What once felt like the future is already part of the past. That’s the nature of innovation, and finance is no exception.
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Binance is arguably the world's largest crypto exchange.
Feb 2026: Polymarket lists a small 5-minute Bitcoin contract. Since then, Binance order flow spikes in the final seconds before settlement; prices revert soon after.
New paper with David Dai and Shihao Yu ( @ShihaoY ): Settlement Manipulation in Prediction Markets (https://t.co/L4fFsnXLhW)🧵
The finding, up front:
Traders push Bitcoin's price in the final seconds to decide the contract. That push makes the price less informative, yet Bitcoin's market more liquid. Market makers are largely insulated; ordinary traders lose $7.6M in two months.
@notnotstorm This is great. Would be useful to show volume delta by category (e.g., crypto -8%, politics +12% vs last week). Been working on ways to map markets with correlated resolutions.
so I think Brian's take on insider trading in prediction markets is interesting:
prediction markets win bc they expose truth faster than every other channel so if you actively encourage insider activity, you get a high-throughput truth transmission system where private truth becomes capital in the market that drives the public price often long before “resolution” or mainstream confirmation.
but now you have to acknowledge the game for everyone else involved (the one that's being played today):
non-insider traders aren’t really trading the outcome, they’re trading the propagation curve of truth. they win by:
- positioning correctly before the informed print
- identifying it when it hits
- and or positioning immediately after the informed print and riding the ensuing price swing
the edge becomes timing + signal extraction and you’ll also get mistaken “insider tells” and imitation because looking informed becomes valuable in this regime.
and the real stress test is LPs/MMs:
encouraged insiders = more toxic flow which means MMs are selling liquidity to people who may already know the answer. so unless the design compensates them, the equilibrium's: spreads widen, size disappears, liquidity becomes conditional, and fees have to rise to pay for adverse selection.
so I’m not anti-insider here as I think insider flow can make these markets more truthful and more societally useful. I just think there's a clear tradeoff rn:
truth speed vs liquidity quality
now if market structure can be sorted out (key word can), I might just come around