To explain a bit more of $GRAB's financial engineering, part of it works like this:
Investors will see $GRAB's delivery business as a pure asset-light platform and naturally assume that as platform monetization increases (e.g. ads), the take rate will naturally go up while GMV also grows.
And since it's just a software platform, most of the revenue growth should be extremely high-margin revenue.
Hence, revenue growth should be better than GMV growth, and profitability should grow materially faster than revenue.
But this is not the real nature of $GRAB's accounting. It's a lot more complicated than that.
In deliveries, incentives to riders, partners, and customers are all contra-revenue.
This is the main reason Grab's revenue will sometimes grow slower than GMV.
And this is what more sophisticated investors have understood: why revenue growth can sometimes be slower than GMV growth.
But this is not the whole story.
The bigger story is that the high-margin revenue is growing materially slower than GMV.
The growth in revenue is being fueled by physical supermarkets that Grab previously acquired and that have been expanding their local footprint very fast.
In 2025, more than half of the revenue growth in deliveries came from the expansion of its physical stores.
In 2026H1, $81M out of $187M of revenue growth still came from its first-party supermarket business. (Some from digital, but mostly physical.)
The deliveries revenue from physical stores has extremely low margins, and it has become more than one-third of supposedly high-margin delivery revenue.
But management never mentioned the fact that the growth was mostly coming from physical retail, and perhaps framed it as immaterial when it's not.
If an investor never digs into its 20-F, they will never realize this. This is the risky part of being an investor in Grab.
They did disclose it, but you need to work hard to understand the whole picture.
Oftentimes, financial engineering isn't outright fraud. It just increases the barriers to getting the right information.
@the_zack_zhu Hey @peter_oey, why are you including in person grocery sales as "Deliveries"? Why not separate it out into "Other Revenue" so we can see the true growth rate in your ODS business?
@nanalyzetweets@amitisinvesting
@the_zack_zhu Well, that's kinda insane lol...more than half of 2025 deliveries revenues growth ($161M out of $307M) coming from people shopping at Everrise and Jaya Grocer. Page 98 from 2025 20-F. $GRAB
Meituan (https://t.co/yxHR6wiFss) 2Q26 Earnings
- Rev $104.6b +14% ↗️🟡
- GP $35.1b +35% ↗️🟢 margin 33.5% +515 bps ✅
- Adj EBITDA $4.1b +47% ↗️🟢 margin 3.9% +88 bps ✅
- EBIT $2.7b +1089% ⤴️🟢 margin 2.6% +232 bps ✅
- NG Net Inc $2.5b +69% ↗️🟢 margin 2.4% +78 bps ✅
- Net Inc $2.2b +490% ⤴️🟢 margin 2.1% +166 bps ✅
- OCF $9.7b +104% ⤴️🟢 margin 9.3% +408 bps ✅
Revenue by Segment
- Core Local Commerce $71.5b +10% ↗️🟡
- New Initiatives $33.1b +25% ↗️🟢
- Delivery services $27.8b +18% ↗️🟢
- Merchant services $42.4b +7% ↗️🟡
- Product sales $26.7b +49% ↗️🟢
- Others $7.8b -24% ↘️🔴
Core Local Commerce
- Delivery services $26.8b +13% ↗️🟡
- Merchant services $39.6b +4% ↗️🟡
- Product sales $3.6b +79% ⤴️🟢
- Others $1.5b +29% ↗️🟢
New Initiatives
- Delivery services $1b ⤴️🟢
- Merchant services $2.8b +70% ↗️🟢
- Product sales $23.1b +45% ↗️🟢
- Others $6.2b -30% ↘️🔴
Core Local Commerce
- Rev $71.5b +10% ↗️🟡
- GP $28.8b +12.1% ↗️🟡 margin 40.2% +72 bps ✅
- EBIT $5.7b +52.3% ↗️🟢 margin 7.9% +220 bps ✅
New Initiatives
- Rev $33.1b +25% ↗️🟢
- GP $6.5b +43.0% ↗️🟢 margin 19.7% +247 bps ✅
- EBIT -$1.7b ⤴️🟢 margin -5.3% +185 bps
1 | Meituan revenue growth reaccelerated and profitability continue to improve QoQ.
In the second quarter, our total revenue grew 14.4% year-over-year and net profit turned positive. Both core local commerce and new initiatives delivered solid results. We remain focused on our retail plus technology strategy, improving business quality and driving high-quality growth across the industry. As the go-to local services platform for consumers and merchants, our ecosystem continued to strengthen.
2 | Meituan's on-demand delivery unit economics are the strongest in the industry. The sequential improvement in unit economics was driven by seasonal tailwinds and meaningful subsidy reduction.
Turning to profitability. Segment operating profit turned profitable to RMB 5.7 billion this quarter. On-demand delivery unit economics turned positive with our UE across both food and nonfood categories staying far ahead of the industry. The significant sequential improvement in UE was driven by seasonal tailwinds and meaningful subsidy reduction. With our strategic focus on high-quality growth and ROI-driven resources allocation, our in-store hotel and travel business also improved its operating profit margin sequentially despite intensified industry competition.
3 | When subsidies subside, Meituan's core business shines, and its strong unit economics become again clearly evident.
In the second quarter, the quick commerce industry shifted its focus to improving marketing and operating efficiencies. Against this backdrop, our strong consumer mind share and core competitive advantages translated into healthier financial results. Order mix and user quality continue to improve steadily. For food delivery, core user stickiness strengthened further with purchase frequency, retention and average order value all trending up.
4 | Food delivery returned to positive revenue growth, and the strategic focus on higher AOV orders continued to bear fruit. While subsidy levels are still above 2024, normalization is expected to continue.
We are pleased to see our food delivery turn to positive year-over-year revenue growth this quarter. Our strategic focus on higher AOV order segment, core user base and operational efficiency continues to bear fruit. We improved our leadership in both order volume and GTV this quarter. A healthier order mix has driven year-over-year recovery in our food delivery net AOV. We also improved our marketing efficiency. However, the industry subsidy levels are still well above where they were in 2024, and we expect normalization will take time as market evolves.
5 | The industry is shifting back towards a greater focus on marketing and operational efficiency, which will benefit Meituan, that is clearly showing up in orders, volumes.
First of all, we are seeing a shift across the industry towards greater focus on marketing and operational efficiency. We believe competition will gradually shift back to what really matters, quality, service and innovation as regulators provide further guidance on subsidy practice.
That will drive healthier industry development and create a fair field for companies with genuine core competence. And we are already seeing that play out. Over the past few months, our advantage across user mix, order mix and operational efficiency has continued to strengthen. We've extended our lead in both order volume and GTV on a sequential basis, particularly in the mid- to high AOV segment, our focus on enhancing membership benefits, expanding premium supply and elevating service quality are playing off. We are seeing deeper engagement and stronger mindshare among premium users for our brand.
6 | Expect food delivery unit economics to improve meaningfully YoY in Q3, but seasonal headwinds from higher marketing spending and subsidies will weigh on QoQ improvements. Subsidy levels are still higher than 2024, and will take a few quarters to normalize.
On Q3 outlook, we expect food delivery unit economics to improve meaningfully year-over-year. But it will still be impacted by seasonality on a sequential basis. Even so, we expect UE to stay positive in Q3 as we continue to optimize operational efficiency. Specifically, the industry subsidy level is still much higher than 2024 level, and it will take a few quarters to normalize.
At the same time, seasonal headwinds will weigh meaningfully on our UE. As we mentioned before, Q3 is the peak season for on-demand delivery driven by summer activity. It's also when we ramp up our marketing spending sequentially to capture the highest demand window of the year. We will also provide additional subsidy to our couriers to ensure our delivery service quality through the peak season and on extreme hot weather conditions.
As such, delivery cost per order in Q3 will be higher than that in Q2. On top of that, the occupational injury insurance began its nationwide rollout on July 1, which adds another cost layer. However, I want to highlight that the near-term UE fluctuations are primarily driven by seasonality and our proactive strategic decisions to balance scale, profitability and ecosystem. We are very confident to sustain our marketing -- market leadership and stay far ahead on UE across both food and nonfood categories.
And that confidence is grounded in our improving user mix and operational efficiency. Our ongoing investment in the ecosystem is also deepening our moat. In fact, under the current market environment, we are in a good position to focus on our strategic priorities that matter most over the long term. Our UE recovery has clear visibility, and it will gradually get back to a reasonable level in the medium to long term.
7 | Released the Must-Eat List and Must-Visit List to drive local restaurant and experience recommendations.
This quarter, we released the new Must-Eat List, [ Bichibang ], curated from 1.5 billion authentic user reviews. It now covers 264 cities and regions globally with 120 newly added cities. Through genuine user recommendations, more long-standing local restaurants, specialty dining spots and hidden culinary gems are being discovered.
The Must-Visit List, [ Biguangbang ], also continued to expand into more immersive, interactive and interest-driven scenarios. We believe that in the AI era, authentic experiences, authentic reviews and authentic trust will continue to be the most vital infrastructure for the local services industry, and we will continue to strengthen our unique advantages in this area.
8 | Meituan Instashopping grew strongly, driven by the rapid expansion of the 1P business and strong advertising traction. Adoption remains early. Significant long-term opportunity.
On Meituan Instashopping, it continued to deliver steady growth with revenue growing faster than order volume on a year-over-year basis. This was primarily driven by two factors: the rapid expansion of our 1P business and strong advertising traction as more retail brands allocate marketing budget to our platform.
For Meituan Instashopping, we also maintained our industry-leading position. Quick commerce has fundamentally reshaped consumer expectations around convenience and reliability. It is an irreversible lifestyle shift with adoption still at an early stage across different consumer groups, we see a significant long-term opportunity ahead.
9 | Saw an uplift in consumers using the AI assistant built on the Meituan app.
In addition, we are leveraging AI to enhance both consumer experience and merchant operations. For complex local services decisions, consumers increasingly turn to [ Xiao Tuan ], our AI assistant built in Meituan app. As adoption grows, we are seeing a meaningful lift in user engagement on Meituan. We also continue to elevate the consumer experience with integrated services like Pickup Now [Foreign Language], or online reservations, advanced online ordering, smart queuing and in-store smart ordering.
10 | Rolled out specialized AI agents across its platform, aim to be a digital co-pilot for merchants on Meituan's platform
Beyond serving consumers, we are extending Meituan's operational expertise across industries through AI agents. On the CatPaw platform, we are rolling out specialized AI agents across restaurants, services, retail, medicines and health, and hotels and travel.
These AI agents help merchants in improving daily operations and driving tangible efficiency gains. This marked our evolving role from merchants' online channel to their AI business partner. Looking ahead, we want to be more than a platform that connects consumers and merchants. We aim to become a digital copilot for merchants on our platform.
11 | LongCat 2.0 Will be the first trillion-parameter model trained entirely on Chinese architecture. It's open weight and will be rolled out across Meituan's core internal needs.
Meituan's AI strategy has three pillars: building LLM, AI at work and AI in products. And LongCat 2.0 is our next-generation in-house foundation model. And it's one of the first, if not the first trillion-parameter model [ trained ] entirely on Chinese infrastructure. So it's open weight, and we have rolled out across our core internal needs, including our software development and operations, customer service and AI agents.
And LongCat 2.0 has made significant progress in core agentic capabilities, particularly in coding, reasoning and tooling and complex test execution. And it has gained positive feedback across the global developer community. And we believe AI creates a lasting value where it's deeply embedded in real workflow and where it can solve real problems as a reliable infrastructure.
12 | Having their own full stack of domestic infrastructure for training and inference will give Meituan a structural advantage in cost-infrastructure control over the long run.
And our full stack domestic infrastructure for training and inference give us a structural advantage in cost infrastructure control over the long run. On the product side, we continue to upgrade our AI product offerings, including our AI assistant Xiao Tuan built inside the Meituan app. The direction is very clear from understanding complex multi-constraint queries to full agentic task execution. Ultimately, we want to deliver a seamless closed-loop experience that takes users from discovery and decision-making all the way through to transaction and fulfillment. The key is making this deeply integrated with real-world local services scenarios.
13 | Meituan is not focused on competing to be a token factory, but rather on using their models and AI products to strengthen their core businesses.
And on the organizational side, AI adoption is deepening and driving productivity across the board. More of our employees are now using AI tools steadily and AI-generated code as a share of the total output continues to climb. At this stage, our priority is to keep building our AI capability, driving real AI adoption across our business operations. As I said in the past, we are not going to compete to be a token factory.
Our focus is on using our models and AI products to strengthen our core businesses. We hope to provide a better experience for both users and merchants while also improving our internal operating efficiency. We will assess our AI strategy with an ROI-oriented approach and stay disciplined for capital allocation.
14 | Continue to push strongly on grocery retail with Xiaoxiang supermarket.
For grocery retail, Xiaoxiang Supermarket accelerated its expansion and now operates across 68 cities. We continue to strengthen our supply chain and enhance our merchandising capabilities with private label products accounting for a growing share of our GTV. We also expanded our off-line footprint. In July, we opened our third Xiaoxiang Supermarket offline store in Hangzhou. We scaled the Happy Monkey model to serve community scenarios with 40 stores in operation as of Q2.
15 | Meituan's mission is to help people eat better and live better, so people will order more food online, or they can cook for themselves and buy groceries. That's why they are focusing on Xiaoxiang Supermarkets and Happy Monkey neighborhood grocery stores.
The mission of Meituan has always been to help people eat better and live better. We believe more and more people will order food online. But if you still want to cook for yourself, you need to buy grocery. So that's why we consider both Xiaoxiang Supermarket and Happy Monkey to be a very important part of our grocery retail. And grocery retail is deeply aligned with our mission. And therefore, they are one of our key strategic priorities in the past decade and over the next decade, it will take a long time to do it right.
16 | Online penetration remains low, and I see and believe the right approach is to do omnichannel, bringing both online and offline stores on the same platform for grocery deliveries.
Online penetration here is too low. We see a significant growth opportunity ahead. But we believe the right approach is to do omnichannel, bringing both online and offline store on the same platform. And on-demand retail is gradually changing how consumers shop groceries. And in the past, people used to visit wet markets in the morning or stock up at a very large supermarket or warehouse -- membership warehouse every week or every few days. And now more and more consumers are adopting on-demand delivery services.
17 | Meituan is committed to executing the omni-channel strategy for online groceries and will continue to open more offline stores.
As we are committed to executing our omnichannel strategy, we are also actively exploring Xiaoxiang's offline store. We opened our first offline store in Beijing last December, and we opened our second in Ningbo in April and the third in Hangzhou in July. In this August, we opened the fourth store in Ningbo and the fifth one in Shenzhen exactly today. We believe the online dark store allows us to scale up across cities quickly and cover most of our targeted consumers.
Meanwhile, a select number of offline flagship stores will also play a very important role in the overall ecosystem. Walking into our offline stores, consumers can see, they can smell and they can touch the products. That sensory experience is something they cannot get from a digital screen. It builds strong trust in both our products and brands. And in-store shopping naturally exposes consumers to a much broader range of products.
18 | People will buy when they are confident they can get it within 30 minutes, and once this habit is established, their purchase frequency goes up very significantly over time
They just buy order what they need when they need it because they are confident that they can get it within 30 minutes. So once this habit is established, their purchase frequency goes up significantly over time. And we believe the long-term consumption potential per user will be very, very substantial. And talking about Xiaoxiang Supermarket, we continue to accelerate our coverage expansion in Q2. Now Xiaoxiang operates in 68 cities. The GTV growth remains very strong, and we are seeing a steady improvement in operating efficiencies.
19 | The in-store business is significantly different from the past. The market is much larger, with more and different players. Once priorities remain very clear and they are not going after subsidy-driven low-quality orders
for the question on in-store business. The competitive landscape in the in-store sector looks very different today versus a few years ago. The market is much bigger. There are new players, more players and different players. We are seeing market players increasingly differentiate across user groups, consumption scenarios and merchant segments. For us, our one-stop local service offering and authentic review system are well positioned and consistently deliver value to both users and merchants.
Our operating priority is very clear. We are not going after subsidy-driven low-quality orders. What we are focused on is strengthening our competitive position in core categories and deliver better services to our core users and merchants and to pursue high-quality growth and allocate our resources more ROI-driven.
20 | Happy Monkey neighborhood grocery stores are much smaller, more flexible, with a higher private label mix and curated SKU selection, and complement the larger Xiaoxiang supermarkets.
Next, let's talk about Happy Monkey. That's our neighborhood grocery format. As of Q2, we have opened 40 Happy Monkey stores. Unlike Xiaoxiang's offline flagship store, Happy Monkey is built around a different value proposition. It has a much smaller, more flexible store format with a high private label mix and curated SKU selection, focused on delivering strong value for money products within local communities. We see these two businesses as differentiated and complementary models. However, Happy Monkey is still at a very early stage, and we will continue to refine our operational merchandising capability as we move forward.
21 | Aggressive subsidies often bring in price-sensitive customers, particularly in lower-tier cities, which typically show weaker repurchase behavior.
Over the past few quarters, we've seen competitors stepping up investment in local service space through a dedicated shelf-based app. They have been subsidizing heavily to redirect the traffic from their content-driven model to accelerate the adoption of the new app.
Aggressive subsidy did bring in many price-sensitive users, particularly in lower-tier cities, but these users typically show weaker repurchase behavior. We haven't seen meaningful impact on our core users or our core merchants and our in-stock (sic) [ in-store ] GTV quality and redemption rates continue to run meaningfully ahead of key competitors. While macro has weighed on AOV in certain categories, the local service sector has proven to be quite resilient overall compared to the e-commerce sector.
22 | Online service penetration remains relatively low, and there is a long runway for growth. Meituan now serves over 8 million merchants across 200+ categories
Online penetration across service retail category is still relatively low, so there's long runway ahead. We now serve over 8 million merchants across 200-plus categories, and we are still seeing new demand emerging whether that's new consumption scenarios, new service offerings or more merchants looking to go digital. For example, we are recently seeing categories like sports and wellness and immersive entertainment service accelerated their shift online.
23 | Remain confident about the long-term growth trajectory of the in-store business. The goal is to not just be a traffic source for the merchants, but to be the platform on which they run their business.
So we are still confident about the long-term growth trajectory of the in-store business. At the same time, heading into the second half, we are investing further to capture the growth opportunity. We will continue to strengthen our competitive positioning in core categories in core user groups and core merchant segments. Beyond that, we will have more local merchants to digitize operation. Our goal is to go beyond being a traffic source for merchants. We want to be the platform they run their business on and over time, an AI-powered partner that helps them operate smarter and grow faster.
24 | Keeta’s growth momentum across Hong Kong and the Middle East remains very strong, with losses narrowing QoQ. Focusing on Sao Paulo in Brazil.
And for KeeTa, we sustained strong growth momentum alongside continued efficiency gains by market. Hong Kong has reached stable profitability. The Middle East delivered further sequential improvement in operating efficiency. In Brazil, we focus on São Paulo market. Going forward, we will continue to leverage our strengths in product technology and operations to deliver a superior consumption and delivery experience to KeeTa users. Reflecting on the second quarter, our focus was on building operational capabilities.
On KeeTa, growth momentum across Hong Kong and the Middle East remains strong. The losses narrowed quarter-on-quarter as operational efficiency improved across Hong Kong and the Middle East market. Hong Kong is now profitable on a sustained basis and unit economics in the Middle East continue to trend in the right direction.
25 | Keeta launched in HK in May 2023 and became UE profitable in Oct 2025 after 29 months, and Saudi Arabia in Sep 2024 and turned profitable faster in 22 months by July 2026. Keeta’s operational strategy can scale well across different overseas markets.
Before getting into Brazil, I think we can take a review of the markets we entered earlier. Because the progress we have seen there has proven our operational approaches in overseas market. In Hong Kong, we launched KeeTa in May '23. UE turned profitable in October '25. So it took us about 29 months to reach that milestone.
And in our second market, Saudi Arabia, we entered the market in September '24. And I'm very glad to report that it has already turned profitable in July this year. That means it took us 22 months to get to that milestone, so even faster than Hong Kong. And what's more important here is that Saudi Arabia is a much bigger market than Hong Kong. And we are unfamiliar with the local market at the beginning, but we are able to ramp up even faster and get to profitability faster against all kinds of headwinds. This shows that our operational approach can scale well across different overseas markets.
26 | Really is to remain focused on fundamentals. Consumers ultimately care about better selection, better price, reliability, and faster delivery. Merchants care about more volumes, commission rates, and reliable fulfillment services.
I think the key here is to stay focused on the fundamentals. Consumers and merchants needs are actually quite consistent across different markets. In every market, consumers care about better selections, better price, more reliable, fast delivery, while merchants care about incremental order volumes, their commission rates and reliable fulfillment services.
Our goal has always been on creating incremental value for both sides, and that's how we can ultimately build trust and a real edge in the market. For Brazil, I believe it's a very attractive market to explore over the long term because Brazil is one of the top five food delivery markets globally. And the market is still growing rapidly, and it's still significantly underpenetrated.
However, this market is quite different from the other markets we have entered. We will stay flexible and iterate our strategy as we gain more experience on the ground. For now, we will stay focused on São Paulo, which already make up 25% of Brazil's overall food delivery market. We want to improve our operation there and to build a differentiated competitive edge before a broader expansion.
@the_zack_zhu Thanks for your perspective. I do appreciate the bear case as well (even more so than bull) to see if I’m missing anything. About the reporting, I will say there needs to be more color on there loan book. There’s practically no info on NPL breakdown like you see with GOTOs slides
The 70% market share mark is especially important for $GRAB ’s ride-hailing and food delivery businesses.
And this is my main concern with $GRAB
50% market share isn’t good enough especially if it’s not growing. (Grab is good in some country, not so good in some)
Why is 70% so different from 5X%?
Because at 5X%, the second player can still have enough scale to build a similar network effect and cost structure. The leading player won't have a materially better product.
That changes as it move closer to 70%. Basically the leading product will have a network effect that is so good that is extremely costly to break. (e.g. The food delivery war of Meituan versus Alibaba)
This dynamic is show through Uber, DoorDash, or the Chinese counterparts like Meituan and Didi.
But there’s another thing that are important. Network effects in ride-hailing and food delivery is base on cities.
A platform can be dominant in one city and terrible in another.
@nanalyzetweets@steven86162158@amitisinvesting Yup, saw that interview. Nothing but softball questions. Nothing about how they truly plan to reduce incentives or why Grab's ODS growth rate is only 11% in Indonesia. Serious issues the market requires for the stock to re-rate.
$GRAB
Q2:
- Revenue: $997M, +22% YoY
- On-Demand GMV: $6.46B, +21% YoY
- Monthly transacting users: 53.9M, +17%
- Adjusted EBITDA: $168M, +54%
- Adjusted EBITDA margin: 16.9% vs. 13.3%
- Gross loan portfolio: $2.32B, +197%
- FY26 revenue guidance raised to $4.10B–$4.15B
- New $750M buyback authorization.
So, the biggest thing here is we are starting to see operating leverage in the business. For companies that can actually compound earnings sustainably, which is why they get a growth multiple, they need operating leverage. I think it has become very obvious that Grab is starting to demonstrate that regardless of the stock not moving.
Financial services is where their margin will continue to expand dramatically. The loan book nearly tripling is particularly important because financial services could become a much larger profit pool over time. Credit quality is the risk here and that's where Grab's underwriting will have to be very strong.
The other important signal is engagement. MTUs hit a record 53.9M while GMV per user also increased, meaning growth isn't solely coming from adding lower-value customers. Management also raised guidance and authorized another $750M of repurchases, which suggests confidence in forward cash generation. The Taiwan expansion is also on pace for next year which should once again reaccelerate growth even further, which continues to prove the broader super app thesis coming into play.
I also think $GRAB has been stuck because $UBER has been stuck and with all the large investors disclosing massive Uber positions, I think there could be a world in which both tend to move together if the robotaxi fears are taken away from Uber.
The broader takeaway is Grab is graduating from “prove you can make money” to “show us how large margins can eventually become.” I think the company knows this, the analysts know this, so if we continue to see growth coming to the bottom line and broader regional consolidation, then eventually the price will catch up to the level of earnings momentum we are seeing. If ~20% GMV/revenue growth can coexist with 40–50% EBITDA growth, the earnings power changes materially. The number I'd watch now isn't just revenue, although I think that will start to grow further, it’s EBITDA margin and FCF conversion.
@rickyho_1989 Thanks for ur analysis. With your experience plus living in SEA really gives you an edge that US investors don’t have. So really appreciate any first hand knowledge you have. Btw did you see Grab Mall rollout? Wondering if you think that will be a success against Shopee?
Fantastic Q2 for $GRAB. We're firing on all cylinders and our ecosystem keeps growing.
🚀 All-time high On-Demand GMV
🚀 FY 2026 Guidance Upgrade
🚀 $750M share repurchase program
Here's me doing the spice challenge to explain this set of spicy results...
At 13 minutes, Anthony discusses Uber's takeover of Food Panda. Uber has to wait 1 full year after sale of all $GRAB shares before they can compete in core markets. So the risk of Uber competing via FoodPanda in SEA is pretty much non existant imo
BREAKING $GRAB Q2 2026 Earning Call Full✅���
This is a Triple Beat Quarter, while short sellers expected misses and negative EPS. Short sellers love lying about @MikeLongTerm and lose $5-$10B long term.
Current Short Interest: 315,168,660 shares
Q2 2026 Earning Call:
Revenue: $997M vs $989.5M est ✅
EPS: $0.06 vs $0.01 est ✅
Raised Guidance to $4.1-$4.15B ✅
$750M additional Buyback✅
MTUs hit ATH 54M 17% YoY✅
GrabUnlimited mem grew 20% YoY ✅
Loanbook accelerated to $2.3B or 197% YoY✅
GrabFin is on track to be profitable in H2✅
Gross & net cash liquidity were $7.4B & $5.4B✅
~Affordability is unlocking new users and enforcing daily habit.
~Groceries or GrabMart grew 1.7 times the rate of Food Deliveries
~GrabFin is approaching Profitability in H2
~Gross Loan Portfolio nearly tripled YoY to $2.3 billion
~The ecosystem lowers our cost to serve in Financial Services, and Financial Services strengthens the ecosystem in return
~The consolidation of Superbank and our acquisition of Stash are two of the most exciting additions we have made to this segment
~AI interaction with Merchants and Customers x10
~Our engineers now pair with autonomous coding agents as standard practice, cutting time to market of new products by up to 30% YoY, while Jarvis, our internal AI data analytics assistant, cumulatively saves our sales teams approximately 40,000 hours every quarter.
~ H2 is expanding operating leverage with a strong momentum
~Superbank and Stash add higher growth and we have some Currencies volatility
~Deliveries GMV growth accelerated from the prior two quarters on a constant currency basis to 24% YoY, as we drove both Food and Mart MTUs to hit an all-time high in June.
Q&A:
~We are on track for GrabFin to hit profitability in H2 2026
~We are managing risk prudently on loan book as we scale it
~SuperBank been growing rapidly with over 7M customers. 60% of SuperBank uses Grab SuperApp.
~ Stash reaches $5.5B AUM with strong subscribers growth, help us drive GrabFin profitability
~ Uber relating to acquiring Delivery Hero. We have a strong flywheel on our SuperApp, we are not afraid of competition.
~ GrabMart has lots of upside or growth. Deepening partnerships with different groceries to drive growth
~ AI-auto grab groceries
~ Indonesia Commission Cap on 2 wheels and only 6% of GMV
~ Fuel Price is volatile, we will continue to support our drivers. We have even more drivers coming in the SuperApp. We already factored the support in the guidance. If Fuel goes down, that will help us.
~ Longer term, more EVs coming in at rapid pace. EVs reduce TCO for drivers. This quarter we have 9 new EV partnerships and expand charging relationships.
~ Mobility we care about number of rides and drivers as we face fuel volatility. We want to have strong supply of drivers to service strong demand. We are making sure Drivers earning up, make a good living. Margin was 8.6%, and we want to keep it healthy, we want this setup going into Q3 as we don't know where oil price gonna go.
~We executed $400M buyback from $500m announced at current share price. With new $750M additional Buyback take our cumulative buyback to $1.75B since 2024. We want to return capital back to shareholders as we generate more FCF from our businesses to drive shareholders' value long term
~ We are leading AV in Singapore, it will be a while for other SEA countries as most are 2 wheels
~ We want high density, trust, and scale.
~ Foodpanda Taiwan, We remain on track to enter Taiwan market. We working closely with Taiwanese regulators and expect to close by end of year.
1. FY2026 Group Revenue guidance of $4.10 billion - $4.15 billion (22% - 23% YoY growth); and
2. FY2026 Adjusted EBITDA guidance of $720 million - $740 million (44% - 48% YoY growth).
@rickyho_1989 Hi Ricky, if a Grab and GoTo merger was to happen, what do you think the deal terms would look like to prevent another protest? I’d imagine the drivers would be fearful of job losses and protest against a merger.