@afrugalinvestor@MrCrumbsbody We still have CUSMA, although now the U.S. has violated it. The real question is whether we’re negotiating a trade deal or something else.
@AmericaExpanded Best bet? Your offers are invitations to destroy our industrial base. It’s the reverse Godfather: you’re making us offers we can’t accept 😉
@beerundbacon@AnnMConnors Majority of trade is free. Each side preserved some tariffs. Would you trade our tariffs for yours? Would you do completely free trade? Or do you want to complain about what you negotiated and champion even bigger double standards? 😉
@KirkWillia13546@Davemac2362 Why walk away from what you describe as the “best” deal? Simple. Your best deal asked us to participate in, among other things, the destruction of our industrial base in order to increase the Mexican industrial base. That may be your best, but it’s not good.
@codypd But the U.S. does, in fact, want to do business with U.S. Your negotiators (when they can stay on the same page) are clear about that. Fair? Also, that business has been very profitable for the US, which is why it’s so huge. Fair?
There is certainly merit in Canada diversifying its trade. No sovereign country should want to be excessively dependent on a single market, particularly one whose political priorities can change with an election.
But I think this argument seriously underestimates the asymmetry of the leverage involved.
Canada can diversify. It should diversify. But diversification is not the same thing as replacing the American market.
Even after Canada’s efforts to expand trade elsewhere, the fundamental reality remains that Canada’s economy is deeply intertwined with the United States through geography, supply chains, energy, manufacturing, agriculture and decades of commercial integration.
And this is where the argument about “weaponizing trade” becomes too simplistic.
The United States has legitimate interests to protect too. Washington is entitled to ask whether the existing trading arrangements remain fair to American workers, businesses and consumers. Canada has every right to defend its interests at the negotiating table, but access to the American market is not a perpetual entitlement that exists independently of America’s own interests.
If Canada responds by diversifying, building domestic capacity and developing alternative markets, that may ultimately make Canada more resilient. That is a perfectly legitimate strategic objective.
But those alternative markets are not charitable substitutes for America. They have their own industries, producers and exporters who want access to Canada. Canada will have to compete for those relationships, just as everyone else does.
And the asymmetry remains enormous.
The American economy possesses vastly greater scale, purchasing power and capacity to absorb economic disruption. Canada can impose costs on American producers, and it can certainly make some American industries uncomfortable. But the ability to impose some reciprocal pain is very different from possessing equivalent economic leverage.
Canada may succeed in reducing its dependence on America over time. What is much harder to demonstrate is that it can replace the extraordinary combination of scale, proximity, purchasing power and integrated supply chains that the U.S. market has provided for decades.
That distinction matters.
Canada can make itself less dependent on the United States.
It cannot simply make the American market economically irrelevant.
So I would be careful about describing this as America pushing its closest ally away and therefore committing a “geopolitical own goal.”
Washington is pursuing what it considers a more equitable and strategically advantageous trading relationship, even if one disagrees with the methods or magnitude of the pressure being applied.
Canada is entitled to resist and negotiate hard and not be seen to be playing politics with realities.
America is equally entitled to decide what terms it is prepared to accept.
The real question is therefore not who can make the other suffer more.
It is whether Canada ultimately concludes that the cost of resisting American leverage is worth the cost, and whether Washington concludes that the concessions it seeks are worth the disruption required to obtain them.
My bet remains that Canada’s diversification will be real and beneficial, but it will take decades to meaningfully reduce its dependence on the American market.
And in that contest, the side with the vastly larger economy, deeper capital markets and greater purchasing power has considerably more room to absorb the scars along the way.
@ChrisbWells@dieworkwear@bruce_arthur Standing up to a country you’ve had decades of free trade agreements with, including the one Trump himself negotiated and celebrated as the best ever.
@BobLonsberry If you don’t like the trade surplus, Bob, why do you buy so much? Do we put a gun to your head or do we trick you or (and hear me out)…is it because it’s very profitable to you?