What happens when a nation's formal alliance commitments intersect with domestic political costs, economic dependencies, and public anxieties about great-power rivalry? 🇵🇭🇹🇼https://t.co/50FnuaRUBt
New out from @CIMSEC: "China is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings," by @AndrewSErickson, @mhbernardo14, Jason Wang, and Pei-Jhen Wu.
https://t.co/81acbIXd0Q
Scrutinizing the wider implications of the growing complexity of PLA amphibious exercises in Sea Control 606. Thanks to @CIMSEC & @BrianKerg : https://t.co/16sRs3oTv0
@ChinaMaritime Report No.52, Everything Everywhere All at Once, published by #CMSI – an examination of the #PLA’s 2025 amphibious exercise using open-source data. Thank you to my co-authors, reviewers, and institutions that made this possible. https://t.co/Al4eSyJuWu
New! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Report #52—“Everything Everywhere All At Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises”
https://t.co/ErujA5zwHJ
Honored to coauthor with Jason Wang, Marvin Hamor Bernardo & Pei-Jhen Wu!
Great inputs from @tshugart3, Mike Dahm, @Ian_M_Easton, Dan Caldwell & @rdmartinson88!
From CMSI Director CAPT @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.):
#China #Military #Maritime Watchers: This is the most comprehensive analysis available of the PLA’s August 2025 amphibious “capstone” exercise.
The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) is pleased to publish China Maritime Report No. 52, “Everything, Everywhere, All at Once”—a detailed examination of the PLA’s large-scale amphibious exercise opposite Taiwan simulating an invasion scenario.
This exercise combined scale, realism & geographic fidelity in ways not previously observed.
Some key takeaways:
⚓ From drills to rehearsal: A multi-phase, multi-axis amphibious operation integrating landings, logistics & command & control into a unified campaign construct.
⚓ Civil-military lift at scale: Extensive use of ROROs, LCTs & other dual-use vessels highlights a maturing solution to amphibious lift—& complicates indications & warning.
⚓ Distributed operations at #Taiwan scale: Activity spanned ~360 km, mirroring Taiwan’s west coast—suggesting deliberate alignment with real-world invasion planning.
⚓ Training in realistic littorals: Inclusion of aquaculture obstacles & anti-landing barriers reflects preparation for complex coastal environments.
⚓ Authored by Jason Wang, Marvin Hamor Bernardo, Pei Jhen-Wu & CMSI’s Andrew Erickson, the report draws on commercial imagery, includes an hour-by-hour reconstruction of the exercise & catalogs participating civilian vessels.
⚓ It also places 2025 in context by comparing it to the 4 previous capstone exercises—highlighting key trends & inflection points.
This report is filled with details & offers insights you won’t find elsewhere.
As the next exercise cycle approaches, this report identifies the operational patterns—& warning indicators—that deserve close attention.
Main Findings
⚓⚓⚓ In August 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale exercise to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. This “capstone” amphibious exercise suggests that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training & preparations for a future Taiwan campaign are becoming more focused, realistic & sophisticated.
⚓⚓⚓ The exercise consolidated elements from previous years into a single simulated operation. It integrated a floating causeway system, anti-landing barriers & obstacles & amphibious Landing Craft Tank (LCT) vessels that landed forces directly onto beachheads.
⚓⚓⚓ For the first time observed, the PLA conducted a phased exercise with simultaneous amphibious landings in 3 distinct locations. Exercise areas incorporated civilian aquaculture obstacles like those expected to be found along Taiwan’s coastline, increasing environmental & tactical realism.
⚓⚓⚓ The exercise occurred at simulated “landing locations” opposite Taiwan, particularly within the Zhangzhou-Xiamen-Quanzhou littoral zone. The locations were distributed at distance intervals comparable to likely wartime beachheads along Taiwan’s western coastline. The total distance between discrete exercise locations was approximately 360 km, roughly the distance between Taipei & Kaohsiung.
⚓⚓⚓ Not merely hypothetical in nature, the exercise reflected a specific geographical & operational focus. It appears to be part of a larger trend whereby the PLA is mapping its exercises onto analogous geography that reflects envisioned targets.
⚓⚓⚓ Future research should explore the potential applications & implications of PLA efforts to train with similar distances & geometries as would be found in prospective conflict zones.
⚓⚓⚓ Starting this summer, observers should scrutinize future capstone amphibious exercises to better understand the PLA’s strengths, weaknesses & underlying operational assumptions.
‘UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS NOT GIVEN FUND’
Sen. Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan was shocked when he learned that there are no allotted funds to conduct the crucial agricultural survey that is used to determine the volume of imports of basic commodities like rice.
READ MORE: https://t.co/Gp3stwooaH
‘HUMANAP SILA NG IBANG PUWEDENG MAGING CHAIRMAN NG BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE’
Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo "Ping" Lacson on Sunday said he is considering stepping down as chairman of the Senate blue ribbon committee due to alleged dissatisfaction from other senators.
READ: https://t.co/XbG62jyGpp
The Senate blue ribbon committee hearing on alleged flood control anomalies set for next week has been cancelled, the commission’s chair and Sen. Ping Lacson confirmed.
READ MORE: https://t.co/grMlRjOPhh
🚨 SWARM ALERT
Imagine YOUR waters swarmed by strangers claiming it’s theirs. Last Wednesday, 17 Chinese vessels encircled BRP Sierra Madre inside PH EEZ. They call it “disputed.” But only one flag belongs. This isn’t distant conflict — it’s invasion at our doorstep.
Former COA Commissioner Heidi Mendoza says she would not accept "under the current setup" an offer to join the Independent Commission for Infrastructure.
"Do you want to work under someone who has questionable voting history?" #ANCHeadstart
Ex-COA Commissioner Heidi Mendoza says she is "not so surprised" at the names that were mentioned during the Senate probe on the flood control mess.
"In the previous audits we have done, those are familiar names," she says. #ANCHeadstart
‘KUNG HINDI KA PA GALIT, BAKIT?’
Former DPWH undersecretary Roberto Bernardo told the Senate Blue Ribbon inquiry that nearly all bidding in the agency was fixed.
He detailed how lawmakers, officials, and even contractors colluded through budget insertions, phased projects and early bidding.
More from this report: https://t.co/iLgMqCzy1D
Honored to coauthor bombshell @ChinaBriefJT article!
“Rigging the Game: PRC #Oil Structures Encroach on #Taiwan’s #Pratas Island”
https://t.co/HAd6qMrLkA
Great to write with Jason Wang, Pei-Jhen Wu & Marvin Bernardo + work with @PLMattis & Arran Hope @JamestownTweets!
Key findings:
🗼 Beijing’s relentless pressure on Taiwan now includes oil rigs: 12 permanent or semi-permanent structures & dozens of associated ships. The structures, which are owned by state-owned firm CNOOC, include 7 rig structures, 3 floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessels, & 2 semi-submersible oil platforms. All are located within Taiwan’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Pratas/Dongsha Island.
🗼 Intruding rigs that exploit natural resources without permission typify maritime gray zone operations conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They are designed to advance territorial claims, establish creeping jurisdictional presence in contested spaces, & shape the operational environment in Beijing’s favor without open conflict—often under the guise of commercial activity.
🗼 CNOOC’s structures could facilitate a full range of coercion, blockade, bombardment, &/or invasion scenarios against Pratas or Taiwan more generally, particularly by enhancing end-to-end “kill chain” (C5ISRT) capabilities if outfitted with sensors.
🗼 Starting in July, CNOOC maneuvered the semi-submersible rig NanHaiErHao deep into Taiwan’s claimed EEZ. It is now only ~30 miles from Pratas’s restricted waters, although CNOOC rigs previously have come as close as 770 yards.
🗼 By operating rigs in a neighbor’s claimed EEZ, Beijing already has succeeded with Taiwan where it failed repeatedly with Vietnam. Persistent Vietnamese protest made the difference on those previous occasions. Failure to protest today risks normalizing sovereignty shaving & encourages further encroachment.