I like this three part @coeff_giving framework.
(1) this new wave of philanthropy is big (compared to current giving);
(2) new wave is small (compared to government and markets),
(3) this new wave can do a lot of good (if you can catalyze govt / markets).
A lot of our @RenPhilanthropy playbooks and funds focus on (3). https://t.co/85JR0MZ1k3
@gquaggiotto Very cool. I see a lot of overlap with the approach of Learning Agendas. I love that they included Board Members as a key role, but/and I wish they gave clarity how BMs shouldmanage tension between "rewarding intellectual honesty" and "genuine
partnership with communities"
Two researchers built a free browser extension that finds legal free copies of paywalled research papers, and almost nobody outside academia uses it.
It's called Unpaywall.
Jason Priem and Heather Piwowar launched it in 2017. The nonprofit they founded still runs it, now under the name OpenAlex.
Here's how you use it:
1. Install it in Chrome or Firefox
2. Open a research paper, even one behind a paywall
3. Look at the right edge of your screen
4. If the tab is green, a legal free copy exists. Click it and start reading
5. If the tab is gray, it couldn't find one
That tab checks more than 50,000 publishers and repositories, including university servers and the sites where researchers post early drafts.
Plenty of authors upload free versions of their own papers to those places, and the paywall page never mentions it.
You don't make an account, and you're not pirating anything. It only points you to copies that were legally posted online.
Unpaywall says its users read 52% of the papers they look up for free. Think about how many tabs you've closed at a paywall page when the paper might have been free somewhere else.
What's the last paper you gave up on because of a paywall?
@davidtlang In the area of social sciences, Agnotology is going to need a lot more attention paid to it considering 1) the enormity of its impact and 2) how those drives will have to shift to accomplish their goals thanks to the entrance of AI. https://t.co/apCOT4skDm
We think the world is short of thousands of high-impact nonprofits, and the people to run them.
So we’re launching a Request for Proposals for incubators: organizations that identify promising ideas, recruit and train founders, and support new organizations through launch.
There are two streams:
1️⃣ Scaling existing incubators: For incubators, studios, and accelerators that want to run a larger or dedicated cohort, expand into a new cause area or geography, or offer seed grants.
2️⃣ Seeding new incubators: For individuals or teams who want to start one, especially in geographies where many high-impact organizations could operate but few incubators exist, like India and Nigeria.
Initial applications should take 2–3 hours to complete. Apply by December 18: https://t.co/9w2wxjLPbl
A lot of people were suprised by our putting community violence intervention at the top of this list.
They were right to be. In my latest @CityJournal SS, I explain that it's just not clear how reliably CVI actually reduces violence.
Link 👇
My response to Thompson on criminology’s credibility problem is now out in The Criminologist.
My main argument is that if we want skeptical audiences to trust us, more & bolder public engagement is not enough. We also need symmetric (high) scrutiny, epistemic humility, and serious attention to how our ideological commitments shape what we produce and promote.
https://t.co/b5WrxBwNox
These results cut deep.
When students ask me how to choose a research project, I tell them to look at the intersection of three properties: rigor, relevance, and surprise.
Good research is relevant and rigorous, but also unexpected. Otherwise, it just confirms something people already intuit.
But surprise is not just a matter of taste. It is a core idea in information theory. An unexpected yet verifiable result carries more information than one we anticipated.
As scholars, we are trained to argue that our results are at least a bit unexpected in the introduction of our papers. In social science papers, we usually do this using the classical trick of the two-handed economist.
But an LLM forecast is very different from a narrative argument. It provides a quantitative expectation of what a study might find.
Eva's results show that forecasts on treatment effects of pre-registered studies can be quite accurate. This suggests these forecasts could become part of the preregistration.
In other words, we could start preregistering surprise.
Of course, not all valuable research needs to be counterintuitive or surprising (this applies mostly to breakthroughs). Replication and precision matter too. But these forecasts could help us distinguish between results that confirm our expectations and those that challenge them.
Great job on this, Eva! I think there's a lot of potential here.
Sometimes someone is like "Are you really uncertain of this [obvious thing]" and I'm like "Yes!". The world is hard to understand. There are many considerations. Many 'obvious' things are now 'obviously' false.
What I’m thinking about: evidence that leads someone to change their goal, rather than just their approach, might be the most valuable kind of evidence use there is. My lightning talk proposal for the Global Innovation Conference in Singapore next month. https://t.co/wnSAwQ1GV2
Everyone talks about what AI will do. But almost nobody asks who will pay for the machines. Taking advantage of AI will require an extraordinary amount of capital, from data centers to new power plants. Will that capital be around?
I try to address that question in the first draft of my new paper “Saving for the Machines.”
To show how important capital is to fuel the transition to an AI-based economy, I document how the same technology path that generates 11.7% annual growth when households choose their saving rate optimally delivers only 2.2% when the saving rate remains fixed. In other words, if we experience slow growth over the next few years despite fast improvements in AI, this slow growth may reflect too little capital accumulation instead of a technological bottleneck.
The key to this result is that AI raises the capital share by moving tasks from labor to machines, which requires that those machines are built. In comparison, ordinary technical progress makes labor and existing machines better at the tasks they already perform.
To inspect the mechanism, I start from an accounting identity: the saving rate is the capital share times the ratio of investment to capital income. If I take the evolution of the capital share as given, I can ask how much the latter ratio moves in response to that evolution. Crucially, with an optimizing household, this ratio barely moves. As machines take over tasks and the return to capital rises, the household responds by letting consumption grow faster, by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution times the rise in the return. To pay for that faster consumption, capital must also grow faster by the same amount. So, the household keeps investing about the same fraction of what the machines earn. And since machines earn a larger share of output, the saving rate also goes up. With a fixed saving rate, the same accounting identity tells me the opposite: the ratio falls in proportion as the capital share rises.
Will the U.S. and other advanced economies then generate enough capital? For many reasons, I doubt it. We might end up in a situation where many of the opportunities offered by AI are left on the table. This is particularly important for all who think that AI might get us out of many problems, such as fiscal troubles (like in France) or ultra-low fertility. We need to save for the machines, and it is not clear we can do that.
Anyway, this paper has been long in the making (many months of hard work), but I have learned much from it. In particular, working through the model changed my mind about many issues related to AI. Again and again, my intuition said X, but the math said Y. And math always won in the end. That is why we write formal models.
A nice example is Proposition 5, whose proof is the one I like the most in the paper. With improving machines and strong task complementarity, there is no fixed balanced growth path because the target itself keeps moving. The nice part of the proof is to realize that, after the right normalization, the moving target becomes a fixed point, and the saddle gets steeper as machines improve. So instead of falling behind, the economy tracks the moving BGP more and more closely. A fair amount of ODE work to get there, but a very simple economic idea underneath it once you get it.
The paper is here:
https://t.co/zthH4T6nS3
and the slides are here:
https://t.co/VAsvWd9EQn
Hey @NiskanenCenter - I want to re-watch a recording of your event on evidence use. Can you double-check that it's supposed to be behind a password? https://t.co/5dfZIkWyjf
The end of software secrecy is almost upon us. The death of closed source, and the final triumph of open source.
I should have realized this a few months ago when I successfully decompiled the game of Firefighter from an ancient DOS shareware binary. My robot friend was able to tell it had been written in Borland Pascal from looking at the data layout; it gave me back very readable Pascal code with sensibly chosen function and variable names. I transpiled it to Rust and now ship it as part of my heritage games collection.
The thing is, I thought of this as a fun stunt but didn't have any confidence that the technique would scale up to large, real programs. I have since learned that people are now doing this sort of thing with entire AAA games, which are among the most complex software artifacts ever to be shipped as a binary. If they can be decompiled, anything can be.
This has implications. Massive implications. We need to think about what the world is like when, in general, there is no longer a secrecy moat around almost any software at all.
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Welcome to the MPNL program's new Chair in Philanthropy, Dr. Jamie Levine Daniel! Funded by a collaborative group of donors from across the country, the Chair is the first in Canada, and is a key building block in establishing Centre for Philanthropy at Carleton University.