Matin Mirramezani

I manage @StanfordISP's Iran 2040 Project and co-authored the Struggle for Development in Iran (@stanfordpress). Cofounded @Generation_Lab. Views are mine.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

@miadmaleki @USTreasury Thank you so much Miad jaan! Super insightful as always.

[Miad Maleki @miadmaleki]

Hi Matin, this is still about activity: operating in one of the five sectors of the Iranian economy, or knowingly engaging in a significant transaction to or from Iran involving goods or services for those sectors. And for U.S. persons little changes; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations already prohibited nearly all of this. The change is really for non-U.S. firms with Iran related trade. Basically, a non-sanctioned counterparty can still be exposed if it operates in Iranian aviation, crypto, gold, shipping, or tech. So to avoid sanctions risk, you’d need to go beyond list screening and run due diligence on a sector-nexus test on top: who the counterparty is, where it operates, what it does, who the end user is.

The secondary sanctions hook still requires “knowingly” and “significant.” Significant is OFAC’s multi-factor test (size, frequency, nature, management awareness, deception); knowingly includes “should have known,” so looking away doesn’t help. One retail-scale transaction is not the target but the pattern of servicing Iranian sector participants is.

One caveat: OFAC has not defined “operating in” the technology or digital asset sector and issued no FAQs with these determinations, including its usual line that activity authorized for U.S. persons. So until it does, I’d treat the ambiguity as risk.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

@arash_tehran 19.5!? Even the grades can't escape the inflation in the Islamic Republic!

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

Another incredible story that explains the price of oil

[Javier Blas @JavierBlas]

TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne says oil is flowing the Strait of Hormuz “very quietly,” and his company is largest trader of Iraqi/Qatari crude.

Pouyanne says it costs ~$20 million per VLCC per SoH passage (including return) in freight and insurance. TotalEnergies is buying crude inside Persian Gulf at ~$50-$60 a barrel as producers are “desperate” for lifters, making the process profitable.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

Great to be with Dan on CNBC ahead of today’s announcement of renewed US economic pressure on Iran

[Dan Murphy @dan_murphy]

U.S. sanctions can hurt Iran if deployed effectively - @matinmrz https://t.co/Z3yhzhcssm

[Azadeh Mokhtari @AzadeMokhtari]

یک زمانی برای چنین اتفاقاتی جوک می‌ساختیم، اما امروز مشکلات آن‌قدر بزرگ شده که با دلار بالای ۲۰۰هزار تومان و تورم له‌کننده،دیگر کسی نمی‌خندد؛فقط عصبی می‌شود.
قطع #برق کمیسیون #انرژی مجلس هنگام بررسی علل خاموشی‌های اخیر،بیشتر از هر گزارش و آماری،وضعیت امروز کشور را توضیح می‌دهد.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

@mousaei_ir @StanfordISP مسلما، ولی در مقاله به این مسئله می‌پردازیم که چرا ترفند‌های دور زدن تحریم‌ها به اندازه‌ی کافی توضیح دهنده‌ی این روند نیستند. بخش مورد توجه‌تر قضیه تغییر سیاست اعمال تحریم‌ها توسط آمریکا هست. که البته خود اون هم دلایل خودشون رو دارن.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

بحث «فشار حداکثری» دوباره گرم شده، برای همین خواستم چند داده از مقاله‌ی اخیرمون در پروژه‌ی ایران ۲۰۴۰ استنفورد @StanfordISP رو مطرح کنم.

صادرات ایران در سال‌های ۲۰۱۹ و ۲۰۲۰ تحت فشار شدید بودن. اما از ۲۰۲۱ بهبود پیدا کردن و تا ۲۰۲۴ از اوج خود در دوران برجام فراتر رفتن. 🧵

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

این سوال بسیار به جا و مهمه. حکومت به جای استفاده از این درآمد برای اعمال اصلاحات اقتصادی لازم برای مهار تورم، بخش قابل توجه عواید فروش نفت رو، گاها مستقیما، خرج پروژه‌های نظامی و امنیتی کرد.
این نمودار از منابع مالی و ردیف‌های مصرفی بودجه ۱۴۰۴ این روند رو نشون می‌ده.

[navid kf @navidkf1]

@matinmrz @h0d3r_fa @StanfordISP پس دلیل تورم ساختاری ناشی از تحریم های چند شال اخیر چیه؟

[Kerri Bitsoff @kerri_bitsoff]

There are serious limits to the effectiveness of a "look north" strategy, and the fact that Iran is shifting this way shows how dire things are. Tehran is bracing against measures Treasury has not even announced yet, with a workaround already running at its ceiling.

Russia and Iran already trade basic goods across the Caspian, but there are physical limitations. Vessels on the Caspian carry only 5,000 tons vs the 60-80K that a Gulf carrier moves. This route gets Iran grain, fertilizer, industrial goods, and whatever Russia wants to send quietly, but low volumes of all of it. It replaces a single-digit percentage of what the south carried.

Overland routes now carry what used to come through the strait. Rail from China also moves consumer goods. Transshipment through Central Asia can handle some of the sensitive tier (electronics, machine tools, and components that front companies buy for Iran), but you just cannot send as much over land. Think dozens of containers vs thousands on a ship. A train arrives in two weeks and a ship in a month, but replacing one ship takes 50+ trains. These routes are a trickle of what the regime had before alienating its Gulf neighbors.

[Dalga Khatinoglu @dalgakhatinoglu]

مقاله من درباره نقش امارات در تجارت نفتی و غیرنفتی ایران

https://t.co/QvZd8dGQRy

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

در مقاله به این می‌پردازیم که چرا این اتفاق افتاد، مکانیزم تجارت چگونه کار می‌کرد، و بودجه‌ی ایران چه چیزی درباره‌ی مصرف درآمدهای نفتی را نشان می‌ده. همچنین شامل جزئیات جالب زیاد دیگه هم هست. مقاله به انگلیسی در وب‌سایت ما در دسترسه:
https://t.co/3oPFboEv4I

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

روایت ساده‌ای از «فشار حداکثری» که می‌گه ایران یک دهه تحت فشار پایدار محدودیت‌های اقتصادی شدید بوده و هیچ چیز تغییر نکرده، با اعداد و ارقام سازگار نیست.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

In the paper we get into why this happened, how the trade mechanism worked, and what the Iranian budget shows about where the proceeds go. Plus a lot of interesting details. You can find it on our website:
https://t.co/3oPFboEv4I

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

You can find the same pattern in production. And it's worth noting the spike in exports and production just as the price of oil was increasing.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

A simplified narrative of "maximum pressure," where Iran has been under the same economic restrictions for a decade, with nothing changing, is simply not supported by the numbers.

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

The recovery started was broad, both oil and non-oil exports rebounded, with non-oil crossing JCPOA-era levels even earlier in 2022. The trend held through the first 14 months of the 2nd Trump Admin (2025 and into Feb 2026).

[Matin Mirramezani @matinmrz]

Once more into the maximum pressure debate. I wanted to share some data from our recent @StanfordISP Iran 2040 paper.
Iran's exports were under immense pressure in 2019-20. But they started to recover in 2021 and by 2024, climbed past their peak under the full nuclear deal. 🧵