CHAOS. CRUELTY. CORRUPTION.
EPSTEIN. EPSTEIN. EPSTEIN.
AFFORDABILITY.
AFFORDABILITY.
AFFORDABILITY.
#8647
VOTE! VOTE! VOTE! for
DEMOCRACY.
DECENCY.
DEDICATION.
VOTE! IN MASSIVE NUMBERS LIKE THE FUTURE OF ALL THAT IS GOOD DEPENDS ON IT ... BECAUSE IT DOES!
Stephen Miller becomes White House Chief of Staff tomorrow, and from where I’m sitting, it looks like the man about to run the White House was bought and paid for before he walked in the door. I followed the money around him and his wife Katie, and it leads to Elon Musk, a foreign government’s lobbyists, her father’s mailbox and investors nobody is allowed to see.
Full article is up on my Substack now (link in bio and it's free). Highlights below:
🚩 Red Flag 1: A dark money group funded by Elon Musk sent $43 million to a group that Miller’s own charity controls. That is Musk money flowing into Miller’s political machine, and none of it has to be disclosed to you.
🚩 Red Flag 2: Musk’s super PAC paid Katie Miller’s firm $884,367, and some of that money came while she was working beside him at DOGE. She was on his payroll and inside the government at the same time.
🚩 Red Flag 3: Katie bought more than $1 million of stock in Musk’s AI company one business day before the Pentagon announced it would use that AI. The trade was never reported, and the rules say it should have been.
🚩 Red Flag 4: Abu Dhabi’s state AI fund owns a piece of that same company. Eight days before Miller got the job, a firm in the same consulting group Katie came from signed a $100,000-a-month contract with the UAE. So, a foreign government now has money on both sides of this household.
🚩 Red Flag 5: Miller was paid $202,000 through a family company listed in his father-in-law’s name. Its clients were the Trump campaign and the Trump-Vance transition, and the transition still won’t say who its donors are. So we don’t know whose money paid him (owns him).
🚩 Red Flag 6: The dark money group Miller’s charity controls paid $156,000 to Borglum LLC, a company with no Florida registration and no named owner. Its address was box 361, the same mailbox as that family company. Based on the records, I think that donor money landed with the Millers.
🚩 Red Flag 7: Katie Miller’s podcast gets about 15,000 views an episode, yet her podcast company has 3,333,333 preferred shares for investors who never have to be named. Nobody puts money into a 15,000-view podcast for the ratings. So who bought in, and what did they get?
🚩 Red Flag 8: About $1.4 million in their kids’ accounts disappears from his ethics form with no sale reported, and a sale of stock in a Pentagon-backed company was reported at less than half of what it was worth. That form is the only way the public can see what the Chief of Staff owns, and it doesn’t match the money.
Any one of these might have an innocent explanation. But eight of them around the most powerful staffer in the White House shows a pattern, and the public deserves to know who is paying him.
The full article is up now on my Substack (link in bio) with every receipt, including the filings, the mailbox records and the UAE contract.
Enjoy!
X और Twitter की लड़ाई अब एक ऐसे मोड़ पर पहुंच गई है, जहां Elon Musk को अपने ही पुराने ब्रांड के लिए कानूनी चुनौती मिल रही है!
जिस Twitter को उन्होंने X बनाया था, अब उसी Twitter को वापस लाने की तैयारी हो रही है।
मामला सिर्फ नाम का नहीं बल्कि अरबों डॉलर की ब्रांड पहचान का है।
अमेरिका की एक Startup कंपनी Operation Bluebird ने दावा किया है कि Musk की कंपनी ने..1/2
BREAKING: 🇷🇺🇮🇱 Russian Defense Ministry Tu-154M lands at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv
The aircraft, registration RA-85042, belongs to the 223rd Flight Unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense and flew from Chkalovsky Air Base in Moscow.
Charlamagne tha God: “The Big Beautiful Bill kicks in in January. When people start losing their healthcare, don’t think that’s the fucking Democrats. That was the motherfucking Republicans who voted in the Big Beautiful Bill. That is Donald Trump’s bill and it kicks in in January”
🚨HOLY SMOKES: Danish MEP Anders Vistisen to Trump:
“Let me put this in words you might understand: Mr. President, fuck off.”
Europe is officially done pretending this is normal diplomacy.
lsraeI’s Mossad was caught spying on Italian PM Meloni and senior officials to gather blackmail for extortion.
lsraeI is doing this to every politician.
⛔️Meanwhile in the land of the free‼️⛔️Check out the beating that a U.S. police officer gave to an elderly man just because he lied about his real name during a traffic stop in Lewiston, Maine (USA)—right there on the street, he lands 5 blows to the head.‼️
How is Russia's network inside Spain organised, and how does it push content?
Our 11-week analysis of Spain's information space shows three layers.
Layer one: the hub. A Telegram channel run from Moscow by Enrique Arias Gil, a Spanish political scientist living under Russian protection. It is small, about 500 readers per post. Its job is not reach. Its job is production: translating Russian hacktivist attack claims into Spanish within the hour, publishing recruitment offers for informants, hackers and soldiers, and doxxing Spanish security personnel.
Everything above it is Russian. Everything below it is built to look Spanish.
🇺🇦🇷🇺 PUTIN PROTECTS HIS PRIVATE PALACE WHILE UKRAINE STRIKES THE FACTORIES PRODUCING RUSSIA'S AIR DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY.
A Ukrainian missile strike against a Russian military electronics manufacturer has raised an uncomfortable question about Moscow's defensive priorities: why are so many air defense systems reportedly protecting Vladimir Putin's residences while strategically important industrial facilities remain vulnerable?
The target was Proton-Electrotex, a factory in Oryol associated with the production of electronic components used in Russian military systems, including Iskander missiles and air defense equipment.
According to accounts of the operation, Ukrainian coastal missile units launched Neptune cruise missiles against the facility approximately 185 kilometers inside Russian territory.
A Russian military channel, Z.O.V., claimed that three of five missiles reached their targets.
Ukraine's General Staff reported secondary detonations following the strike and concluded its announcement with a warning: "To be continued."
Oryol Governor Andrey Klychkov acknowledged damage to the premises during what he described as efforts to repel an attack, without identifying the industrial facility involved.
The reported target is particularly significant because the plant produces components associated with the very weapons Russia relies upon to defend against aerial attacks.
In other words, Ukraine was targeting part of the industrial supply chain supporting Russia's missile and air defense capabilities.
The strike also comes amid claims that Moscow has concentrated substantial numbers of Pantsir air defense systems around Putin's private residence in Valdai.
Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk had highlighted the imbalance hours earlier, contrasting the extensive protection reportedly provided to Putin's residence with airfields that may have only one or two defensive systems.
His broader point concerned the vulnerability created when limited air defense resources are concentrated around selected locations.
Once a defensive system is destroyed or bypassed, the infrastructure it was protecting becomes exposed.
The exact relationship between the reported Valdai deployments and the Oryol strike has not been independently established, but the episode illustrates the difficult choices Russia faces when defending an enormous territory against increasingly capable Ukrainian long-range weapons.
And the problems described in Russian accounts extend beyond missile defense.
In another reported operation, three Ukrainian soldiers, including servicemen identified by the callsigns Tank and Gul, infiltrated a Russian rear position, captured a mortar crew and used the captured weapon to fire against Russian lines.
If accurate, the incident illustrates how gaps in rear-area security can be exploited even without large attacking formations.
Meanwhile, separate Russian accounts have raised questions about censorship, corruption and the reliability of official military reporting.
War correspondent Vladimir Romanov allegedly faced accusations of serving enemy interests after describing civilians leaving Russian-controlled Oleshky for Ukrainian-held territory during a truce associated with Melania Trump.
He claimed that 17 buses carried residents who chose Ukraine over Russia. Following criticism on Russian state television, he deleted the account and disappeared from public view, according to the narrative.
Another allegation concerns the reported concealment of approximately 1,000 Russian troops inside a hospital in Oleshky during the truce, followed by claims that Ukraine's 34th Marine Brigade struck the force. The circumstances and casualty figures require independent confirmation.
Russian investigators have also exposed allegations of a military construction fraud scheme worth approximately 12 billion rubles, or $120 million, involving 32 supposedly nonexistent facilities.
Among the alleged projects was an Arctic air-control installation on Wrangel Island, an isolated location better known for its polar bears than military infrastructure.
Russian commentator Kolyasnikov responded by describing the Defense Ministry's problems as an almost unimaginably vast institutional mess.
These allegations emerge alongside reports of sabotage incidents in Europe, including aviation bomb threats and a fire at an arms facility, as well as an extraordinary fraud case in Moscow involving a woman who allegedly transferred $4.5 million to someone impersonating an FSB official.
Russian authorities have also been pursuing control over domestic businesses, including tobacco production facilities.
Taken together, the accounts portray several different pressures on the Russian state: Ukrainian attacks on military industry, difficult decisions over air defense deployments, vulnerabilities behind the front lines, allegations of corruption and efforts to control damaging information.
Not every allegation has been independently verified, and these incidents should not be treated as evidence of a single coordinated operation.
But the strategic issue raised by the Oryol strike is substantial.
Russia cannot protect every factory, airfield, logistics hub, military headquarters and politically sensitive residence with the same concentration of advanced air defenses.
Every system assigned to one location is unavailable somewhere else.
And as Ukraine continues developing longer-range strike capabilities, those choices become increasingly consequential.
The reported attack on Proton-Electrotex illustrates how targeting military production facilities can potentially affect more than the immediate site of an explosion.
Disrupting components used in missiles and air defense systems could also complicate the production and maintenance of the weapons Russia needs to sustain its war.
For Moscow, defending its military-industrial infrastructure is becoming a strategic challenge of its own.