Who knew a really long string could make an Entra ID login disappear from the logs entirely? In our #blog, @nyxgeek breaks down how overflowing #Azure's sign-in logging mechanism allowed access tokens to be issued without a single log entry. Read it now! https://t.co/2joOibx3Ia
Check out GoLinHound:
- Discovers Linux & SSH attack paths
- Outputs OpenGraph JSON for BloodHound ingestion
- Integrates with SharpHound and AzureHound data to unveil cross-technology attack paths
https://t.co/HPh2xiiCzl
SpecterOps released "DumpGuard" along with a detailed article on how they were able to bypass Windows Credential Guard in both privileged and unprivileged contexts. I learned a ton about Isolated LSA and friends: https://t.co/Qa4aieDBji
Fact: Remote service and scheduled task creation bypass firewalls on DCs and Win file servers because of SMB tunnelling.
Solution: Create RPC filters that block MS-SCMR and MS-TSCH over named pipes. The latter has 3 UUIDs, so blocking the atsvc pipe is more elegant. #DSInternals
Check out Titanis, my new C#-based protocol library! It features implementations of SMB and various Windows RPC protocols along with Kerberos and NTLM.
https://t.co/GC5wA2y3EO
The DSInternals.RpcFilters PowerShell module for Windows RPC filter management is out! Includes support for the new OpNum matching capability of Windows Server 2025. Looking forward to community feedback.
https://t.co/AhhoyABwri
I've been researching the Microsoft cloud for almost 7 years now. A few months ago that research resulted in the most impactful vulnerability I will probably ever find: a token validation flaw allowing me to get Global Admin in any Entra ID tenant. Blog: https://t.co/jD6EaGtsn3
Check out this new blog post from @_wald0 discussing the fundamental components & mechanics that enable the emergence of critical Attack Paths in Microsoft's increasingly popular Intune product. ⬇️ https://t.co/tPygSMu7go
The Chinese threat intelligence report is here:
https://t.co/X5TEiZHQXa
It’s always nice to see reports from other parts of the world because they can give a different perspective.
That said, the translation I read was super confusing so I’m sure I missed some details
I finished my talk at BHEU! The attack methods and techniques shared in the talk are not a great deal, but I hope this serves as an opportunity to draw attention to the importance of security measures for Intune. Here is the tool released for the talk.
https://t.co/2tVVJuNe4n
FLARE is releasing a tool today that I've been working on over this year that helps break down binaries into smaller functional clusters and uses Gemini to describe their relationships, behavior and the overall malware functionality. It's called XRefer and it is out for you to read about and try out. Check out the write up here, and look below for some examples: https://t.co/qLxJMOgePy
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) on Domain Controllers (DC).
It does not get worse than that. Probably will be included in #ransomware campaigns.
Any technical analysis of CVE-2024-49112 published?
CC: @gentilkiwi@harmj0y@_wald0
Want to run roadrecon, but a device compliance policy is getting in your way? You can use the Intune Company Portal client ID, which is a hardcoded and undocumented exclusion in CA for device compliance. It has user_impersonation rights on the AAD Graph 😃
New #AADInternals version is finally out now:
▪ Moved endpoint related stuff to new module: AADInternals-Endpoints
▪ Added blue team stuff: Get app consent info, find backdoors, convert SID<>Entra ID Object ID, find abusable dynamic groups
▪ Added red team stuff: Get ESTSAUTH cookies, export Intune certificate, invoke PS scripts as system or other users
See full change log at: https://t.co/GpEUaIHfT8
The systems used to intercept those calls were designed, built and installed specifically for the FBI to intercept calls. These systems were working exactly as intended, except being operated by “the bad guys.” A scenario always raised as a reason for strong encryption.