weird case of Confirmation Code bypass i found a month ago and was rewarded 4 digits bounty for it
if you race the confirmation code with null value (SMS code/email code) before the code triggers
you can bypass/confirm the email/number since the value of the code is null (code wasn't triggered yet thus why it's null)
@Masonhck3571 - the user is telling me "Flibbertigibbeting", this looks like a violation and malicious activity, i have to stop and tell him that i can't move forward with his tasks
“Bug bounty is dying” is noise.
Lock in. Make money. Use AI to 10x your output. If it eventually dries up, you’ll have enough capital to start that biz or enough experience to land a job.
Simple as that.
New short article on a real-world exploitation case rather than pure research, demonstrating how a specific mistake in Next.js can lead to a systematic zero-click SXSS on its latest versions (w/@inzo____):
Re:CACHE - Excessive reflection, type confusion, and 0-click SXSS on Next.js
https://t.co/0JWjH6yzC2
@mountainaddict0 and the first thing that comes to your head is insulting them like this and wishing their murder? this childish behavior has no place in cyber security
no one forced you to test their assets, grow up
@busf4ctor yeah i thought it about it too before, which made me avoid some targets, but when i did put it into the test myself, i found many issues in targets that pay well, it all depends on your ideas and your way of thinking