Tomas Vavro

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[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@gl_sk herr hambalek je uz moderatorom?

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@Jano_Fule Aj ten ziletkovy drot je fake - ziletky objednali tupe cez kamaratovu firmu.

[Марʼяна Безугла (Mariana Bezuhla) @marybezuhla]

Була сьогодні на протестах звечора і до ночі. Дуже багато спілкування, фото, вражень. Лише одна провокація від групки агресивних людей, до 10 осіб, які намагалися перед ж��рналістами зафільмувати мене і знецінити. Сутичка тривала хвилин п'ять. Це не діє. Такі люди шкодять справі. Можливо, їм хтось платить, щоб змістити акценти боротьби. Перевести все в "ги-ги".

А боротьба зараз без перебільшення — за майбутнє.

Мала радянська армія не може перемогти велику.
Російський жорстокий генерал не може очолювати українське військо і міняти міністрів одного за одним.
Президент не може вибирати минуле.

Дякую всім, хто сьогодні реагує.
Не мовчіть.

Кажуть, на протестах було не менше п'яти тисяч. Думаю, завтра буде більше.

[Kristina Berdynskykh @berdynskykh_k]

Kyiv. 2 day pro-Fedorov protest. “I fought for freedom and liberty on the battlefield. And now I’m forced to defend them here? I can’t stand, I won’t remain silent”. #Ukraine

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

triple F - Fuck For Fuel #ruZZianow

[ChrisO_wiki @ChrisO_wiki]

It was probably inevitable that Russians would start offering gasoline in exchange for sexual favours...

"Hi there, cutie 🥰

I spotted you in the ‘Ufa Petrol’ chat. I can see you’re looking for petrol in town

I’ve got four cans of 95 octane Lukoil. We can fuck for it, if you want

If you don’t believe I’ve got genuine Lukoil, I’ll take a photo of the receipt for you right now"

(h/t @albafella1)

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@gl_sk yup, nech urobil Zele xyz dobrych skutkov, uz taha UA do hajzlu otrasnym sposobom. rok dozadu afera s NABU, teraz nie ze svojimi saradami vyhodil “iba” ministra obrany a zahranicia, ale este k tomu den pred mesacnym parlamentnymi prazdninami. pocas plnej vojny. #mjch

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@DarPutinovi @andrewofpolesia Chmaru musia najprv odvolat aby bol civil a mohol ist ako minister. Cela tato fraska je otrasna chujovina od Zeleho. Krajina piatym rokom vo vojne aka tu nebola 70 rokov a den pred parlamentnymi prazdninami si da dalsiu komplet nepremyslenu rosadu...genius...

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@IAPonomarenko Zele shortening periods between his government castlings is something I really can't understand.
With Zeles leadership it's getting worse in regards to the internal affairs and one can't expect anything good from it.

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@MiPo3x Az tu som konecne pochopil tu politiku besneho deda na 4 ci 3 svetove strany. Diky!

[Tatarigami_UA @Tatarigami_UA]

A few more expanded thoughts on the current situation. I'll start from a distance and gradually move toward the center of the issue.

We live in an era where the battlefield evolves so rapidly that if you fall out of the information cycle for even 6–12 months, you'll be shocked by how much has changed. New technologies emerge, geopolitical balances shift, financial situation changes, producing a completely different battlefield dynamics. In such an environment, you need people who can not only adapt quickly, but also systematize those changes and, far more importantly, implement them.

Mykhailo Fedorov was one such minister. Within months, he helped introduce several adaptations that had a tangible impact on the battlefield. Unfortunately, this kind of talent is rare. Yet perhaps even more important than the practical results was the hope he brought to the troops. Hope that things could improve. Hope that change was possible. Hope that someone at the top understood that yesterday's solutions would not solve tomorrow's problems.

This hope was not baseless. It was actively helping shape the conditions for victory.

Now let's zoom out from the Ministry of Defense and look at the broader picture.

Since 2023, I have consistently argued against promoting General Syrskyi to the position of Commander-in-Chief. Even back then, as commander of the Ground Forces and the Khortytsia operational grouping, he was displaying three major flaws that, in my view, outweighed his strengths.

The first was an unwavering top-down approach to command. In this system, even sergeants are not treated as independent tactical decision-makers but as instruments for enforcing the will of higher command. It is a model commonly associated with the worst traditions of the Russian military. Such systems tend to produce higher losses, lower morale, and an environment that can only be sustained through coercion and, in some cases, physical abuse. A brigade commander who refuses to impose such practices is seen as weak and is eventually replaced by someone more willing to enforce "iron discipline," regardless of the human cost.

The second was the systematic construction of a network of loyal officers throughout the Armed Forces. Like many senior figures in politics or military institutions, Syrskyi built a power base. However, in this case, it reached unusually high levels. Officers whose loyalty was unquestioned advanced through the system, while individuals perceived as potential rivals or threats were marginalized. The story surrounding General Drapatyi is one example. Cases involving units such as Skelya, the 155th Brigade, and the Assault Troops under Man'ko further illustrate the consequences of such a system. When loyalty becomes the primary criterion, even poor decisions can be executed without meaningful opposition. And when problems emerge at lower levels, the mechanisms described in the first point ensure they rarely travel upward.

The third was a strong resistance to systemic change. This is largely an extension of the previous two points. Individuals who proposed new approaches, new structures, or new ways to break the operational deadlock were often viewed not as assets but as threats. A loyal network of officers can then create an environment where reformers are either pushed out, sidelined, or forced to leave on their own.

Unfortunately, it appears that Fedorov managed to irritate many entrenched interests. This likely included individuals within the Ministry of Defense involved in procurement, traditionally one of the most corruption-prone areas of government, as well as figures within the military command structure itself. After all, from their perspective, who is this civilian in his thirties to interfere in matters they consider exclusively military?

This brings us to the core issue.

General Syrskyi does not possess the formal authority to appoint or dismiss ministers. However, because of his loyalty to the Presidential Office, his extensive network of loyal officers, and his willingness to execute virtually any task assigned to him, his opinion carries significant weight. Apparently, together with other influential figures who are deeply uncomfortable with change, that weight proved greater than the benefits Fedorov had brought.

Ultimately, however, the decision belongs to the President. Whether to remove Fedorov, whether to retain Syrskyi, whether to continue along the current path, those are presidential decisions. Responsibility therefore rests with him.

And that brings us to a more uncomfortable point.

Despite the concentration of power created by wartime conditions, President Zelensky has often shown an ability to hear public opinion. He reacted to public pressure over NABU. He has, on multiple occasions, adjusted course when political pressure became too great to ignore.

Yet power has a tendency to influence even the most disciplined individuals. No one is entirely immune to it. Years of authority, especially authority exercised under extraordinary circumstances, can slowly distort one's judgment and narrow the range of voices one is willing to hear.

I continue to support the President and believe he should remain in office in accordance with the Constitution. But I am increasingly concerned by the direction in which some decisions are pointing. It is a road that begins with good confidence in one's own judgment, but can gradually evolve into something else entirely.

A road well known from the myth of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@PepaTesarik @andrewofpolesia Okrem ineho napr. preto, ze nebol spokojny so Syrskym a hlavne nedaval asi dost zakazok FirePoint-u s ktorym je Zele nepriamo spojeny. Namiesto toho daval zakazky aj inym a schopnejsim producentom a to serie Zeleho chlebodarcov.

[Anonymous @YourAnonCentral]

@FedorovMykhailo Great work and excellent results; it is a mistake to remove you. Looking forward to your future presidency.

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@DylanMalyasov Several castlings took place and only one element remains the same since beginning.
Statistics is unforgiving. As a quality guy, experience tells me that stats tend to be right. He did overshoot this time. Sadly.

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

Just thinking, that if Zaluzhnyi with unsuccessfull counter-offensive is still so popular, Fedorov is then easily able to became president if he keeps delivering like he is so far. Fingers crossed for UA.

[Rob Lee @RALee85]

“Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to remove defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov, the 35-year-old architect of Ukraine’s wartime defence technology drive, after just six months in the post as part of a major cabinet reshuffle.

Several senior figures close to Zelenskyy said the president had held conversations about replacing the minister as he prepares to unveil his new government on Thursday…

But defence industry officials, senior Ukrainian officials, MPs from Zelenskyy’s party and others familiar with the matter have said — some publicly — that Fedorov had been a barrier to interests seeking to profit from Ukraine’s vast wartime defence budget…

Fedorov repeatedly blocked attempts to steer lucrative procurement contracts to favoured companies, which put him at odds with powerful figures inside Ukraine’s political and defence establishment, said people familiar with the situation.”
@ChristopherJM
https://t.co/D5E0uGNdur

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@TomasVilimec to uz ked aj mantinel ako jeho pasazier povie, ze mu nie je vsetko jedno, amen tma…

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@Fbeyeee Krista, oni sa neponaucia a furt budu zakladat dalsie a dalsie brigady 😵‍💫

[Tomas Vavro @orvaq]

@JanBudaj aj som sa sprvu zhacil, ze ci to nie je moc, ale vsak “zijeme len raz”. hh

[Anonymous @YourAnonCentral]

Also, this is your sign to get your shit together, touch grass, it is what it is. Don't worry about that, if it happens, it happens, so let's defeat them so it doesn't happen, simple.

[Anonymous @YourAnonCentral]

For nearly five years, I've heard this question anytime Ukraine is beating the crap out of Russia, or the EU applies new sanctions: "What if Russia uses nukes?" The answer is, we die, wtf do you mean what if? lmao