Jone Link

She/her/hers

[Rahm Emanuel @RahmEmanuel]

If you want to know what’s wrong with Washington, take a look at the Rand Paul/Dr. Fauci hearing. Pointing fingers and assigning blame rather than learning lessons to prevent the next pandemic. Where are the hearings on the measles outbreak? How about hearings on the cyclosporiasis outbreak?

If that’s not enough to get you sick, this administration continues to leave Americans more vulnerable than ever to disease as they continue to dismantle the FDA and the CDC.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

On the Brink of Uncontrolled Escalation? The Middle East Is Leaving the United States and Its Allies With Two Increasingly Unattractive Options

The latest developments in the Middle East, including Iran's strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan and the joint U.S.-Saudi response against Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq following attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, underscore how rapidly the region is moving toward a broader confrontation. They also highlight the extent to which the recent U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran has further destabilized an already fragile regional balance.

The central challenge facing Washington and its Gulf partners is that neither Iran nor its regional allies appear willing to retreat from what they now define as core strategic objectives. Tehran continues to insist on maintaining its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis have made clear that they will not end their campaign unless the Saudi-led restrictions imposed on them are lifted. Military pressure alone has shown little indication of changing these positions.

As a result, the United States and its regional partners are approaching a strategic crossroads. One option would be to accommodate at least some of Iran's and the Houthis' demands in order to reduce tensions. The alternative is to continue applying military pressure, accepting the growing likelihood of a prolonged regional confrontation in which attacks on shipping, energy infrastructure, and critical trade routes become increasingly frequent.

Against this backdrop, further retaliation by Iraqi Shiite militias and the Houthis appears increasingly likely despite the latest U.S.-Saudi strikes. If Washington responds with additional military escalation, Tehran is unlikely to remain passive. Instead, it would probably seek to raise the costs by expanding the conflict through its regional network, increasing pressure on global energy markets and raising the risk of a wider military confrontation that could eventually draw in additional Gulf states and Israel.

From Tehran's perspective, American hesitation reflects strategic weakness rather than restraint. This perception creates a dangerous dynamic: the more Washington attempts to restore deterrence through limited military action, the more Iran may feel compelled to demonstrate that escalation will impose unacceptable costs on the United States and its partners. The result is an increasingly unstable cycle in which each side believes that backing down would undermine its credibility.

In practical terms, the region may already be approaching a point where limited, calibrated strikes are no longer sufficient to contain the crisis. At the same time, a negotiated solution remains difficult because the core demands of Iran and the Houthis are viewed in Washington and among its regional allies as fundamentally unacceptable.

Unless an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough emerges, one that involves meaningful compromises from all sides, the coming days are likely to be characterized by continued escalation, growing risks to global energy markets, and an increasing possibility that the conflict expands beyond its current boundaries.

#iran

[James Martin, SJ @JamesMartinSJ]

“And whenever you pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, so that they may be seen by others. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward. But whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret, and your Father who sees in secret will reward you" (Mt 6:5).

[Hedgie @HedgieMarkets]

🦔AI companies are bulk-buying rare books, scanning them through high-speed machines that cut the spines off, and shredding the originals. A service called ISBNdb facilitates orders of up to a million books and keeps buyers anonymous. Pre-2022 books are premium because they're free of AI-generated text. A federal judge ruled the practice is fair use because eliminating the original means only one copy exists at a time. Anthropic hired the former head of Google Books partnerships to obtain "all the books in the world."

My Take
This got to me. A bookseller told 404 Media that rare books with almost no surviving copies are being fed into this pipeline. Books that survived wars, fires, and centuries of handling are being shredded so an AI can learn to write a better marketing email.
ISBNdb's website literally says "'AI company destroys two million books' is not a headline that generates sympathy," and they still built an entire business around making it happen quietly. They offer NDAs as a feature. They coach clients to call it "digital preservation."

I've covered AI companies scraping the internet, torrenting libraries, and stealing music. This is worse because it's irreversible. You can re-upload a website. You can reprint a bestseller. You can't replace the last three copies of an 18th-century botanical text once someone shreds them for training data. And the judge said it's legal. So it's going to accelerate.
"We shred rare books and offer NDAs so nobody finds out" is a legitimate business model in 2026. What a timeline.

Hedgie🤗

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

As argued repeatedly, the current campaign has produced limited operational gains that are unlikely to alter Iran's strategic calculus. The Trump administration now faces a fundamental choice.

It can significantly escalate the conflict and accepting that Iran will almost certainly respond with broader retaliation that could disrupt global energy markets, damage regional stability, and pull the United States deeper into a prolonged confrontation without guaranteeing Iranian capitulation. Or it can pursue a negotiated settlement that, by necessity, accepts some form of Iranian influence over the Strait of Hormuz.

The reality is that there is no easy middle ground. Even the current limited campaign is already imposing costs on the global economy while placing growing demands on U.S. military resources, including missile interceptor inventories. Washington must decide whether to go all in diplomatically or all in militarily.

Those who believe the United States can simply maintain maritime pressure indefinitely underestimate Tehran's position. From Iran's perspective, if it cannot export its own oil, then no one else should be able to do so freely through the Gulf. Meanwhile, renewed tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis further strengthen Iran's strategic position by increasing pressure on global shipping and energy markets.

President Trump is therefore confronting one of the most consequential strategic decisions of his presidency. Every available option carries significant costs. But if the United States is not prepared to commit the military resources necessary to secure the Strait of Hormuz or to eliminate Iran's remaining enriched uranium capability, then a negotiated settlement may ultimately be the more realistic path forward.

#iran

[The Team House @TheTeamHousePod]

Delta Operators Tracked Using Ad Data Commercially Available

Mike Yeagley EP-401
#teamhousepodcast #theteamhouse #jackmurphy #deltaforce #adtech #jsoc #smartphones

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Gut feelings and threats won't solve this. After nearly six months of conflict with Iran in one form or another, the Trump administration still appears to underestimate the nature of the regime it is confronting.

U.S. policy should begin with a basic working assumption: Iran is unlikely to capitulate simply because military pressure increases. The key question is what Washington expects to achieve. Does it believe Tehran will abandon its missile program, give up its right to enrich uranium, or relinquish what it sees as its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz? There is little evidence to suggest the regime is prepared to make concessions on issues it considers fundamental to the Islamic Revolution. On the contrary, Tehran appears convinced that, over time, Washington's political resolve will weaken first.

If that is the underlying assumption behind the current strategy, disappointment is almost inevitable. Iran is not going to plead for an agreement or surrender its core strategic assets. Instead, the likely consequences are continued upward pressure on global oil prices and growing frustration in Washington as expectations collide with reality.

Retaliation is not a strategy, and a bombing campaign without a clearly defined political objective is unlikely to produce the desired outcome. If the goal is to force Iran back to the negotiating table in a significantly weaker position, that objective appears increasingly unrealistic.

Policymakers should be clear-eyed about the costs. A strategy centered on coercing Iran into submission risks imposing substantial economic and strategic costs on the United States and its allies without achieving its intended political objectives.

Iran is far from invulnerable. It has significant military, economic, and social vulnerabilities that can be exploited. But one reality remains unavoidable: confronting Iran requires time, sustained political commitment, a willingness to absorb casualties, major economic costs, and enormous military resources.

As long as the administration is unwilling to bear those costs, extending the current campaign, even if it produces tactical successes, is unlikely to bring Iran to the point of strategic defeat. If anything, a prolonged campaign without the resources or political will necessary to achieve decisive results risks strengthening Tehran's belief that it can simply outlast Washington.

#iran

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Houthis are not going to stop attacking, just as Iran is not going to stop supporting them.

These threats are unlikely to change behavior in either Sana'a or Tehran. If anything, repeated ultimatums that are not enforced risk highlighting the limits of American deterrence rather than its strength.

President Trump is free to escalate if he believes that serves U.S. interests. But he should also recognize that every public threat that is not followed by action further erodes the credibility of American deterrence. Threats alone are not a strategy.

The United States is not negotiating with business partners seeking the best deal. It is confronting deeply ideological actors that have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to absorb significant costs rather than capitulate under pressure. Expecting Tehran to reverse course simply because Washington raises the rhetorical stakes misunderstands how the Iranian leadership makes decisions.

Iran is not waiting for another agreement at any price, nor is it pleading for negotiations. If Washington's approach relies primarily on threats without a clear strategic objective and a credible plan to achieve it, it risks reinforcing the perception that the administration is reacting tactically rather than pursuing a coherent long-term strategy.

#IranWar‌

[James Martin, SJ @JamesMartinSJ]

"In my almost 40 years as a Jesuit, I’ve known dozens of celibate gay priests who have led what Pope Francis called 'good, holy and celibate' lives, modeling Jesus’s message of love and mercy. Similar to the experience of Father Berg and Professor Lock, they have been for me, and for many of my friends, spiritual directors, pastors, professors and mentors. And they have done so in a church that sometimes ignores, denigrates or even insults them. The most compelling argument for openness to ordaining gay men to the priesthood is the presence of many holy and healthy gay and celibate priests."

[Marc Polymeropoulos @Mpolymer]

https://t.co/9wEtpHBEjq

[Rick Wilson @TheRickWilson]

LOL. Are the communists in the room with you right now? Are they telling you to hurt yourself, or others? Is there someone we can call to get you help?

[FOX Sports @FOXSports]

A ten-goal thriller in the Bronze Final 🔥

[Connor Stringer @connorstringer]

24 before the World Cup final kicks off, and not a single penalty has been handed down to the players who took part in this stunt. FIFA is far too inconsistent in its rulings and punishments. Joke outfit.

[Marc Polymeropoulos @Mpolymer]

A theory….he should not have played golf with Trump. The curse knows…it just waited…. and then got him. 🤷🏻‍♂️

[rachel cohen @rcohen]

🧵It sounds like the major focus of this speech is going to be China and the suggestion the IC concealed from POTUS and Congress the extent of China’s involvement in the 2020 election.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The administration's actions in recent days are likely reinforcing a longstanding concern in Tehran: that negotiations with Washington may not produce durable or reliable outcomes.

If Iranian leaders conclude that diplomacy offers diminishing returns, they may become less willing to exercise the restraint they previously showed when there was still a realistic prospect of an agreement, in relation to the naval blockade.

That raises the central strategic question: What is the administration's desired end state? If Iran remains unwilling to compromise on what it views as its core interests in the Strait of Hormuz, what is the realistic objective of escalating military pressure? Is the goal to compel negotiations, restore deterrence, or fundamentally change Iran's behavior? Each of those objectives would require a different strategy.

Without a clearly defined political end state, there is a risk that continued escalation becomes an end in itself, one that increases tensions, raises global oil prices, and gradually pulls the United States into a broader regional confrontation without delivering a durable strategic outcome.

#iran

[Kevin Scott @Kscott_94]

Fire crews stretched tonight across greater Belfast.

At least five appliances have been deployed to the Village Bonfire in south Belfast after it collapsed in the direction of homes.

Fire crews, here now battling to cool nearby properties. @BelTel

Elsewhere, fire crews have attended the following bonfires:

Comber Road - Newtownards
Rathcoole
Sandy Row
Larne - Craigyhill
Love Lane - Carrickfergus
Whitehead
Tigers Bay
Fourtowns - Ballymena

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

We keep coming back to the same fundamental question: What does the U.S. administration actually want?

If Washington's priority is reaching a durable agreement with Iran, it will have to accept that there is no realistic return to the status quo that existed in the Strait of Hormuz before February 28. From Tehran's perspective, the rules of the game have changed, and it is unlikely to reverse course simply because of additional pressure.

If, however, the administration's priority is restoring the previous maritime status quo, then it should also recognize that the chances of a U.S.-Iran agreement decline significantly, while the risk of renewed escalation increases.

The administration cannot pursue both objectives simultaneously. It must decide which one matters more.

The current memorandum of understanding, much like previous interim arrangements elsewhere, was negotiated quickly in order to preserve diplomacy. But the core disputes, including Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz, remain unresolved. Those are not peripheral issues; they are central to both sides' strategic calculations.

The Iranian leadership did not fundamentally change its worldview after the war. If anything, it appears more determined to defend what it considers its core interests.

That is why limited military strikes inside Iran are unlikely, to change Tehran's approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, they risk pushing both sides further away from the negotiated outcome that, at least in principle, both Washington and Tehran still appear to prefer.

That is the difficult reality policymakers need to confront.

#iran

[James Martin, SJ @JamesMartinSJ]

It's hard to know what to make of the Vice President's bizarre, almost nonsensical, comments here. It sounds like he is equating the use of these "hideous signs" to an alternative version of the Nicene Creed.

A little background: The Nicene Creed, formulated by the Council of Nicaea in AD 325, is an essential profession of faith used by the Catholic Church (among other churches). It is also the familiar creedal formula spoken by Catholics during Sunday Masses: "I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth..." It's a statement of belief, mainly about the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It obviously doesn't talk about "hideous signs" welcoming people.

However, the Nicene Creed does affirm belief in the church as "one, holy, catholic and apostolic." (These are the four traditional "marks" of the church.) This means, among other things, believing that the church comes to us directly from the apostles (it's "apostolic"). Thus, it derives its authority not only from Jesus Christ, but also through the "apostolic succession," an authority passed down from the apostles in the early church to the Pope and to the bishops today.

It's ironic, then, that the Vice President is mocking things like love and the church's teaching on migrants in the same breath that he is professing his faith through the words of the Creed, which includes belief in authority of the church. Because this "one, holy, catholic and apostolic" church has long proclaimed the Gospel message of love and care for the stranger, which Jesus himself preached during his public ministry.

So a butchering of the Creed would mean, in fact, not listening to the church's teaching on these matters and, even worse, not listening to Jesus's own teaching on love and loving the stranger.

Because, in the words of the Creed, we also believe in "one Lord, Jesus Christ."