Here is my effort to combine several different strands of thinking about China. Thank you @evansryan202 for the opportunity: From Engagement to Rivalry: Tools to Compete with China via @TXNatSecReview https://t.co/0jckcwoKVK
The Chinese United Front Work Department has had people like Jensen Huang on the radar for quite a while. They built a full data analysis system around the attempt to identify key players in the Taiwan-US semiconductor nexus 1/2 : "Profiles, Network Characteristics, and Recommendations for Leading Ethnic Chinese Talent in the Chip Industry"
@PLMattis on @CNN: “Not only would Jensen Huang be a target, he would be one of the highest priority targets. And you could go across the industry and realize that any of the leadership of these companies, anyone in the C-Suite of these companies is likely to be an intelligence target.”
https://t.co/YflTCS9Ahj
China's shadowy "United Front Work Department" uses an AI powered Big-Data Center at Jinan University to help with expansion of its global influence operations, internal documents reveal. A 160 sqm installation, including six departments use mass OSINT collection and analysis to expand the Communist Party's reach around the world. 🧵 1/6
Estonia's ex-intelligence chief Kross: The Russian areas behind our borders are pretty much empty, and so is Kaliningrad. Everybody is in Ukraine.
The Pskov airborne division near our border has less than a battalion now. Even those are not well trained — Times Radio. 1/
Kross: When Russian jets entered our airspace, NATO jets pushed them out. Article 4 was triggered. No serious incidents since.
I hate the term hybrid operations. Russians blow up stuff, burn down industry and try to assassinate people. That's sabotage and terrorism. 5/
Our look at Alice Huang, the woman at the center of Nvidia's spy scandal. From the world of Shanghai finance to an unreported appearance with Jensen in Singapore in 2013, Ms. Huang's biz background helped her break into global A.I. tech circles.
https://t.co/w8zYn6nk2i
Noam is looking at this the wrong way around.
The pertinent question isn't why PRC intelligence would seek to directly cover someone like Jensen Huang.
The question is why the routine and ubiquitous PRC-intelligence-linked coverage or attempted coverage of literally every other prominent American executive and political principal aren't more widely (un)covered.
1/ Hong Kong Catholics are once again caught between faith and state control.
After police reportedly questioned a church about a Mass for 168 fire victims, the parish removed its explicit dedication to them.
Has even praying for the dead become a political threat?
It's pretty clear that there have been and will continue to be vicious fights within the administration over export controls.
As @tculpan is hinting at, the story here almost certainly involves (1) what was Jensen Huang's influence on export control policy (among other issues), and (2) to what extent did he and Commerce Department officials know that Nvidia chips were being purchased or otherwise diverted for PRC use.
The Huang-Huang story is just an underlying factor that tweaks the motivation element from selfish and commercial to adversary motivated.
The stakes are bigger than the salaciousness.
Commerce hasn’t added a single company to the Entity List in over a year.
That’s the longest stretch without using the trade blacklist in nearly two decades, possibly longer.
It’s not just Megaspeed. It’s a complete shutdown of all regular business. The lights are functionally off at BIS.
Absolutely insane that the Department of Commerce still refuses to place Megaspeed on the Entity List, despite knowing it is run by Chinese spies. It's difficult to draw any other conclusion from this than that Commerce leadership is just utterly uninterested in protecting US national security. Totally disqualifying.
Also, Megaspeed is undoubtedly only the tip of the iceberg. Commerce needs to urgently fix the gaping hole in US export controls that Southeast Asia represents, and at a minimum impose a license requirement for the entire region, and likely for all large-scale orders to untrusted companies like Megaspeed. The fact that Commerce refuses to even block shipments to companies known to be running by Chinese spies is a total dereliction of duty.
And Nvidia claims that they placed Megaspeed on their "block list" and stopped shipping to them in 2025. But if that's the case, why is Megaspeed still listed on Nvidia's website as an official cloud partner? And did Nvidia also stop shipping to Speedmatrix, Megaspeed's subsidiary in Malaysia? This denial doesn't add up at all.
Canada’s value to Beijing lies partly in its access to continental air defence, allied intelligence, interest in the Arctic and supply chains that run straight into the American economy. Coercion of this kind rarely announces itself as a security threat! It comes in through investment, interference and dependency, the grey zone where "guardrails" are tested. Diversifying away from an unpredictable Trump-era Washington is a legitimate aim. Describing China as the lesser risk is a very poor and dangerous diversification strategy, which Canada's allies won't be able to ignore.
I think @DesmondShum is absolutely right about Alice Huang's business career.
Nothing seems to suggest she was actually an MSS officer.
But the MSS definitely sees value in those individuals and does make use of them, especially when aiming internationally.
This is why I hate people just saying "spy" because it can mean anyone from an intelligence officer to someone who was exploited, even loosely.
We also need to distinguish what might an intelligence matter from what is someone who is effective at hustling business.
Good input by Desmond and @steveyates
Desmond's distinction explained:
Alice Huang looks more like a commercial fixer (掮客) who may also have served as a clean-handed front (白手套) for business interests than like a dedicated Ministry of State Security-style intelligence operative.
That distinction is meaningful in Chinese political-commercial jargon: one emphasizes deal facilitation and possible fronting for private or elite commercial interests; the other would emphasize formal intelligence collection and reporting to the state security apparatus. Both roles can overlap in practice, but they are not the same thing.
We should not arm our adversaries. My bipartisan MATCH Act would prevent Communist China from accessing the high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment needed to win the global technology race. It is already included in the Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Congress has the opportunity to pass the full NDAA in the weeks ahead. I urge my colleagues to protect America’s lead from Communist China.
One of the Lievens said to a room of students at Cambridge in 2014 that Crimeans are all Russians anyways so what does it matter.
An ethnically Russian Ukrainian from Crimea stood up and said if our family wanted to be Russian, we would have moved to Russia. We chose to be Ukrainian and to live in Ukraine. The Kremlin has taken that away from us.
More evidence that Commerce’s refusal to implement or enforce export controls may not be a directive coming from the White House.
The White House is reportedly pushing to close the remote access loophole—potentially the single most important thing we could do right now to secure U.S. AI advantages over China—while Commerce leadership refuses to block companies literally run by Chinese spies from receiving AI chips, is not enforcing controls already on the books that are designed to prevent Chinese cutouts like Megaspeed from getting chips, and is actively interfering with ongoing law enforcement investigations involving Megaspeed and Nvidia.
It’s stunning that the White House and Commerce could be on such different pages on export control policy. If the White House can’t get Commerce under control, then Congress has no choice but to launch an investigation into Commerce’s handling of these issues.
A good listen. CEOs everywhere....self-assessment time. The sounds and carefully scripted words of a compromised executive. He knows he is providing talking points provided to him. Like all compromised individuals, he is in a bind. A deep dive damage assessment is required as part of Nvidia's board review. But first...stop the bleed. Ask for the intel reports to build a roadmap. The world is watching. Eyes wide open.@emilychangtv@Kate_OKeeffe
From the @nytimes: “Peter Mattis (@PLMattis), a former C.I.A. counterintelligence analyst, said China’s spy agency had made technology a focus of its activities, seeing it as “the key fight for dominance in the economic world.”
“They’re interested in what’s taking place in technology, in the technical specifications of what’s being built and in shaping decision-making as it relates to those things,” said Mr. Mattis, who is now the president of the Jamestown Foundation, a national security think tank. “Jensen is someone you’d want to influence because he wields a lot of power and is at the crux of a world-shaping technology.”
https://t.co/LuvwlMsNxO
Well stated @PLMattis. Recall Huang's comments that 'China Hawk' is a badge of shame, and that there should be no limits on tech exports to China. He wasn't challenged on this and still remained in the President's 'circle' - and able to influence.