Enjoyed debating. You just need to believe what management says, nobody has better data than them. Niccol is the best CEO in consumer and has no incentive to sugarcoat. Cathy said closures, transfer, and delivery were about half of 7.9%. Everyone has the alt data, if management was off, everyone would've gone short.
Ok thinking from first principles. High costs mean a store there needs a higher AUV to survive, and the closed ones are the ones that didn't get there. Being below a high local bar doesn't put you at system average. But you told me yesterday you model closed store AUVs in-line with system-wide. You're putting system average on stores you know were underperforming, which gives you $1.03B. Use a realistic AUV and you'd need over 100% retention to get there, so 425 bps can't be right.
Yea the AUV math is the problem. The AUV driver score just shows these stores are in dense areas with a ton of traffic, but that traffic is split between all the stores nearby. You can't use that to say the closed stores were doing near system AUV. They were underperformers sharing traffic, so their AUV was way lower, which means the $1.03B transfer is way too high.
Sure rent and labor are higher in urban areas, but that doesn't change the AUV math. High AUV area doesn't mean high AUV store. If three Starbucks are splitting the same traffic, each one does less. And lagging your sister stores doesn't put you in line with system when those sister stores are already below system. Where's your closed store AUV even coming from? We might have different providers but I highly doubt they're showing a double-digit difference.
How are you saying costs are obviously higher? You're just assuming high costs so system-average AUV works. And your AUV math is wrong. You're leaning on the closed stores having more traffic drivers around them, but by your own numbers 62% had another Starbucks within a mile. That traffic gets split between all of them, it doesn't all go to one store. Split it up, and the closed stores end up way below system, which is exactly what the alt data shows.
Think it's going to be. New entrants are accelerating and taking share like crazy. Caffeine is addictive, and GLPs are a tailwind for caffeine, but people are increasingly switching to energy drinks (more caffeine/$, also a major part of new entrants' menus). Young people are especially switching to energy drinks, so the next generation is going to drink less coffee and the SBUX brand could erode.
@MagicCompounds@CeleritasRe Yeah, everyone knows they bought comp with closures in 25 and that more were coming. If management were actually understating it, everyone has the data and would've shorted it. The share loss to 7 Brew and $BROS is the whole short case.
@CreditCapi@BrokenMoats Why $BROS as the hedge? It trades like a quarter of $SBUX ADV and runs way higher vol, so unless you're vol-weighting it you're not really hedging out factor risk.
Ok cool analysis you guys did, but if you actually look at per-store traffic in these specific trade areas, the closed stores were running well below system average, and even the open Starbucks around them were below average. These aren't more attractive areas, they're just overpenetrated, with multiple Starbucks within a mile. More AUV drivers just get split across more stores, so per-store volume ends up below average.
@CreditCapi Why are you using AUVs in-line with system-wide? Management said they were closing underperforming stores, and if you actually look at closed store traffic data, they were averaging significantly less than system-wide.
@CreditCapi Ok looking forward to it, but doesn’t 483 bps imply that 1) closed store AUVs are running at or above system-wide, or 2) retention rates are extremely high?