Luke Douketis🇨🇦🇺🇦🏳️‍🌈

UWO BHSc BA History. I like model tanks. I hate maga fascists and vatniks

[Serhii Sternenko @sternenko]

One-year-old Angelina, born in August 2025, died right in her stroller. Her mother, Inna, passed away in the hospital.

What were they guilty of? Why does the US President support this russian evil?

[Evergreen Intel @vcdgf555]

We are at this point.

[MenchOsint @MenchOsint]

⭕️ The moment Yemen's Ansarallah shot down a Saudi AH-6i Helicopter over Najran, using a surface-to-air missile.

[Samson Serious @SamsonSerious]

Another banger, I’m afraid

[NOAH @NoahGairn]

The CCG, undoubtedly, knows how to show off.

[April Huggett @AprilHuggett]

I had a passionate speech about the betrayal from the #Trump administration but russians sent aerial bombs into #Kramatorsk.

All I can say is help us survive the winter.

https://t.co/zGWhZIFlTL

[AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 @AMK_Mapping_]

Everyone always talks about how chaotic the frontline is, and what is called the "death of the conventional frontline" in Ukraine, but I thought I should make a visualisation to show you all what that might actually look like.

This is a map showing my view of where each side may hypothetically be holding a position in the Kostyantynivka direction, to give you an idea of how deep this "infiltration zone" goes.

When someone asks "why cant you just map all of Kostyantynivka as under Russian control if the Ukrainian positions there aren't militarily significant anymore", this is what I mean when I say Ukraine still holds too large of a presence. Obviously this map isn't designed to show exact areas where positions are held, but it's based on my interpretation of what the situation could theoretically look like.

I also think this visualisation gives a good idea of the criteria I have for what should be considered a "control zone, a "grey-zone", and an "infiltration zone".

[Jompy @Jonpy99]

Unfortunately in the few weeks after the latests image I got of the 349th, this base has also seen a massive increase in stored equipment.

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

Map Updates🧵(1/3) ⬇️

Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk and southwest of Orikhiv.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Holubivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 14. Russian forces concentrated assaults toward Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Orikhiv. The Ukrainian 17th Army Corps reported on October 15 that Ukrainian forces control Novoandriivka, refuting previous Russian claims. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 14 and 15 but did not advance.

[おちりぷりん @Southwood_]

https://t.co/u9eH6a8ndK
ウクライナの人が自分の装備と一緒に写真を撮っています

[WW3finalboss @WW3finalboss]

Still one of the most epic discombobulations of Russian armour I've seen

[highprogressive🥂👁️ @highprogressive]

“Zelensky is bombing oil factories to harm republicans in the midterms”

[Faytuks Network @FaytuksNetwork]

Romanian President Nicușor Dan confirms drones struck two chemical tankers near Romania’s Black Sea coast. Seven sailors remain missing from Wine Trader. Yara J’s crew is safe. Spanish F/A-18s and Romanian F-16s were scrambled amid the drone incursions into Romanian airspace.

[Woofers @NotWoofers]

Ukrainian airports have been shut for four and a half years. I think it’s fair to offer the Russians reciprocation or mutual reopening.

Indeed there are many things that can be reciprocated which are currently not happening if it is deemed to be beneficial to the war effort.

[imi (m) @moklasen]

RU 29th Army using a fundraised ATV to dump gravel into the river to restore the crossing in Velyka Novoselivka after the ukrainian airstrike destroyed the temporary bridge and pontoon link.
47.834445, 36.828881
@UAControlMap
https://t.co/rEKLCToDqK

[Reliona @relionwastaken]

western cat: stupid, lazy, irresponsible, probably anti-vax

turkish cat: smart, doesnt miss a pediatrician appointment, pro-vax

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

MORE: Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi continues to generate cascading effects on neighboring sectors immediately north and south of the Lyman area. Biletskyi reported that Ukrainian counterattacks forced the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) to redeploy elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction, easing the pressure on Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) — as ISW recently forecasted.

ISW has also observed evidence that Ukraine’s successes during Operation Vivaldi are creating cascading effects for Russian operations north of Lyman in the Borova direction while also hampering Russian efforts to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the east.

The Russian Southern GoF has slowed its offensive tempo toward Slovyansk from the east, potentially to regroup its forces. The Russian military command likely intended for offensive operations east of Slovyansk to synergize with the Russian Western GoF’s efforts against Slovyansk from the northeast — the effort that Ukrainian forces thwarted during Operation Vivaldi.

Ukrainian forces have also been counterattacking east of Slovyansk, which, combined with the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could further halt the Russian drive toward Slovyansk from the east entirely.

[Rob Lee @RALee85]

The results of a Ukrainian Neptun strike from overnight. Russian glide bombs remain a serious problem for Ukrainian brigades on the front line, and Su-34M bombers are a priority target.

[kriegsforscher @kriegsforscherD]

It’s been a while I have posted something. Need to say I am a little bit busy right now with my project that will be presented closer to end of the year. But here is some interesting data to think about🔽

One Russian CAA has limitations in terms of how much drones they can use per month (like with shells for artillery). Need to say that that CAA operates at a calm part of the frontline:

- RF FPV: 6853;
- RF fixed-wing FPV: 1611;
- RF heavy copter type FPV: 1355;
- fiber optics FPV: 558

In general 10 377 FPVs per month. FO FPVs became popular since 2024 and were told multiple times that they will dominate the space. It’s the end of the 2026 and the % (of course it depends on the part of the frontline) of FO drones is around…5%.