justsome

no not like that

[justsome @justsome_posts]

*hits blunt* ok how bout this one

[henry 🌘 @hdevalence]

@gakonst i think more efficient exploit markets is a more likely outcome than more efficient disclosure processes

[Ethan Buchman (🐝,🦇) @buchmanster]

@ameensol @gregthegreek anyway the the real way to support "undercollateralized" stablecoins is to collateralize them with the productive capacity of businesses. you want to take out a $100 loan? you must accept the coin for $500 of your goods and services. this is how mutual credit works

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@marlomajor @kevinsekniqi he really doesn’t

[Odysseus | phylax.systems @odysseas_eth]

@_Dave__White_ @transmissions11 attempts at a truly modern and gas efficient erc1155 would come in handy. Let’s do this

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@NourHaridy @paradigm_ctf Not trying to knock you, just pointing out you’re missing out on a valuable resource

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@NourHaridy @paradigm_ctf I’m sure you haven’t

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@NourHaridy volume and breadth pale in comparison

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@NourHaridy reading public audit reports is the best resource for learning how to find bugs/secure contracts. locking away the reports b/c non-devs don’t know how to evaluate them would be a shame

[Stephane @thegostep]

An absolute bomb of a research post just dropped by @fradamt & al

https://t.co/7smOBXKPt5
https://t.co/tfwMOQFuFx

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 @NourHaridy Not familiar with synthetix, but I think the difference here is you’re not getting liquidated, your stop-loss order is getting executed. As long as it stays in dola the system doesn’t need immediate liquidations? Is that right @NourHaridy ?

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@NourHaridy @SamuelShadrach4 Something like this, but the debt is minted as dola + more than just eth accepted as collateral

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@makoto_inoue @ensdomains Kind of a variant of SAI w/o tokens, no?
Users lock eth into a contract and it records a debt equivalent to the USD value of the deposited eth. User can wipe debt & withdraw: locked eth - (debt*current USD/ETH rate). No liquidations, ENS essentially forgives debts temporarily.

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@thegostep @SamuelShadrach4 Render unto Miners what belongs to Miners

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@thegostep https://t.co/jW2QnUM9gy

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 Well tbh they’re not discouraged per se in this scheme. More forcing MEV to go entirely to miners, or risk a reorg.

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@thegostep @SamuelShadrach4 Yeah the “discouraging hacks” is more a provocative thought experiment, really interested in how mev capture can be accelerated and those fees forwarded to pay for security until some finality gadget or social consensus can finalize the block.

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@AFDudley0 @bertcmiller Re:2, something like this?
https://t.co/rr3mZa6lan

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 MEV wars can be accelerated to discourage defi hacks. Write a bribe pool contract that pays out 1/10000 of the pool to the coinbase when a (permissionless) bribe fn is called. Fork MEV-Geth to accept block bundles + fork choice rule of chain w/ most ETH in the bribe pool.

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 No worries, still working out the shower thought myself

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 Instead of paying one miner to include your tx in a block that can get reorg’d, you pay 10000 future miners to mine on a given chain

[justsome @justsome_posts]

@SamuelShadrach4 Well tbh they’re not discouraged per se in this scheme. More forcing MEV to go entirely to miners, or risk a reorg.