Christophe Jégu

Voyageur Photographe : follow the light Critique de cinéma ( Journaliste financier. Intéressé par la géopolitique, sans être un expert.

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@FINALLEVEL @eiht0eiht When you will play in Paris ?

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@allocine @UniversalFR Quand sont les prochaines avant premières sur Paris ?

[SPECTRUM FILMS @SpectrumAsie]

Spectrum règle ses problèmes et revient bientôt. En attendant : https://t.co/O5xjRi1z5k

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@GerardAraud Un de mes chocs littéraires de ces dernières années

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@AlexAlmeida2020 The french défense budget almost double in 10 years...

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@MovieRamafr @Maverick Belle réussite

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@NCheron_bourse Les deux parties sont obligées de bouger car leurs positions sont intenables Trump ne peut se permettre la poursuite de la hausse du pétrole et des taux et les Iraniens ont besoin d'exporter leur pétrole

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@NCheron_bourse L'or se reprend

[Alice Rufo @RufoAlice]

« La gratitude a toujours bonne mémoire » témoignait Simon Abkarian en introduction de la 3e session des Assises du Monde combattant axée sur "Faire de la mémoire un principe d'action".

Au cours de son intervention, il est notamment revenu sur l’histoire partagée entre la France et l’Arménie. En 1915, les résistants arméniens du Musa Dagh, encerclés par l’armée ottomane, ont pu être évacués avec le soutien de la Marine française, grâce au courage du vice-amiral Louis Dartige du Fournet.

L’acteur qui a incarné le Général De Gaulle au cinéma, a souligné l'importance de la transmission de ces histoires de résistance, française comme arménienne, en rappelant que : « Les héros, d’où qu’ils viennent se ressemblent puisqu’ils redonnent espoir et conviction à nos humanités et à nos consciences. »

Cette transmission doit passer par l’éducation car « l’éducation est le socle de tout, une éducation discrète qui mène à l’amour de son pays. Je viens d’un peuple qui ne se prive jamais de cette force-là. »

La vidéo dans son intégralité ici👇
https://t.co/StBWRxQFvO

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@neonrated @papertigermov Hâte

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@CdricLabrousse Avec un baril déjà à plus de 100 dollars et un rendement du 10 ans américain à près de 5% ?

[Echoes of War @EchoesofWarYT]

Twenty-five years ago today, the first warning anybody on the ground received did not come from the FAA, or NORAD, or the FBI. It came from a 45-year-old flight attendant crouched in the back galley of the plane that was already hijacked.

American Airlines Flight 11 left Logan at 7:59 a.m. It was taken somewhere over central Massachusetts around 8:14.

At 8:19, Betty Ong got on an airphone with a calling card and reached American Airlines operations in Cary, North Carolina. The man who picked up thought at first it was a prank.

She stayed on that line for 23 minutes. She stayed on it until the aircraft hit the North Tower.

Listen to what she is actually doing in those 23 minutes. She is not screaming. She reports that the cockpit will not answer. She reports that two flight attendants have been stabbed, and names them, Karen Martin and Barbara Arestegui. She reports a passenger stabbed in business class. She reports that someone has sprayed mace in the forward cabin and that they cannot breathe back there. She says, in a voice people who have heard the tape describe as almost conversational, that she thinks they are being hijacked.

Then she starts giving seat numbers.

At the same time, in another galley on the same airplane, a 35-year-old flight attendant named Amy Sweeney was on a line to Michael Woodward, the flight service manager at Logan and a friend of hers for ten years. She had two small children at home in Acton, Massachusetts.

Sweeney gave him three seats. 9D. 9G. 10B.

Woodward wrote them down. Somebody pulled the manifest and looked up those seat assignments while the plane was still in the air.

9D was Mohamed Atta. 9G was Abdulaziz al-Omari. 10B was Satam al-Suqami.

Names, addresses, phone numbers, credit cards. The men who planned the entire operation to be anonymous were identified by name before the second plane had even hit, because a flight attendant on a hijacked aircraft did the most boring, most disciplined thing imaginable and read out seat assignments.

Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window and tell him what she could see.

She said she saw water. She said she saw buildings. She said they were flying very low, way too low.

Then she said, "Oh my God."

The line went dead at 8:46.

Two women, on the first aircraft, with no training for any of this and no reason left to believe they were going to live. They spent the last twenty minutes of their lives calmly feeding intelligence to people on the ground.

Everything the country learned that morning, it learned from them first.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

So...What now?

Since the collapse of the Syrian army, the Middle East has rarely witnessed a strategic failure of this magnitude.

The Houthis were capable of disrupting maritime traffic even before gaining greater control over the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab. But territorial control changes the equation. It gives them far greater operational flexibility to threaten, disrupt, and potentially regulate one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

What has happened over the past several days is therefore not simply a Saudi problem. It is an international problem.

Saudi strategy bears considerable responsibility for how we got here. Riyadh spent years believing it could contain the Houthis through financial incentives while simultaneously focusing much of its political energy on weakening the UAE’s influence and its partners in southern Yemen. That approach has failed spectacularly.

But the consequences now extend far beyond Saudi Arabia. Washington’s reluctance to reenter a major confrontation with the Houthis suggests an uncomfortable conclusion: the previous U.S. campaign failed to establish sustainable deterrence. In one important sense, the Houthis succeeded in creating their own deterrence equation with Washington. The Trump administration does not want another open-ended Middle Eastern war, and the Houthis understand that constraint.

More importantly, what we are seeing is directly connected to the broader failure to establish deterrence against Iran. Tehran and its partners have concluded that the current moment presents an opportunity to change the regional strategic map rather than merely survive within it.

Which strategy to adopt?
One important caveat must be said before: the Houthis are not ten feet tall.

They face severe economic problems, significant challenges in governing the population and territory under their control, and real limitations in their ability to employ strategic weapons effectively and consistently, even if their capabilities in this area are clearly improving.

Most importantly, the Houthis remain economically vulnerable. Their ability to absorb military pressure should not be confused with an unlimited ability to withstand sustained economic isolation and pressure.

That distinction matters. The lesson of recent events should not be that the Houthis are unbeatable. It is that military pressure alone has failed to produce sustainable deterrence. A more effective strategy would exploit their vulnerabilities, particularly economic ones, while simultaneously strengthening their opponents, disrupting Iranian support, improving intelligence, and establishing credible consequences for attacks on international shipping.

The Houthis have become a formidable strategic problem. They have not become an invincible one.

1. Build a real international coalition centered on Riyadh.
Its primary mission should be unambiguous: protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab and prevent any armed group from acquiring effective control over an international maritime chokepoint.

2. Stabilize southern Yemen.
The remaining anti-Houthi forces need serious political, economic, and security support. That requires rebuilding a functioning southern front and finding a workable arrangement involving Aidarous al-Zubaidi and the STC.

3. Maintain sustained maritime and land interdiction.
Iran must be prevented from exploiting the new situation to further improve Houthi missile, drone, maritime, and intelligence capabilities.

4. Start building real military capacity in southern Yemen.
That means training, organization, intelligence, logistics, command-and-control, and foreign advisers. The objective should be to create credible options for the future rather than improvise them during the next crisis.

5. Establish clear international red lines.
The Houthis should understand in advance what consequences will follow attempts to close or fundamentally disrupt international shipping through the strait. Red lines without credible enforcement, however, will only make the problem worse.

6. Maintain economic pressure.
Military deterrence and economic pressure should reinforce one another. The Houthis cannot be allowed to conclude that territorial expansion will eventually produce international economic normalization.

7. Consider recognizing Somaliland and developing it as a strategic hub.
A long-term coalition requires infrastructure on the western side of the Gulf of Aden. Somaliland could provide access, logistics, intelligence, training, and force-projection capabilities close to the Bab al-Mandab.

8. Disrupt the Houthis’ expanding regional network.
Particular attention should be paid to their presence and relationships in Iraq and potentially Jordan. The challenge can no longer be treated exclusively as a Yemen problem.

9. Focus much more seriously on Houthi links with al-Shabaab.
Any operational, financial, technological, or logistical cooperation across the Red Sea could transform two regional security challenges into a much larger strategic threat.

10. Dramatically improve intelligence.
The coalition needs better intelligence on senior Houthi leadership, missile and drone infrastructure, strategic weapons, logistics networks, and Iranian assistance. Deterrence without intelligence is largely rhetoric.

And what is likely to happen instead?

The danger is that Riyadh will conclude that the costs are simply too high, seek an immediate ceasefire, and eventually accept the lifting of restrictions on the Houthis in return for quiet.

That might stop the fighting temporarily. But it would also teach the Houthis, and Iran, a devastating lesson: escalation works.

This is therefore bigger than Yemen and bigger than Saudi Arabia. The fundamental question is whether the United States and its partners are prepared to defend freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints—or whether they are prepared to accept a new Middle Eastern reality in which an Iranian-backed armed movement can rewrite the regional order through force.

#IranWar‌
#yemen
#Houthis

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@jajacobbi Belle apparition dans La pêche au trèsor des Marx Brothers où elle vient se plaindre à Groucho d'être suivie dans la rue

[U.S. Central Command @CENTCOM]

CENTCOM forces destroyed five Iranian crude oil carriers, Sept. 8, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted a U.S. Navy warship with ballistic missiles twice over the past two days. The U.S. warship successfully evaded the attempted Iranian attacks and continued to patrol regional waters. No American personnel were harmed.

Full statement here: https://t.co/wdLe7s23Ib

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Initial assessment of the Iranian response:

1. Iran is escalating and nothing about that should be surprising. Tehran has repeatedly signaled that it will respond to growing U.S. pressure by moving up the escalation ladder, not by backing down.

2. The scale and coordination of the missile launches matter. Firing this number of missiles from multiple locations suggests that Iran has been rebuilding its operational capabilities. It also likely reflects growing confidence in the size of its remaining missile inventory and its ability to sustain additional rounds of attacks.

3. Iran appears to be aiming for more than signaling. Tehran likely calculates that a sufficiently large and complex salvo, potentially including cluster-warhead missiles, could overwhelm or penetrate U.S. and allied air defenses in Jordan. In other words, the objective is not simply to demonstrate capability; it is to inflict damage.

4. There is no reason to assume this round is over. Given previous IRGC threats, Iran could expand its response beyond missile attacks, including attempts to strike tankers while they are anchored in Gulf ports.

5. Iran’s strategic objective is increasingly clear: impose a much higher price for the U.S. “tanker-for-tanker” strategy and demonstrate that military pressure will not restore deterrence. This explains the steady movement upward on Iran’s escalation ladder.

6. The speed of Iranian decision-making is also significant. Tehran appears to have prepared a "menu" of retaliatory options in advance, allowing it to respond quickly rather than starting a new decision-making process after every U.S. action.

7. This creates a fundamental problem for Washington. It will be extremely difficult to identify the point at which additional U.S. military action suddenly restores deterrence. If Washington escalates, Tehran is likely to escalate again. Pressure is producing escalation, not capitulation.

8. The current status quo is therefore inherently unstable. Iran will not simply accept an indefinite maritime blockade, nor will it allow Washington to impose mounting economic costs without imposing costs of its own.

The key question for Washington is no longer whether Iran will respond to additional pressure, but how far both sides are prepared to climb an escalation ladder that neither appears capable of controlling.

#iran

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@philippe_rouyer @CercleCanalplus @canalplus Le film donne une image bien trop policée de Poutine

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

@DannyDrinksWine I watched both back to back and realised The magnificent seven is a piece a crap compared to The seven samouraï

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

Beau travail

[Frenchie @Frenchie_]

J’ai cartographié la future chaîne électrique des data centers IA, du réseau jusqu’à la puce avec les bénéficiaires

Au cœur de cette nouvelle transformation le fameux 800 V DC

À 600 kW, une distribution en 48 V nécessite environ 12 500 ampères, À 800 V, elle n’en demande plus que 750.

Cette réduction du courant permet de diminuer la quantité de cuivre, les pertes résistives, les contraintes thermiques et l’espace occupé par l’alimentationNVIDIA évoque un gain d’efficacité pouvant atteindre environ 5 % sur l’ensemble de la chaîne

L’image représente une architecture cible simplifiée, pas un système unique qui serait déployé partout dès demain, mais qui va scale jusqu'à Kyber

La transition devrait se dérouler en quatre phases :

Phase 1 — 2026/2027 : retrofit du white space

L’infrastructure AC existante reste en place : transformateurs, UPS, switchgear et busways 415/480 V.

Un power rack, ou sidecar, est ajouté près des racks de calcul. Il convertit localement l’AC en 800 V DC et peut intégrer des batteries ainsi que des supercondensateurs.

Cette phase ajoute donc du matériel sans supprimer immédiatement l’infrastructure historique.

Phase 2 — 2027/2028 : arrivée du compute natif 800 V

Le 800 V DC atteint directement le rack, puis le compute tray.

La conversion vers environ 50 V n’est plus réalisée par un PSU AC/DC traditionnel, mais par un module DC/DC placé dans le rack ou directement sur la lame de calcul.

C’est à ce moment que le 800 V devient progressivement une nécessité physique pour les racks approchant 600 kW.

Phase 3 — fin 2028/2029 : distribution DC à l’échelle du bâtiment

La conversion AC/DC remonte dans le grey space : un redresseur central transforme le 415/480 V AC en 800 V DC, ensuite distribué dans le data hall.

Le power rack devient essentiellement un battery rack chargé du stockage, de la protection et de la gestion des transitoires.

Une partie du switchgear basse tension, des PDU AC et potentiellement des UPS centralisés commence alors à disparaître. Les data centers de colocation pourraient néanmoins conserver plus longtemps ces équipements afin de prendre en charge des charges mixtes.

Phase 4 — après 2029 : le Solid-State Transformer

Le SST vise à convertir directement la moyenne tension en 800 V DC.

Il pourrait remplacer le transformateur basse tension et le redresseur par un équipement unique, plus compact et programmable.

Mais cette phase reste la plus incertaine : certification, fiabilité, sécurité et disponibilité des composants SiC haute tension doivent encore progresser.

On lit donc la chaine imagée ainsi :

1. Production, réseau et raccordement haute tension
2. Transformateur et appareillage moyenne tension
3. Conversion vers 800 V DC par TRU ou, à terme, par SST
4. Protection, stockage et appareillage 800 V DC
5. Busway 800 V DC jusqu’aux racks
6. Hot-swap, e-fuse et isolation à l’entrée du rack
7. Conversion DC/DC : 800 V vers 50, 12 ou 6 V
8. VRM multiphase vers une tension inférieure à 1 V
9. GPU, CPU, XPU accélérateurs personnalisés

Cette transformation redistribue la valeur entre plusieurs catégories d’acteurs, et tous ne gagneront pas au même moment

On l’a vu avec $WOLF et $NVTS, le repricing lié aux promesses de ces nouvelles architectures a été spectaculaire. Dans la tech, le marché valorise très rapidement les anticipations parfois avant les revenus mais cela ne signifie pas que la transformation sous-jacente soit anecdotique. Ces technologies pourraient réellement devenir des briques essentielles de l’infrastructure de demain, tout cela en ayant une volatilité énorme.

Ceci est le premier post d'une série sur l'électrification et le futurs de ces architectures

[Christophe Jégu @juge29]

Excellent

[Budo Gang @BudoGang]

Yasuaki Kurata, Jackie Chan and Sammo Hung faced off in a memorable martial arts battle in the 1985 Hong Kong action comedy Twinkle, Twinkle, Lucky Stars!
#jackiechan #yasuakikurata #hongkongaction #kungfustar

[Budo Gang @BudoGang]

Yasuaki Kurata, Jackie Chan and Sammo Hung faced off in a memorable martial arts battle in the 1985 Hong Kong action comedy Twinkle, Twinkle, Lucky Stars!
#jackiechan #yasuakikurata #hongkongaction #kungfustar