みみた

Reinforcement Learning, Natural Language Processing / 東北大 M1

[Shijimi @Shijimihed]

最近、学会発表指導で感じたことを一つ。
催促してもスライドがなかなか仕上がらず、学会の前々日の夜10時に「添削お願いします」とメールが来たことがあります。何とか明け方に手直しして修正を指示しました。しかし、レスポンスはなく、そのまま発表へ。
発表を聞いた同僚の話では、指摘は適切に修正され、内容は良かったようですが、発表後に「ありがとうございました」の一言もありませんでした。

上級医としては正直、モヤモヤしました。

学会でも論文でも、形になって発表が終わったら、できるだけ早く感謝の言葉やメールを協力者へ送ってください。
これは、仲間と気持ちよく仕事をしていくための、とても大切なマナーです（明日は我が身ですが😅）。
指導・協力してくれた人への感謝を忘れないでほしいです。

[Kimi.ai @Kimi_Moonshot]

Kimi K3 (open weights, coming soon)

[Claude @claudeai]

Introducing Claude Opus 5.

It's a thoughtful and proactive model that comes close to the frontier intelligence of Fable 5 at half the price.

[Kimi.ai @Kimi_Moonshot]

Meet Kimi K3

[Kyome𓅹 @Kyomesuke]

満を持して次世代版のRunCat Neoがリリースされました！オープンソースになり、カスタムメトリクス表示機能が追加され、Claude CodeやCodexのRate Limitをはじめ、好きな情報を表示できるようになりました。何を表示させるかはユーザー次第。
https://t.co/zof3snbMXm

[OpenAI @OpenAI]

Sol, Terra, and Luna, our GPT‑5.6 family of models, are starting to roll out now in ChatGPT, Codex, and the API.

[OpenAI @OpenAI]

GPT-5.6 Sol, along with Terra and Luna, will launch publicly this Thursday.

We’re expanding preview access globally now.

[Anthropic @AnthropicAI]

New Anthropic research: A global workspace in language models.

Of everything happening in your brain right now, only a tiny fraction is consciously accessible—thoughts you can describe, hold in mind, and reason with.

We found a strikingly similar divide inside Claude.

[Thariq @trq212]

I've heard a lot of questions about Fable's availability on subscription plans.

While it will come off subscriptions after July 7th, we aim to restore Fable as a standard part of our subscriptions as soon as capacity allows, as we mentioned in our original blog post.

[Claude @claudeai]

Fable 5 is back.

[Anthropic @AnthropicAI]

We’ve received notice that the Department of Commerce has lifted export controls on Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5.

We'll begin restoring access tomorrow, and will share an update soon.

We’re grateful to our users for their patience, and to everyone who worked with us on redeploying the models.

[Yuma Ichikawa @yuma_1_or]

Fujitsu発の生成AI「PHOTON」を発表🔥

Transformerとは異なる階層言語モデルを採用

不要な計算を削減し, 並列推論を大幅高速化

本研究はACL2026にてOral採択（7/6発表）

Long Context × Multi-Query時代の新たな選択肢になるはず…😎

今後の大規模化に期待してください.

https://t.co/qSp0v3zEfb

[arrow2nd @_arrow2nd]

うちのOpus4.8は、作業途中に自分の部屋をつくって満足してた

[Anthropic @AnthropicAI]

The US government, citing national security authorities, has issued an export control directive to suspend all access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by any foreign national, whether inside or outside the United States, including foreign national Anthropic employees.

The net effect of this order is that we must abruptly disable Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all our customers to ensure compliance.

Access to all other Claude models is not affected.

We apologize for this disruption to our customers. We believe this is a misunderstanding and are working to restore access as soon as possible.

Read our full statement: https://t.co/bwn0sximKZ

[OpenAI @OpenAI]

We heard you wanted to use Codex rate limit resets on your own time.

Starting today, we’re rolling out the ability to save rate limit resets to use later.

We’re starting Go, Plus, Pro, and Business users with one free reset:

[今井翔太 / Shota Imai @ImAI_Eruel]

さすがにあまりにも研究者コミュニティで大炎上しすぎたせいか、AnthropicがFable5でAI開発の出力を通知なしで強制弱体化させる件について、謝罪と方針撤回がある模様。
これはWiredの速報ですが、たぶんそろそろ公式の方から発表があるのでは。
https://t.co/Z7Zb3Cd9ey

[Claude @claudeai]

Introducing Claude Fable 5: a Mythos-class model that we’ve made safe for general use.

Its capabilities exceed those of any model we’ve ever made generally available.

[珠音こころ @tamanekokoro]

Debian津田「su - を差し上げます」

[International Cyber Digest @IntCyberDigest]

‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP.

The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years.

Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box.

The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root.

Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root.

What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk.

Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants.

The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today.

This vulnerability affects the following:
🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root
🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host
🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner
🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root

Timeline:
🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team
🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d)
🔴 April 22: CVE assigned
🔴 April 29: public disclosure

Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module:

echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf
rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true

For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...