Musa Wali

Kanuri | Born in the Sahel

[Tshego @twintshego_]

“ Messi has never faced England “ that time It’s England who never faced Messi. He reached two World Cup finals, they just never made it there🤷‍♀️

[Andy™ @TheMilanAddict]

What direction is this shit even facing

[Musa Wali @mbwali_]

@aliyuyahas Is usually 10k 😃

[Romeo. 🖤🇫🇷 @societyhatesro]

but make we talk truth if na you fifa give script to miss penalty, do assist, and score from 2-0 down you go fit do am?

[Musa Wali @mbwali_]

Game over

[• @aliyuyahas]

- No show/Change fee - N240.5K (receipt available)
- Airport to Accommodation - N25K (receipt available)
- 2 Nights - N50K (receipt available)
- Accommodation to Airport - N10K (estimated)

N325.5K lost.

I completely understand operational safety comes first, but if you had been honest and announced that there would be a 3hr 20 min delay; not the 1hr, then an additional 50 min & flight arrival at 5pm announcement (for a flight that was to depart 2:30pm), I could’ve bought another ticket at a cheaper cost.

You understand why apology alone isn’t enough right?

I can accept an apology for the wasted time and emotional stress but can it cover the financial cost?

[Erling Haaland @Erling]

Well well well 😂

[Musa Wali @mbwali_]

What a match

[Musa Wali @mbwali_]

Maye

[TG OMORI @boy_director]

Bro what the fvck is wrong with this African teams and not fvcking staying focused!

[Daddy D.O🇳🇬 @DOlusegun]

OFFICIAL: The reduction of import levy on new vehicles from 20% to 10% and that of used vehicles from 15% to 5% in order to ease cost of vehicle importation by commences today.

[Oloye. @Ol0ye]

I miss that Malta refinery.

[Fabrizio Romano @FabrizioRomano]

🌎🇮🇷 OFFICIAL: Aliza Beiranvand wins FIFA Man of the Match Award for Iran against Belgium.

7 saves for the Iranian goalkeeper. 🧱

[Martien 🇳🇱 @MartienBall]

Happy 18 day anniversary to all those celebrating

[🐾 @elsdawg]

a fan has just made an AI alternate version of events if Gabriel had scored his penalty
https://t.co/sGdZxXQPt3

[Ernest Coleman @cole__xy]

Cocaine 1-0 HIV

[Sam Ekpewheni @MadProfitGuy]

Someone said something here that has always been in my left hand.

Said...

"If you want to take a screenshot for evidence, unsave the contact and make the screenshot with the person's number."

The opportunity has come.

[Mujahid Saleh Saad @MujahidSSaad]

Cigiya! Cigiya!! Cigiya!!

ƁARAWON BABUR NE
WANNAN SHINE YASACE MANA BABUR A RING ROAD BAKIN AISHA PLAZA DA RANA.

DAN ALLAH YAN UWA KUYAƊA WANNAN HOTON, GA WANDA ALLAH YASA YA GANE SHI YA SANSHI YA TUNTUBE MU TA WANNAN NUMBER 09037701947-08062377790 GA HOTON SA NAN A KASA.

[Elnathan John @elnathan_john]

Repeated claims like this show how little Nigerians know about their own country. There is enough scholarship on these issues to not make broad and widely debunked claims like this.

First: The claim that the almajiri system functions as a conveyor belt to terrorism and banditry is contested by the most rigorous scholarly work on the subject and there is the work of Dr. Hadiza Kere Abdulrahman @dj_kere whose doctoral research "The Men They Become": Northern Nigeria's Former Almajirai: Analysing Representational Discourses of Identity, Knowledge and Education (2018), involved years of fieldwork and direct engagement with former almajirai. Assuming I read her work correctly, she found that the mainstream representation of the system (which has been repeated in the tweet below) is only "one possible set of articulations and that alternative meanings exist." Other research she has done found no operational extension of say Boko Haram in almajiri Qur'anic schools, and that almajiris themselves "vehemently rejected any moves to join Boko Haram activities." @dj_kere has also argued that the almajiri system's deterioration, is a product of colonial disruption and post-colonial governance failure, not an inherent feature of Qur'anic education itself.

Even in the case of Boko Haram, where the almajiri connection is most often asserted, the evidence does not support a direct causal line. We have the work of @HannahHoechner for example. She has argued in this piece here (https://t.co/XuohhpnSfN) about this. In the article she mentions that "correlation is not proof of causation: That almajirai joined does not automatically mean that almajirci made them join." There is also the 2017 paper, "The Almajiri System and Insurgency in Northern Nigeria: A Reconstruction of the Existing Narratives for Policy Direction," where research shows that "the Almajiri system in itself does not radicalize the Almajirai cohort," but that decades of bad governance have produced a large, alienated, and economically destitute youth cohort who become targets for recruitment — a crucial distinction between vulnerability and causation.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was not himself a product of the street almajiri system: according to Hussain Zakaria (for example in the US Institute of Peace report "Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?", 2014), Yusuf had the equivalent of a graduate-level education, having studied theology at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, where he absorbed Salafi-jihadist ideology from transnational networks — not from classical Qur'anic schooling.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the conflation of Fulani banditry with the almajiri system is especially unsupported. There is ample research here. For example, in "The Other Insurgency: Northwest Nigeria's Worsening Bandit Crisis" (published in Security and Defence Quarterly 2021), the research establishes that that northwest banditry is driven by land-use conflict, Fulani pastoralist "grievances" (quotes mine- you can call it something else), climate-driven competition over grazing routes, and governance collapse — not by Qur'anic schooling of any kind.

Added to that, the Fulani ethnic militia phenomenon has its own distinct social base. If you read the War on the Rocks analysis by @jh_barnett and Murtala Rufai, they have noted that "the majority of bandits have shown little interest in adopting" jihadist ideology, with alleged cooperation between bandits and jihadists being "less meaningful than many observers assume." You can read that analysis here: https://t.co/YM22c3fPhn

As for Boko Haram's actual membership profile, the documentary record points in the opposite direction from the almajiri narrative. Again I urge people to read the USIP report "Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?" of 2014 which documents that as early as 2004, "students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates, and joined the group." This account is corroborated by Human Rights Watch in "They Set the Classrooms on Fire": Attacks on Education in Northeast Nigeria (2016), which records testimony of a local imam urging believers to destroy their educational documents, with university graduates complying publicly. @HannahHoechner's own work confirms that "some members of the group used to be university graduates who tore their university certificates at the beginning of the Boko Haram propaganda" — a fact that fundamentally complicates any simple narrative linking Islamic street education to the rise of the insurgency.

Please people, read, read, read. Especially at a time like this when people are angry and making broad claims.