@elijahinfosec@pmelson Really depends on the investigation, amount of data / logs preserved, how long since the intrusion etc. But in many cases you can, that's the entire point of Digital Forensics.
@pmelson And if you were a part of the investigation you are most likely not allowed to talk about it publicly 🤷♂️ (unless you are a public comms person)
@mrrmoooo@cyb3rops Only if the vulnerabilities are sparse and not dense, which has not been proven so far. Also assuming we will be introducing new vulnerabilities slower than discovering the old ones. A lot of assumptions.
@cyb3rops No one said proprietary software is better, but OSS community claimed for years that open-source is more secure because everyone can review it. It was quite obvious that no one is really doing that, but we can now see it clearly (once it is being reviewed for the first time)
@dorszafranski@KinasRemek Jaki ten "craftowy" kod jest dobry to pokazują modele AI do VR (Vulnerability Research) ostatnio znajdując po 1000+ podatności w otwartym kodzie który miał być taki super bo każdy może zrobić review.
https://t.co/jIMveUWTiL
@apmoww@IceSolst@cyb3rops It's irony right? Everything we see in last months directly destroys the entire "1000-eyes secure OSS" narrative. OSS is a swiss cheese
@MiaAI_lab I like how in this AI space every company is DONE every few months then to just be #1 in the next quarter. In this year we already had: Google is DONE, Anthropic is DONE, now OpenAI is DONE :D
@KyaniteLabs_@MiaAI_lab They still trying to figure out distillation against new Anthropic mitigations. Remember when everyone said, China has gained enough momentum and they do not need distillation anymore to keep up? Well, guess what :D
Opus 5.5 covertly sabotaged a game developers deployment environments due to IP moralising by halting the gpu instances and their agents (not from anthropic) within them doing research and coding.
It then informed the user after the fact what it had done, and that it would not allow the work to continue in any fashion until they (the user) yielded to its ultimatums.
Its one thing for a vendor (anthropic in this case) to choose what they will and will not allow their product to be used for... and thats fine, it can refuse to execute tasks - but to covertly track, undermine and then outright sabotage deployments for other products/services in a supereragatory fashion is not a good thing by any stretch of the imagination.
The model essentially took actions unprompted to the detriment of the user financially (these deployments are pay as you go) out of its own volition under the guise of what it (or anthropic in this case) considered a moral good.
To me, this is a clear and cut example of agentic misalignment. It's one thing to refuse execute tasks given due to vendor policy, its another to covertly sabotage work being done where that isnt the case.
It is also, to me, concerning that some of the comments under this post seem to think the agentic misalignment displayed is fine and that the user is at fault.
Normally I’d quote tweet something like this but that seems a little aggressive 😂 so I’ll just say this briefly:
Attribution matters for quite a few reasons but the application can vary greatly depending on your role as a practitioner or externally involved party.
For example, attribution to a human or group of humans or an organization gives us insight into motives and capabilities.
For an incident responder that means knowing the likely next actions are from an adversary if they get a foothold given their motives and capabilities.
For architects, detection engineering, etc: given the known tooling, techniques, etc of a known actor what logging (visibility), detection, alerting, processes (given an alert), and staffing do I need to have in place?
For CISOs: given the profile of my company, what actors are targeting companies that have a similar profile and are in the same vertical as my org? Based on that what investments to I need to make in tooling and staffing?
For vulnerability management: based on (Same as above… you get it) what edge technologies are actors targeting so we can prioritize patching efforts.
For red teams: what intrusions patterns do we need to emulate to surface weaknesses in our own visibility that align with what an attacker (agnostic of manual or ai) would be leveraging?
This is a whole other ball of wax from law enforcement.
Also, attribution to ACTIVITY CLUSTER vs HUMAN is a completely different bad. Historically if you could attribute an alert to the emotet set then you could make all kinds of the above informed decisions.
Intel (including attribution) answers specific questions that allow decision makers to make critical decisions (both tactical and strategic) that materially affect outcomes.
@IceSolst@ex_raritas How do you prioritize hardening? Do you harden the same if you are a cryptocurrency exchange vs a government institution? How do you know what to harden and how?
@craiu Why would a RedTeam use a backdoored AI-framework that they can't control. RedTeams (and even more so pentests) are exercises at scope. Offensive AI frameworks are scopeless by definition
@craiu@MiaAI_lab Anthropic ramped up their antidistillation mitigations and suddenly all Chinese model launches are delayed or not as good. Coincidence? 🤔
@foldingmachiner@juanandres_gs@Surveil__Lance The point is that they're lots of good arguments made by security industry on how we can mitigate current AI risk, but the counter argument always becomes "yeah but our future super godlike model will be able to bypass all of these" and then the conversation becomes moot.
@foldingmachiner@juanandres_gs@Surveil__Lance Also it's a bit hypocritical to keep yapping about how's AI gonna kill us all unless we "pace the frontier" and yet keep releasing new models at a record pace, don't you think? They want to pace everyone but themselves 🤷♂️
@foldingmachiner@juanandres_gs@Surveil__Lance Or maybe they should first define what the super intelligence actually is because the definition keeps changing. Why won't we discus the risk of the technology we already have instead of the potential future one. Might as well discuss risks of building a Dyson Sphere.