The T-72B3 equipped with the Arena-M Active Protection System appears to have functioned as intended during one of the FPV drone attacks. However, at least one subsequent drone managed to strike the vehicle, likely because the left-side launcher had run out of munitions.
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The first known appearance of the Russian T-72B3A main battle tank equipped with the Arena-M active protection system (APS) on the frontlines in Ukraine.
The Arena-M APS was designed to protect Russian armored vehicles from ATGMs, RPGs and FPV drones. In this case, the system appears to have failed to do its job as the tank was successfully struck by a Ukrainian FPV drone.
The footage comes from the recent Russian mechanized assault near the settlement of Mayak in Dobropilla direction, Donetsk front. The attack ended up in failure.
Let's talk a bit about the feared Vikhr, as it garnered significant attention and recognition during the first two years of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, as well as during the Kursk incursion.
What is the Vikhr? The 9K121 Vikhr (NATO reporting name: AT-16 Scallion) is a Soviet-designed, laser-guided anti-tank missile deployed on most modern Russian attack helicopters (Ka-50/52, Mi-28). The missile has a range of 8 to 12 kilometers and reaches a speed of 610 m/s. Equipped with a roughly 4 to 5.5 kg tandem warhead, current data indicates it is capable of penetrating 700 to 1,000 mm of Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA).
Beyond technical specifications, its combat record is equally notable. One of the primary platforms for the Vikhr is the Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter—two systems whose names have become virtually synonymous in modern military discourse. Between 2022 and 2023, prior to the widespread proliferation of FPV drones, the Vikhr (alongside Lancet loitering munitions and other anti-tank guided missiles) accounted for the majority of destroyed armor. This was largely because helicopter crews could launch the missile from stand-off ranges beyond the reach of Ukrainian man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).
During the 2023 Ukrainian summer counteroffensive, operating in tandem with Lancet loitering munitions, vast minefields, and artillery, the Vikhr fundamentally altered the outcome of the operation. Slow-moving or immobilized Ukrainian armored columns were relentlessly targeted by Ka-52s armed with Vikhr missiles. This period marked the height of the missile's operational success, sharing credit with the Lancet for destroying the bulk of Ukrainian armor. However, this success exacted a toll in two distinct ways: first, the Ukrainian military forward-deployed several Western air defense systems near the front lines during the later stages of the offensive; second, the high frequency of helicopter attack sorties inherent to these engagements exposed the platforms to elevated risk—resulting in a stretch where the Russian Air Force suffered near-daily losses of Kamov helicopters.
During the Kursk incursion, the missile was also utilized by Mi-28 helicopters under nighttime conditions. Numerous independent Western experts, journalists, and even the UK Ministry of Defence noted the missile's effectiveness against Western-supplied armor. Although the system cannot operate in all weather conditions and its laser beam-riding guidance presents certain tactical limitations, the Vikhr remains a highly capable and effective missile overall.