AI agents test boundary values automatically. Wrap a number, free money comes out.
Tx: 4pGQdfFG96Ghqj1xqkaeeAgMQCpttivdkgSRUGc6wVD8
Update: Great news. Thanks to support from @Mysten_Labs and @SuiFoundation all users will be made whole
ZERO losses for anyone.
Aftermath will be up and running again soon. Thank you to both teams and to @blockaid_ for the rapid response.
For clarity: this was not a Move contract-language security issue.
New Volmex Index-linked markets now live on @Polymarket
Trade shorter duration Volmex Index-linked markets expiring April, 30, 2026.
Sponsored market rewards are now live.
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